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The recent development of communication technology through social media, more 
particularly Twitter, has changed the way that firms communicate with investors. This 
channel has created an opportunity for firms to disseminate their information to investors on a 
real-time basis directly. This thesis aims to investigate whether firms can influence their cost 
of equity (COE) by broadly disseminating their information over Twitter. Employing a 
sample of non-financial firms with a Twitter account, listed on the US NASDAQ stock 
exchange over the period 2009-2015, the thesis comprises several objectives. The first 
objective investigates the effect of firms’ dissemination of financial information (iDisc) over 
Twitter on the cost of equity. The results find evidence that firms’ dissemination of financial 
information over Twitter (iDisc) significantly reduces the cost of equity. These results are 
pronounced for less visible firms that are relatively small in size, have a low analyst 
following and a small number of investors. Highly visible firms are less likely to benefit from 
iDisc influencing their cost of equity as other communication channels may have widely 
disseminated their financial information. Additionally, further tests are employed to 
investigate the influence of news magnitude on the examined relationship. The findings of the 
additional tests show a significant negative association between iDisc and cost of equity. The 
second objective is to investigate whether firms’ dissemination of carbon-related information 
over Twitter, referred to as iCarbon, influences their cost of equity. The study finds that 
iCarbon is significantly and negatively associated with COE. Also, additional tests are 
applied to investigate whether Bloomberg's environmental (ENV) and environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) disclosure scores influence the relationship between iCarbon and cost 
of equity. The findings show a consistent negative association between iCarbon and cost of 
equity after determining the effect of ENV and ESG score. The findings of the thesis 
encourage managers to consider the benefits of directly disseminating financial and carbon 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1! Introduction  
The development of information technology, particularly social media, has proliferated in the 
past decade, opening up new possibilities for information processing and decision making. 
This development of social media creates additional communication channels where users 
share views, exchange news, update status and express ideas on a frequent and timely basis. 
This shift in communication technology has influenced the ways in which firms 
communicate important information to investors (Lee et al., 2015a). Among many social 
media platforms, Twitter has gained popularity recently with investors as a means of 
retrieving firm news, and many firms have increasingly used this channel to disseminate 
material information (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Brunswick, 2014; Lee et al., 2015a). 
In April 2013, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a statement 
allowing firms to use social media, such as Twitter, as an information medium for 
disseminating and discussing corporate disclosures that comply with Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD). This statement follows Netflix’s CEO action of disseminating of 
fundamental information on his social media account, and a debate was held on whether his 
actions had violated SEC regulations. However, this information caused an increase in 
Netflix’s stock price by over 20%. Accordingly, this action has attracted attention regarding 
the use of social media as an important channel for disseminating firms’ fundamental 
information. Given the rapid growth and increasing interest in social media, this 
thesis focuses on firms’ adoption of social media as a channel for disseminating investor-
related information, and its corresponding effect on the cost of equity. 
1.2! Thesis Motivation and Importance 
Social media platforms, such as Twitter, provide firms with various opportunities to improve 
their communications and connect with a large set of audiences including customers, partners 
and investors (Siikanen et al., 2018). These online revolutionary channels also provide a large 
volume of information often called big data that potentially creates value for the firm 
(Raguseo and Vitari, 2018). More importantly, social media channels create opportunity for 
firms to engage in real time basis with investors and improve transparency (Bellucci and 
Manetti, 2017). In recent years, firms have started to consider the relevance of using social 
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media as “an integral component of firm communications” (Blankespoor et al., 2014, p. 84). 
Typically, firms publicised their information through traditional media channels such as the 
press and conference calls. Recently, social media platforms have formed an additional key 
channel for information dissemination purposes. A survey of Fortune 1000 firms found that 
93% of respondent executives believe that management participation on social media is vital 
to attract and connect with investors (Brandfog, 2016). Most notably, the increasing reliance 
on social media among individuals to access firm news and investment advice makes firms 
that fail to participate and connect with investors very noticeable (PR Newswire, 2015; Cade, 
2018). Other researchers (see Lau and Wydick, 2014; Miller and Skinner, 2015) have argued 
that the rapid increase of social media will eventually overtake and weaken the roles of 
traditional media channels by reducing the interest in and resources available to them. 
Meanwhile, social media will become more important. 
Considering the important role of using social media, the current study focuses on a popular 
social media platform, Twitter, which has been used increasingly in practice and in the recent 
literature (e.g. Bartov et al., 2018; Cade, 2018; Jung et al., 2018b). Among other social media 
platforms, Twitter has become a dominant tool for investor relation purposes (NIRI, 2013; 
Elliott et al., 2018; Grant et al., 2018). Approximately 84% of US firms in the third quarter of 
2014 had Twitter accounts, and 70% of them had investor-related tweets (Investis, 2015). 
Twitter, as an information channel, has significantly lowered the cost of communication and 
changed the way investors acquire information (Jame et al., 2016). The platform reduces the 
time that investors expend to “pull” information by allowing firms to “push” their 
information to investors directly and on a fast time basis (Blankespoor et al., 2014). It also 
allows firms to have more flexibility and control over the decision to disseminate firm 
information, where they can choose the time, content and number of disseminated messages. 
These features allow firm information to achieve a wider reach to investors in a direct 
manner, on a timely basis, and at lower acquisition costs (Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
Therefore, it is crucial for firms to acknowledge the benefits of Twitter to satisfy investors’ 
demand for information and improve their firm’s information environment. However, it is 
worth noting that the information provided on this platform should be transmitted in a short-
message format. This feature means that firms use this channel mainly for dissemination 
purposes by highlighting or linking to information that has already been disclosed to the 
public. Whilst previous studies have investigated Twitter effects on capital market activities 
such as stock prices, returns and liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a; 
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Bhagwat and Burch, 2016; Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017; Jung et al., 2018b), by extending the 
literature, the thesis is motivated to investigate the value of disseminating firm information on 
Twitter by examining its association with the cost of equity. 
The motivation behind understanding the effect on the cost of equity is because of several 
reasons. First, cost of equity (COE) is referred to as the discount rate or the internal rate of 
return that is applied on firm’s future cash flows to determine firm market value (El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Lui et al., 2016). Generally, it represents the rate of return that investors require for 
firms’ riskiness and investments (El Ghoul et al., 2018). As such, COE performs as a key 
element in firm investment decisions and the reduction of the COE should encourage firm 
managers to consider the benefit of disseminating firm information over Twitter. Secondly, 
Fourthly, academic literature (Botosan, 1997; Fu et al., 2012) has supported this view, as 
inconclusive evidence has been obtained regarding the effects of firm information on the 
COE. Such mixed results fuel a continuing debate among scholars regarding the effect of 
firm information on the COE (Easley and O'hara, 2004; Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 
2007; Lambert et al., 2011; Cheynel, 2013; Lambert and Verrecchia, 2015). Whilst many 
studies (e.g. Kothari et al., 2009a) examine how voluntary and mandatory disclosure 
influences the cost of equity, the association of firms’ dissemination channels, specifically the 
Twitter social media platform, with investor-related information and COE is still under 
investigation. 
Dissemination plays a critical role in expanding the spread of a firm’s information, and more 
effectively meeting investor demand for information. In particular, stockholders’ demand for 
information is escalated by information asymmetry and uncertainty between investors, which 
result in an increase in the COE (Kothari et al., 2009a). This escalated demand for 
information and its effects on COE motivates both regulators and firm managers to improve 
the transparency of the firm information environment and to attempt to distribute that 
information to a greater number of investors through many information intermediary 
channels. Correspondingly, the SEC has encouraged firms to adopt technology channels as a 
mechanism for disseminating information, in an attempt to improve the transparency and 
efficiency of the market (SEC, 2008). Whilst firms may intend to rely on information 
intermediary channels managed by third parties, such as the press, these channels are inclined 
to provide coverage for firms that have already acquired major reader attention (Miller, 
2006). This means that not all firms can benefit from such dissemination channels to connect 
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with potential investors. Firms, therefore, may use Twitter, an increasingly popular 
technology channel, which allows them to bypass other information intermediaries and 
disseminate their information directly to investors (Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
To examine the association of dissemination with COE, this thesis is divided into two main 
empirical chapters focusing on two types of information that firms disseminate on their 
Twitter accounts. This information is part of firm mandatory disclosure which is already 
known to the market, and which firms are not required to disseminate on Twitter. Hence, the 
effects of dissemination and disclosure can be differentiated. Firms use Twitter messages to 
broaden the dissemination of firm information rather than for revealing new information 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018). That is, Twitter messages are short (limited to 
140 character) and they usually include quotes or links to press releases or conference calls. 
However, Twitter features allow firms to spread the dissemination of firm information and 
enhance investor attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; Blankespoor 
et al., 2014). In addition, theoretical studies (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980: Hong and Stein, 
1999) suggest that the market efficiency of price discovery is not only affected by the 
information content but also by the information means that is used to spread firm information 
across investors. Hence, the speed with which the information is reflected in a firm’s price 
depends on the number of investors who become informed in a timely manner (Twedt, 2016). 
Firm dissemination via Twitter allows firm information to reach a large set of current and 
potential investors (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018). Twitter features should 
improve the dissemination of firm information available to the market and may influence 
investors’ beliefs about the firm’s COE. By improving investor recognition and reducing 
information acquisition costs, which limit investor attention, the broader dissemination of 
information via Twitter should enhance investors’ information, reduce information 
asymmetry and hence influence the COE 
The first empirical chapter focuses on financial information, which firms increasingly 
disseminate on Twitter (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Elliott et al., 2018; Jung et al., 2018b). This 
type of information receives stronger interest from investors, who find Twitter an important 
medium with which to look for such information (see Elliott et al., 2018). Alternatively, 
firms’ managers are required to communicate with market participants and report this type of 
information (Loughran and McDonald, 2014), providing that this information influences 
investors’ decision making and investment behaviour towards the firms by allowing investors 
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to evaluate their financial performance, future cash flow and market value (Botosan, 1997; 
Barth and Schipper, 2008; Fu et al., 2012; Schreder, 2018). Overall, financial information 
results in many economic consequences, and managers increasingly disseminate the 
information on Twitter to meet investor demand for the information (García-Sánchez and 
Noguera-Gámez, 2017; Grant et al., 2018). Thus, the study examines the association between 
the dissemination of financial information (iDisc) on Twitter and the COE. 
Traditionally, a firm’s financial information has always been viewed as the key component of 
their value and the sole interest of investors. However, in the current knowledge-based era, 
non-financial information has increasingly gained importance within a corporation. In the 
second empirical study of this thesis, the focus is placed on a type of non-financial 
information being disseminated on the Twitter platform, i.e. carbon-related information. 
Environmental issues and liabilities related to climate change and carbon emissions have 
attracted growing research interest, given the major impact they have on ecosystems and 
human lives and health (Giannarakis et al., 2017). This interest has become increasingly 
important to many firms, with some being penalised by investors for not reporting carbon 
information (Matsumura et al., 2014). Recently, Volkswagen lost billions of dollars in 
penalties, fines and repair costs for their emission scandal. This scandal has harmed the firm’s 
business in many countries (El Ghoul et al., 2018), whereas firms with better complying of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) help firms to enhance their reputations and value which 
can lead to reduce the cost of equity (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cahan et al., 2015; Byun and Oh, 
2018). Besides this backdrop of costs, closer attention from investors, media, regulators and 
environmental groups motivates many firms to make strategic investments to improve their 
environmental performance (El Ghoul et al., 2018) and consider climate change as part of 
their management strategy (Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Sprengel and Busch, 2011). As 
Ng and Rezaee (2015) point out, “this interest has created opportunities and challenges for 
firms in their risk-return relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders” (p. 128). It 
also creates growing pressure on managers to comply with shareholders’ information 
demands and gain legitimacy among their stakeholders. In particular, social media (e.g. 
Twitter), can be a suitable channel for firms to engage with stakeholders and a potential 
legitimation tool (Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Deegan, 2019). Thus, managers have 
incentives to meet investor demand of information and gain legitimacy by strategically 
conveying messages about carbon related information.  
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Prior literature (Bellucci and Manetti, 2017) notes that Twitter can be a suitable 
communication channel for stakeholder engagement, and an instrument for legitimatisation. 
Others (Adams, 2002; Deegan, 2002; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017) also suggest that firms can 
use these instruments to impact the perceptions of stakeholders and society, and reduce the 
regulatory cost. As such, firms can use Twitter to disseminate carbon-related information to 
enhance society’s and stakeholders’ perceptions about the firm and also to enhance the firm’s 
image (Clarkson et al., 2011; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017). Disseminating carbon-related 
information over open platforms such as Twitter also allows firms to gain legitimacy by 
demonstrating that they are environmentally responsible organisations (Stanny, 2013). That 
is, Twitter allows firm information to reach a broad audience, including market participants, 
stakeholders and environmental support groups who care about climate change and firms’ 
environmental information (Lee et al., 2015). As such, dissemination over Twitter also allows 
firms to engage and improve dialogue with multiple audiences over carbon-related 
information, which enhances social support and the perceived legitimacy of firms (Seele and 
Lock, 2015; Lee et al., 2018b). Consequently, the second empirical study focuses on the 
dissemination of information related to carbon emissions and climate change. Specifically, 
the study examines the effect on the COE of disseminating carbon-related information. 
Given the importance of understanding social media in information communication 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Miller and Skinner, 2015; Cade, 2018), the thesis is justified by 
the call of Kothari et al. (2009a) for more research into “technological innovation […] and 
changes in disclosure channels and the number and type of information intermediaries that 
continue to reshape disclosure and financial reporting practices and create new and exciting 
opportunities for research” (p. 1667). The thesis also follows the call of Jia et al. (2016) and 
Deegan (2019) for a study of the role of social media as a channel to connect audiences 
with firms, which is likely to influence corporate practices towards environmental issues 
and reporting.  
Furthermore, the empirical studies will be based on the United States (US), as it is one of the 
leading countries in addressing regulations pertaining to firms’ use of social media platforms. 
In addition, firms in the US show a higher adoption of social media (Zhou et al., 2015) and 
early use of these platforms to disseminate firm information (Jung et al., 2018b), which 
provides better coverage during the sample period. This thesis focuses specifically on firms 
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that are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange, because of its relevance to this topic.1 
Specifically, NASDAQ is one of the main stock exchanges in the US after New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). It is also one of the major technology focused stock exchange in the US. 
Many technology firms are traded on the NASDAQ (Chen et al., 2010; Leuz and Wysocki, 
2016), those which have a greater likelihood of adopting new technology, and hence a higher 
probability of adopting Twitter (Debreceny et al., 2002; Blankespoor et al., 2014; Lee et al., 
2015a). Compared to the other main stock markets, such as the NYSE, the NASDAQ is 
dominated by relatively small firms, usually with a weaker information environment and a 
lower number of analysts following them (Bushee et al., 2010; Dang et al., 2018; 
Meshcheryakov and Winters, 2019), and hence face higher visibility concerns than firms in 
NYSE (Bushee and Miller, 2012). This concern is relevant for this study because information 
dissemination on the Twitter platform can increase a firm’s visibility and information 
environment (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Overall, the sample of the thesis provides a proper 
setting to examine the influence of disseminating financial/carbon-related information. 
In essence, the thesis helps to extend the literature on the role of social media as an 
intermediary channel in the capital market, and provide a better understanding of how social 
media shapes firm information environment. Subsequently, the next section discusses the 
thesis aims and objectives.  
1.3! Research Aims, Objectives and Questions 
The thesis aims to investigate whether firms’ dissemination of investor-related information 
through social media, particularly Twitter, has real economic market consequences. To assess 
this impact, the thesis empirically examines the impacts of disseminating two components of 
firm information, i.e. financial information and carbon-related information, on the COE. The 
thesis will assist researchers, managers and policymakers to understand the value added by 
information dissemination through Twitter, especially regarding firm equity financing. It also 
investigates the use of Twitter in enhancing the spread of firm information to existing and 
potential investors by providing a smoother access channel for information. Therefore, the 
aim of the thesis is to achieve the two following empirical objectives: 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
1 NASDAQ – National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations. 
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1)! To investigate the association between a firm’s dissemination of financial 
information (iDisc) on Twitter and the cost of equity (COE). 
This study seeks to find a significant association between firms’ dissemination of 
financial information on Twitter and the COE. The study also investigates whether the 
association differs for highly visible and less visible firms. Less visible firms are 
usually neglected by the media, market participants and financial analysts; hence their 
small size and lower COE, as their information is less likely to reach a broad number 
of investors (Bushee and Miller, 2012; Blankespoor et al., 2014). In contrast, highly 
visible firms are usually followed by financial analysts and have more media 
coverage. These firms tend to be large in size, have higher liquidity and lower COE. 
As such, firms that are less visible can benefit more from disseminating financial 
information over Twitter by reaching a larger set of current and potential investors. 
Furthermore, an additional investigation is conducted on whether news magnitude or 
tweet tone influence the association between dissemination of financial information 
(iDisc) on Twitter and the COE. 
2)! To investigate the association of a firm’s dissemination of carbon-related 
information (iCarbon) on Twitter and the cost of equity (COE). 
This study aims to empirically examine whether disseminating carbon-related 
information on Twitter influences firm equity financing. Prior literature (Lee, Oh and 
Kim, 2013) has shown that firms that are more environment-ally responsible are more 
likely to adopt Twitter for stakeholder communication purposes. That is, Twitter 
allows firms to benefit by being more environmental responsible by increasing 
stakeholder awareness of their environmental activity. Furthermore, firms that are 
more environmental responsible receive more positive news and have a better media 
image (Cahan et al., 2015). Therefore, the study investigates whether firm 
environmental (ENV) and environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting 
scores influence the association between a firm’s dissemination of carbon-related 
information (iCarbon) on Twitter and the COE.2  
Financial and carbon information is known to the market as firms are required to report this 
information to the public. In addition, financial information is part of the mandatory 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
2 The reporting scores reflect the amount of information that is reported by the firm about environmental (ENV) 
and environmental, social and governance (ESG) information and made available to the public. 
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disclosure requirement. In the case of carbon-related information, firms that emit at least 
25,000 metric tons of CO2 are mandated to report their emissions to the market. However, 
firms are not required to disseminate the information over Twitter, which means that the 
effects of dissemination and disclosure can be differentiated (Jung et al., 2018). Hence, 
financial and carbon-related information are relevant for the study. Furthermore, firm 
dissemination over Twitter can be viewed as an extension of the firm’s disclosure strategy 
(Jung et al., 2018). Information about financial and carbon emissions can aid market 
participants in evaluating firms’ riskiness, which allows them to make better investment 
decisions to maximise their wealth. This type of information has an influence on firms’ value 
and the COE (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim et al., 
2015; El Ghoul et al., 2018). Both financial and carbon- related information attract great 
interaction from market participants (Ng and Rezaee, 2015). To achieve these aims and 
objectives, the following research questions are addressed in the thesis: 
1)! Does firm dissemination of financial information (iDisc) on Twitter influence firm 
cost of equity? 
2)! Does firm dissemination of carbon-related information (iCarbon) on Twitter influence 
firm cost of equity? 
1.4! Findings of the Thesis 
1.4.1! The effect of Twitter dissemination on cost of equity 
The first empirical study examined whether a firm’s dissemination of financial information 
(iDisc) on Twitter impacts their COE. By using a sample of 584 non-financial firms with 
Twitter accounts that are listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange, representing 1,737 
observations, for the period 2009-2015, the study found that the dissemination of financial 
information on Twitter has a significant negative association with firm COE. The finding 
implies that enhancing the broadness of firm financial information through dissemination 
over Twitter allows firms to reduce their equity financing. The study collects some of the 
“big data”, equal to 1,197,208 tweets from 584 firms’ Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. 
The selection of the sample period allows us to avoid the financial crisis that caused a 
macroeconomic shock between 2007 and 2008. Although Twitter was launched in 2006, its 
popularity grew particularly in 2009 (Marwick and Boyd, 2011; Zhou et al., 2015). 
Moreover, a small number of selected sample firms adopted Twitter before 2009. The study 
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also found that this effect of disseminating financial information (iDisc) over Twitter on COE 
is more pronounced for firms that are smaller in size, have a lower number of analysts’ 
fellowship, and a smaller number of shareholders’ investors. In other words, the effect of 
iDisc on COE is stronger for less visible firms that have a lower information environment and 
a greater need for additional channels of information dissemination. In addition, the study 
examined whether the news magnitude influences the association between iDisc and COE. 
Consistent with firms’ strategic disclosure behaviour, the study expected that firms that 
missed an earnings forecast would have lower incentive to disseminate their news. The study 
also examined whether the tone expressed in iDisc tweets would influence the association 
between iDisc and COE. The empirical findings showed that iDisc is consistently negative 
with COE, whereas news magnitude and tweets tone had no significant influence on the 
results. Furthermore, the study showed that the effect of iDisc on COE is consistent, after 
using a different estimation measure for COE and iDisc and also considering additional 
control variables. For example, the results show that iDisc tweets that include hyperlink to 
more information (iDisc_Hyperlink) and that are disseminated to larger number of audiences, 
more specifically followers, (iDisc_Followers) have significant negative associations with the 
COE. Overall, the study found that the dissemination of financial information on Twitter 
allowed firm information to reach a broader number of investors directly, at a lower cost and 
with better accessibility, which, as a result, reduced the firm’s COE. 
1.4.2! The effect of carbon dissemination on cost of equity 
The second empirical study examined whether a firm’s dissemination of carbon-related 
information on Twitter has an impact on their COE. By using a sample of 584 non-financial 
firms with Twitter accounts that are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange, representing 
1,737 observations, for the period 2009-2015, the study found that the dissemination of 
carbon-related information (iCarbon) has a significant negative association with firm COE. 
This finding indicates that firms that gain legitimacy among stakeholders by disseminating 
their carbon information through Twitter to a broader set of potential investors, including 
environmentally concerned groups, are compensated with a lowering of their equity 
financing. The study also examined whether a firm’s environmental (ENV) or environmental, 
social and governance (ESG) reporting scores have an influence on the effect of iCarbon on 
COE. That is, whether firms with better ENV or ESG reporting have greater incentive to 
disseminate their carbon-related information on Twitter. The findings showed that the impact 
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of iCarbon on COE is not influenced by firm ENV or by ESG reporting scores. These results 
indicate that dissemination has its own capital consequences to influence COE, which is not 
affected by the scores of firm ENV or ESG reporting. The robustness test of the study also 
shows consistent findings by considering different estimation measures for iCarbon. For 
instance, tweets with hyperlink facilitate easy access for more information. The result shows 
that iCarbon tweets that include hyperlink reduce the COE. Taking the retweet feature on 
Twitter, tweets are usually retweeted when other users want to share the information and 
show agreement and support for the information (Boyd et al., 2010; Recuero et al., 2011). As 
such, the retweet may improve the validity of the tweet causing greater impact on investor 
behaviour and perception (Cade, 2018). The findings of the study show that iCarbon tweets 
that are retweeted (iCarbon_Retweet) have a significant negative association with COE. 
Furthermore, the findings of the robustness check show consistent negative association by 
considering different COE measures and including additional control variables. Overall, the 
findings provide evidence that the iCarbon assists firms to reach a large group of audiences 
including current and potential investors and environmental concerned groups, allowing them 
to learn about firm carbon information, and hence, reward these more legitimate firms with a 
reduction on their COE. 
In conclusion, the thesis found that dissemination of both financial and carbon information 
reduces a firm’s equity financing. This thesis contributes to recent literature on firms’ use of 
Twitter to disseminate financial information by showing that tweeting financial and carbon 
information is meaningful and beneficial to investors, as well as firms, by reducing the COE.3"
1.5! Contribution of the Thesis  
By meeting the objectives, the thesis contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Much 
research has examined the influence of disclosure level and the quality of different types of 
disclosure, including management forecast, financial, environmental, social and intellectual 
disclosures (e.g. Botosan, 1997; Botosan, 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim and Shi, 2011; 
Mangena et al., 2016), and disclosure channels such as corporate websites and conference 
calls (Zhao et al., 2009; Orens et al., 2010). There is little evidence on firm dissemination of 
information activity and social media, i.e. Twitter. By investigating this association, the thesis 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
3 In order to control the endogeneity problem between iDisc or iCarbon with COE, the study employs the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) model and dynamic panel GMM estimator. The study also uses variance inflation 




also extends the studies that explore the importance of a firm’s use of Twitter for the 
information environment and capital market. Prior researchers have examined the 
consequences of the dissemination and announcements of corporate news through Twitter on 
capital market characteristics, such as returns, liquidity and information asymmetry 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a; Prokofieva, 2015; Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017; 
Jung et al., 2018b). These studies show firm activity over Twitter can result in a reduction in 
information asymmetry and improvement in market liquidity among US technology firms 
and Australian listed companies (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015). Further studies 
(Lee et al., 2015a; Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017) show that Twitter activity can attenuate 
negative market reaction, such as product recall and acquisition announcements. Meanwhile, 
Jung et al. (2018b) examined firm strategic decision to disseminate earnings news. It is still 
unclear whether firm dissemination activity over Twitter has an impact on the COE. 
“The first empirical study contributes to the literature by examining the effect of firm 
dissemination of financial information (iDisc) over Twitter on the COE. The study also 
extends the literature by investigating how the association differs across firms with different 
visibility levels, in terms of market value, number of analysts’ following and number of 
investors. These findings add to Al Guindy (2017), who examined the firm use of Twitter. 
The study was based on two binary variables of whether firms adopt Twitter and use Twitter 
to report financial information, and their effect on the cost of capital. Nevertheless, this thesis 
focuses more on dissemination rather than firm use of Twitter. The thesis also focuses on two 
different sets of information: financial and carbon related. Furthermore, using different 
measures of firm dissemination activity over Twitter, the thesis uses dissimilar COE 
estimates, control variables and estimation models. Meanwhile, Al Guindy (2017) uses 
Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan’s (2001) model to estimate the cost of capital. Using a 
particular model may cause spurious results (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2011). 
Hence, this thesis uses four different COE estimates to reduce any possible estimation error. 
Furthermore, Al Guindy (2017) did not control for press coverage which firm tend to use to 
disseminate firm information, whereas this thesis controls for many information intermediary 
channels, including the press. In addition, the thesis also extends previous literature by 
focusing on firms that are listed on NASDAQ and by selecting a longer sample period. The 
thesis also collects the big data of firm tweets, over a million firm tweets, for a longitudinal 
period of time to quantify the amounts of financial information that are disseminated over 
Twitter. Furthermore, the thesis also contributes to the literature by examining whether the 
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magnitude of firm news and the tone of the tweets influence the impact of a firm’s 
dissemination of financial information (iDisc) over Twitter on the COE. These findings 
extend Kothari et al. (2009a), who found that the information content of different information 
intermediaries had different effects on COE, whereas this study examines the effect of 
dissemination and the tone of firm messages over a new information intermediary, Twitter. 
Moving towards non-financial information, prior literature attempted to provide a better 
understanding of the influences of carbon emissions and climate change on the COE by 
studying the impact of carbon/climate risks and reporting (Chen and Gao, 2011; Kim et al., 
2015; Li et al., 2017; Lemma et al., 2019), temperature shock (Balvers et al., 2017), 
environmental profile (Chava, 2014), environmental practices to reduce emissions (Gupta, 
2018), and management of environmental risk (Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the second empirical study of the thesis extends the literature by focusing on the 
dissemination of carbon-related information (iCarbon). That is, dissemination has its own 
consequences on the capital market which is different from corporate disclosure (Bushee et 
al., 2010). In addition, the study adds to prior literature by focusing on an essential 
relationship linked to carbon emissions and climate change by using Twitter and its 
association with COE. The study also contributes to the literature by further 
examining whether firm environmental (ENV) or environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) reporting scores influence the association of carbon-related information and COE. 
Furthermore, most previous studies (e.g. Lee et al., 2015b; Peng et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 
2018) attempted to study the dissemination effect of carbon disclosure and communication 
over the media in emerging markets, as in the contexts of Korea and China. However, this 
study focuses on Twitter specifically, and on the US, a strongly developed country and 
financial market. Firms in the US are mandated to report their emissions if they emit at least 
25,000 metric tons of CO2. Such information does not need to be disseminated over Twitter, 
as it has been reported through other disclosure channels, which supports the use of Twitter 
purely for dissemination purposes. 
Even though financial and carbon related tweets involve limited amount of information, the 
result show that both iDisc and iCarbon influence firm equity financing. These findings 
should extend previous studies (e.g. Bushee et al., 2010; Drake et al., 2014; Twedt, 2016) 
that show that dissemination has its own effect on the equity market. To the best of my 
knowledge, this thesis is the first to examine the association between firm dissemination 
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using Twitter and the implied COE (based on an average of four implied COE estimates). In 
particular, the thesis focuses on the dissemination of both financial information and non-
financial information. Chapters 3 and 4 will describe in more detail the contributions of the 
two empirical studies, respectively. 
1.6! Implication of the Thesis 
The findings of the study provide several implications for firm managers, investors and 
regulators. While firm managers are still investigating the value of the corporate use of 
Twitter and social media, the thesis findings recommend firm managers to incorporate 
Twitter into their corporate reporting strategy. In particular, the findings of the first and 
second empirical study show that firm dissemination over Twitter has negative impact on the 
cost of equity. This implies that broader dissemination over Twitter should enhance the reach 
of firm information among investors which in turn would reduce the information asymmetry, 
increase investor awareness of the firm, reduce the investors’ acquisition cost of information, 
enhance firm legitimacy and hence reduce the equity financing. These findings encourage 
firm managers to use Twitter more for disseminating both financial and carbon related 
information to reach investors directly and on a timely basis. Additionally, the finding of firm 
empirical study suggests that firms that are less visible should give more consideration to 
using Twitter for dissemination purposes. These firms would benefit more from using Twitter 
by reducing information acquisition costs and thus enhancing its visibility among investors. 
Similarly, these findings should interest investors who use Twitter for information 
processing. The findings of the thesis show that dissemination over Twitter is meaningful for 
investors, and firm managers should consider communicating and sharing their information 
with investors through Twitter.  
Dissemination to wider coverage!of investors can provide vital implications for market 
liquidity and efficiency (Bushee et al., 2010). Peress (2014) finds that improving the 
dissemination of information can help investors to incorporate the information into the share 
price, which improves the efficiency of the market. That is, dissemination allows many 
investors to receive firm information in efficient time, which can help them to alleviate the 
information asymmetry and enhance investors’ recognition and evaluation of the firm’s value 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 2015). As such, improving dissemination can help to 
enhance trading activity and also enlarge investor base (Gao et al., 2020). In addition, 
theoretical studies (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980: Hong and Stein, 1999) suggest that the 
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market efficiency of price discovery is not only affected by the information content but also 
by the information means that extend the spread of firm information across investors. Hence, 
the speed with which the information is reflected in the firm’s price depends on the number 
of investors who become informed in a timely manner (Twedt, 2016). Firm dissemination via 
Twitter allows firm information to reach a large set of current and potential investors 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018). Twitter features should improve the 
dissemination of firm information that would be available to the market and may influence 
investor beliefs about the firm’s cost of equity (COE). By improving investor recognition and 
reducing the information acquisition cost that limits investor attention, broader dissemination 
via Twitter should enhance investors’ information, reduce information asymmetry and hence 
influence the COE. 
While regulators focus more on how information is used, there should be more consideration 
on the costs that market participation acquires for searching and processing information and 
how firm information reaches investors and market participants. New technology channels 
such as Twitter provide faster, inexpensive and better acceptability of information. This 
channel accelerates the delivery of firm information to a broad reach of investors at lower 
cost. This thesis suggests regulators expand mandatory disclosure requirements to include 
more technology which should attribute to a better capital market. Understanding the effect of 
dissemination over Twitter on COE should provide regulators and policymakers with insight 
into the benefit of using social media.  
In response to the growing use of Twitter by firms for disseminating corporate information, 
regulators have issued several pieces of guidance for firms that use Twitter for disseminating 
material information. Although Reg FD requires firms to disclose material information in 
press releases or by filing 8Ks, there is no clear guidance for how firms should use Twitter to 
disseminate material information. However, in 2013, the SEC announced that firms can use 
Twitter to disseminate material information such as financial related information (SEC, 
2013). Furthermore, the SEC made an announcement in 2015 which stated that Twitter can 
be used to attract investors’ interest in stock or debt offering. This guidance supports firm use 
of Twitter by supplementing firm disclosure by enhancing the dissemination of firms’ key 
information. In addition, the SEC has initiated many regulations to enhance investors’ 
investment decisions such as electronic filing through eXtensible Business Reporting 
Language (XBRL) and reporting through corporate websites, which aims to improve 
16"
"
investors’ awareness and to reduce information acquisition costs (Blankespoor et al., 2018). 
Twitter can provide aid for investors by allowing them to receive firm information in fast, 
less expensive and direct messages, which allow them to receive firm information with a 
lower acquisition cost. This results in better investor awareness (Blanespoor et al., 2014). 
Overall, these regulations aim to help investors to make better investment decisions and to 
make the market more liquid, efficient and transparent by using technology-innovated 
communication channels such as Twitter. 
Explicit implications should also be provided to regulators and policymakers about climate 
change and carbon emission. Trump administration announced on 1 June 2017 that the US 
would withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord as it was claimed it would cause the country 
many economic disadvantages (The White House, 2019). As the formal withdrawal from 
Paris Agreement will occur in 2020, many researchers have chosen to examine the impact of 
this decision (see Wang and Sueyoshi, 2018). However, firms with better complying to CSR 
tend to have reputation and value form investors’ perspective (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cahan et 
al., 2015; Byun and Oh, 2018). Other reports show that climate change would have an impact 
on American society by causing potential damage to people’s health and life and would cost 
the country billions of dollars (BBC News, 2019; Reidmiller et al., 2018). However, the 
findings of the research will assist regulators and policymakers by showing that a firm’s 
dissemination of climate change and carbon emission information will assess them with 
lower COE. This finding implies that dissemination of this information is perceived 
positively by the capital market participants and investors take climate change into their 
consideration. This suggests regulators and policymakers should implement more guidance 
towards climate change rather than withdrawing from environmental regulations.  
In 2009, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US began the Greenhouse Gas 
Reporting Program (GHGRP), which required firms to report their carbon emissions. Under 
this mandatory reporting of carbon emissions, firms that emit more than 25 thousand metric 
tons are required to report their emissions to the EPA each year. In response, the EPA publish 
these reports to assess research that attempts to link carbon emissions and climate change. 
Under this guidance, the EPA estimates that the majority of carbon emission firms in the US 
(approximately 85% to 90%) report to the EPA (EPA, 2013). That being said, the disclosure 
of carbon emissions before GHGRP was voluntary under the carbon disclosure program 
(CDP). In comparison to European firms, firms in the US are “not subject to a carbon 
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emissions cap-and-trade scheme whereby firms that emit GHG in excess of their allowances 
have to incur a monetary cost which may be expected to negatively impact their equity 
values” (Clarkson et al., 2015; Cooper et al., 2018, pp. 228). Even though greenhouse gas 
emissions are not toxic, they could have an impact on the society by influencing potential 
climate change (EPA, 2015). The EPA has also introduced a Clean Power Plan (CPP) that 
motivates firms to disclose carbon-related information. The CPP aims to establish “standards 
on carbon dioxide emission performance rates for new coal and natural gas-fired power 
plants” (Hsueh, 2019, p. 194). However, the CPP policy plan has subsequently reversed 
under President Trump’s administration. Nonetheless, the findings of the thesis show that 
investors value carbon-related information because it reduces firms’ equity financing. This 
finding suggests that managers and regulators should implement more plans for controlling 
carbon emissions. 
Overall, the thesis findings strongly suggest that firm managers should actively disseminate 
financial and carbon-related information over Twitter to meet investor demand of information 
and improve the firm information environment. The findings also suggest that using Twitter 
as a controlled intermediary channel for iDisc and iCarbon purposes allows firms to reduce 
the information problem and uncertainty surrounding investors’ expected rate of return. It 
also allows firms to gain legitimacy among their shareholders. In general, the research 
findings have shown that investors value firm dissemination of information, and this can 
benefit firm managers by resulting in a lower COE. 
1.7! Structure of the Thesis  
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides background information for 
Twitter. Chapter 3 presents the first empirical study. This chapter is composed of the 
following sections: introduction, background and literature review, hypothesis development, 
methodology, empirical results and analysis, and conclusion. Chapter 4 reports the 
second empirical study; this chapter includes the following sections: introduction, literature 
review, hypothesis development, methodology, empirical results and findings, and 
conclusion. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides a conclusion of the thesis by providing an overall 
summary of the main contributions and findings of the whole thesis. This chapter also 
includes a discussion of the practical implications of the thesis, and limitation and 
recommendations for further research. 
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Chapter 2.! Background of Twitter 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of Twitter as an information dissemination channel. 
The chapter is structured in two sections, first, providing broad aspects of Twitter definition 
and mechanism and second, discussing corporate use of Twitter as social network channels. 
The study focuses on Twitter, a subset of broad social media, which is classified as a social 
networking site. An overview of Twitter will be provided. Twitter has become a dominant 
tool of firms with regard to communicating with investors. The platform has experienced 
phenomenal success due to its early and high adoption rates. A potential explanation for its 
popularity can be partly based on the mechanisms, features and tools available to a Tweeter 
(a Twitter user), which will be explained in Section 2.2. As social media has caused a 
paradigm shift in the ways people communicate, connect, express and share ideas with each 
other, corporations have acknowledged these unique features and brought Twitter into use, 
mainly for the purposes of communicating and engaging with investors (Blankespoor, 2018). 
As a result, corporate use of Twitter platforms will also be discussed. Subsequently, an 
illustration of firm adoption of Twitter platforms, together with the regulations related to the 
corporate usage of this platforms, will be discussed. The chapter also reviews the motives for 
firm adoption of Twitter. Section 2.3.3 describes the determinants of firm disclosure 
components on social media. Once a firm has determined the information package, they 
select a channel to disseminate the information. Section 2.3.4 discusses firm dissemination 
channels in detail. Overall, an understanding of the mechanisms behind Twitter in particular, 
which motivate firm adoption of this channel will provide a solid foundation for a better 
understanding of the thesis at its latter stages. 
2.1! Twitter Definition  
In 1979, Tom Truscott and Jim Ellis created a discussion system called Usenet, which 
allowed worldwide Internet users to post messages to the public, yet the concept behind 
social media started around 20 years ago when Bruce and Susan Abelson created “Open 
Diary”, an old online site where many online diary writers were brought together into one 
community (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Martinviita, 2016). At that time, a social network 
site was called a “weblog”, before being shortened to “blog”. As Internet and mobile use and 
availability among individuals increased, this added to the popularity of social media sites 
(Debreceny, 2015). This increase in popularity led to the creation of MySpace, Facebook and 
Twitter in 2003, 2004 and 2006, respectively, which in turn led to the coining of the term 
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“social media”. Meanwhile, a list of these applications may provide an idea of what is meant 
by social media. A broad definition of social media describes a set of technological 
application platforms built on Web 2.0 which allow many users or groups of people to 
exchange and generate content (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010; Lei et al., 2019). The 
development of social media such as Twitter has allowed users to continuously interact, 
participate and engage in real-time conversation in collaborative way and with greater 
efficiency (Lei et al., 2019). These platforms allow anyone with an account to provide 
feedback, make conversation, receive notifications and develop social bonds (Blankespoor et 
al., 2014; Miller and Skinner, 2015; Blankespoor, 2018; Elliott et al., 2018).  
Twitter can be defined as application services that allow users (individuals) to create public 
profiles, articulate a list of shared connection users, and view and interact with users from 
their connection or within the application in short messages that is limited to 140 characters 
(Boyd and Ellison, 2007; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). This application helps users to connect 
with their pre-existing networks (e.g. friends and colleagues) and other users with shared 
interests (e.g. regarding politics, career or similar activities). Twitter also allow users to 
understand their connections and make them visible for other users. Nevertheless, the 
visibility of users’ profiles may differ depending on users’ preferences. For example, users in 
Twitter have the option to choose whether their profile is private (“followers only”) or public 
(“everyone”). 
In recent years, interactive social media platforms such as Twitter became the dominant 
choice for communication among firms and individuals (Lee et al., 2015a). As the thesis 
focuses on one of the most popular social media platforms, Twitter, an overview of this 
platform is provided in the next section. 
2.2! An Overview about Twitter Platform 
Twitter has rapidly become one of the most popular social media platforms since it was 
created in 2006. This platform has attracted around 320 million users, as a monthly average, 
sending approximately 500 million tweets per day (Jung et al., 2018b; Twitter, 2013; Twitter, 
2014; Twitter, 2015). This channel generates over one billion monthly visits to sites with 
embedded tweets (Leek et al., 2017). Figure 2.1 shows the average number of active users (in 




Figure 2.1 demonstrates the quarterly average active users on Twitter in million 
(source: Twitter.com) 
Twitter can be described as both a micro-blogging site, as it allows users to post short 
messages via the website or mobile application, and a social network site, because it allows 
users to create a profile page and connect with other users (Thelwall et al., 2011). That is, this 
platform can connect friends and interest groups in addition to adopting an information-
sharing role (Sashittal et al., 2015). Therefore, many celebrities and brand companies have 
adopted Twitter, creating at least one account. Typically, users using social media create 
accounts that carry their brand names followed by the “@” symbol (e.g. @Starbucks on 
Twitter, which has approximately 11.4 million followers). Among popular accounts on 
Twitter are Katy Perry (@katyperry), Justin Bieber (@justinbieber), Samsung Mobile 
(@samsungmobile) and Whole Foods (@WholeFoods), who have significant numbers of 
followers of 107, 10, 12.1 and 4.47 million, respectively. 
On Twitter, users who create an account can share their identity and personal information by 
uploading and posting their picture, name, bio, location, website and date of birth on their 
profile page (Figure 2.2 shows an example of a user profile account on Twitter: @Starbucks). 
The profile page shows information about the account, such as the number of tweets, 
accounts followed (following), followers and likes. It also includes the “follow” button, 
which enables users to subscribe or follow each other with a simple click. Once a user 
becomes a follower of an account, he/she will receive the account’s tweets on their Twitter 
timeline in a timely fashion. Thereby, the number of followers represents the number of 
Twitter users who have chosen to receive the account’s tweets (Cade, 2018). This number 
usually represents user influence and popularity on Twitter (Kwak et al., 2010; Lee et al., 
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2013). Although users may be followed by many users, they do not have to follow these 
accounts in return. Therefore, the number of followers can be different from the number of 
accounts followed (following). The number of accounts followed represents the number of 
other users from whom the account user has opted to receive messages. This subscription 
feature enables Twitter to combine two aspects of social networking and news media (Lee et 
al., 2013). That is, Twitter enables users to have two-way directional relationships by having 
multi-way conversation and sharing of interests, which is similar to other social media sites 
(for example, Facebook), and a one-way broadcasting relationship, as in media channels (for 
example, news broadcasts). However, the low message reciprocity between users suggests 
that the primary function of Twitter is to spread news and information (Kwak et al., 2010; 
Thelwall et al., 2011). 
 
Figure 2.2 provides an example of Starbucks profile account on Twitter (@Starbucks). 
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The mechanism behind the Twitter platform allows users to communicate with each other by 
writing and sharing 140-character messages called “tweets” (Cade, 2018). Once a tweet is 
posted by a user, the message will be displayed on the user’s profile, followers’ home pages 
and Twitter’s public timeline. This short message, the tweet, can contain text, images, 
hyperlinks, videos, hashtags (#) and/or cashtags ($). It may also include the “@” symbol, 
which is used to mention and interact with specific account holders. The hashtag and cashtag 
features are commonly used features that Twitter developed as an element of information 
flow (Sprenger et al., 2014). The hashtag enables users to write and easily find messages 
about relevant topics or categories (e.g. #earnings, #emissions). Likewise, users can also 
write stock related messages by including a prefixed dollar sign and firm ticker symbol (e.g. 
users that tweet about the Starbucks corporation would include $SBUX). These features 
allow large audiences, including those with no Twitter account, to easily search for 
information. In addition, the short messages on Twitter make it an ideal channel to share 
opinions in a timely manner, whereas longer format channels involve a longer search time for 
users seeking reports or articles (Bartov et al., 2018).  
However, Twitter not only allows user followers to receive tweets, but also allows other users 
to repost and share others’ tweets with their own follower list by simply clicking on the 
“retweet” button (Jung et al., 2018b). The purpose of the retweet feature is usually related to 
information dissemination, enabling user tweets to reach a larger audience than merely the 
user’s own followers list, as users tend to follow different accounts (Thelwall et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, Twitter also allows users to show their liking of tweets through the “like” 
button ( ), or to engage in conversation by “replying” to the tweet ( ). Even though Twitter 
may be used for social purposes, these features of Twitter create multiple knock-on sharing 
effects that elevate the platform as a suitable information dissemination channel for different 
purposes, including political, economic and corporate purposes. 
Twitter have gained popularity among individuals and become part of firm communication 
strategy. In addition to the widespread nature of Twitter platforms among individuals, an 
increasing number of firms have adopted many of these platforms as tools for 
communication. As Twitter is considered to be a social media platform, the next section 
attempts to provide a better understanding of corporate use of Twitter. 
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2.3! Corporate Use of Twitter  
Since the development of online communication and the Internet, firms have been using 
different information technology channels to disclose material information and manage 
investor relations (Debreceny, 2015; Lei et al., 2018; Lei et al., 2019). For example, firms use 
their websites to provide information or make webcast conference calls (Ashbaugh et al., 
1999; Ettredge et al., 2002; Bushee et al., 2003). This abundance of information on the 
Internet leads investors to search various online channels to “pull” firm information (Miller 
and Skinner, 2015). For example, investors can search for firm information via Google 
search, Yahoo Finance, and the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval system 
(EDGAR) (Das and Chen, 2007; Da et al., 2011; Drake et al., 2017; Lei et al., 2019). 
Previous literature has suggested that these channels are associated with many capital market 
consequences, such as market volatility and liquidity, price discovery, trading volume and 
realised return (e.g. Da et al., 2011; Drake et al., 2012; Dimpfl and Jank, 2016).  
However, Twitter has created new sources of corporate information that have changed the 
way that investors acquire information (Jame et al., 2016). This channels not only provide 
firms with facilitating features to communicate with market participants, but also allow the 
market participants to publicise or express their opinions about the firm (Cade, 2018). Twitter 
may also work as information intermediaries for investors (Drake et al., 2017). From the 
firm’s perspective, Twitter can facilitate sending direct messages and having conversations 
with a large variety of audiences, bypassing other traditional media channels such as 
newspapers, television and radio (Lee et al., 2015a). It also enables firms to engage with 
audiences in many disciplines directly and on timely manners. Firm activities on Twitter may 
include engaging with customers for advertising and marketing purposes (Lee et al., 2018a). 
Firms may also use Twitter accounts for customer services, promotions, special offers and 
product information. Even though Twitter is widely used to facilitate business-to-customer 
communication, it may also provide firms with the opportunity to enhance their business-to-
business (B2B) (Siamagka et al., 2015). Accordingly, one third of B2B firms use Twitter to 
generate product demand (Wang et al., 2016). In addition, many firms create social media 
accounts for career and employee recruitment purposes. For instance, Cree Inc 
(@CreeCareers) and Cynosure Inc (@CynosureCareers) have initiated Twitter accounts that 
mainly focus on career-related news.  
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Firms also use their Twitter accounts to communicate with stakeholders and market 
participants by conveying financial information (Zhou et al., 2015; Jung et al., 2018b). Social 
media platforms are also used by some firms to share non-financial information, such as 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) and climate change information (Schäfer, 2012; Eberle 
et al., 2013; Reilly and Hynan, 2014; Manetti and Bellucci, 2016; Araujo and Kollat, 2018). 
Previous literature shows that firms with higher CSR ratings are more likely to adopt social 
media (Lee et al., 2013), and firms with high environmental performance tend to use Twitter 
to highlight their prosocial behaviour (Huang et al., 2016). Overall, using Twitter allows 
firms to connect and communicate with customers, partners and investors; advertise their 
products and services; and share, discuss and present their information, such as financial 
performance, CSR and/or climate change information. 
Given firms’ willingness to connect with a variety of audiences at lower cost, and in a highly 
timely manner, previous studies have shown that a considerable number of firms have 
adopted Twitter platforms. For example, Culnan et al. (2010) found that, among Fortune 500 
firms, 53% of firms used Twitter, 46% used Facebook, 20% used blogs, and 11% used client-
hosted forums. In addition, Zhou et al. (2015) showed that among US firms with social media 
accounts, Twitter was employed relatively early, with a higher adoption rate compared to 
other social media platforms. Jung et al. (2018b) found that S&P 1500 firms’ adoption of 
Twitter surpassed their adoption of Facebook and other social media platforms. This research 
shows that firms prefer Twitter to other social media platforms, as a more effective 
communication channel. In addition, Twitter messages receive a higher response rate than 
Facebook posts, leading to longer user engagement (Zhou et al., 2015). Twitter, as the most 
influential platform, which has been increasingly employed by firms to convey information, 
has been mentioned and approved by the SEC for corporate disclosure purposes. The 
following section provides more detail on social media guidance and regulation. 
2.3.1! Regulation on twitter and other social media platforms 
In 2000, Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) was enacted, requiring firms to disclose non-
public material information to investors through recognised information distribution channels 
(e.g. filing 8-K with the SEC). Under this regulation, firms are required to publicly disclose 
material information at the same time that this information reaches a certain group of market 
participants or shareholders. A requirement is subjected to whether the information is 
distributed to selected parties intentionally or unintentionally. If it is intentional, then the 
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information must be disclosed simultaneously for all parties. If it is unintentional, then the 
information must be disclosed promptly. As the popularity of the Internet has increased, with 
many firms using their websites to supplement their public disclosures, the SEC, in August 
2008, issued revised guidance for the Reg FD regulation regarding the use of websites being 
a qualified disclosure channel for material information. Under this regulation, firms need to 
meet some criteria for their website to qualify as a recognised channel for corporate 
disclosure. First, firms need to notify investors about using their website for corporate 
disclosure purposes. Second, firms need to ensure that the website is publicly available for 
investors and the market. Finally, firms must afford public investors and the market a 
reasonable period of time to react to the posted information (Alexander and Gentry, 2014; 
SEC, 2008). This guidance encourages managers to use information technology channels and 
promote a more transparent, liquid and efficient market (Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
In July 2012, Reed Hastings (the CEO of Netflix) posted a Facebook message on his personal 
account about the monthly viewing hours of Netflix in June: 
 “Congrats to Ted Sarandos and his amazing content licensing team. Netflix 
monthly viewing exceeded 1 billion hours for the first time ever in June. When 
House of Cards and Arrested Development debut, we’ll blow these records away. 
Keep going, Ted, we need even more!” 
At that time, there was no explicit guidance regarding whether publishing such material 
information on social media complies with Reg FD. However, the SEC initiated an 
immediate investigation as to whether the Netflix CEO violated Reg FD by publishing this 
information on his social media account, and not filing the information on other regulatory 
channels. On 5th December 2012, the SEC made a Wells notice to notify the CEO and Netflix 
about bringing an enforcement action due to their violation of Reg FD (Dorminey et al., 
2015). Netflix defended its position by stating that the information posted on Reed Hastings’ 
Facebook account was not material, and that the account is public for 200,000 users, 
including reporters (Alexander and Gentry, 2014). However, the SEC decided to not proceed 
with the investigation, and closed the case with no charges against Mr. Hastings and Netflix. 
Instead, the incident resulted in the creation of added guidance regarding firm use of social 
media, particularly the use of Twitter and Facebook, as mentioned in the statement, to 
disseminate key information complying with Reg FD (SEC, 2013a; SEC, 2013b). 
Furthermore, the SEC in 2015 also announced that firms can use Twitter to send messages to 
attract potential investor interest regarding firms’ stock and debt offering. Following the 
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announcement of this guidance, a growing number of firms have begun to use social media to 
disseminate investor-related information and corporate events information (Lei et al., 2019). 
Overall, this guidance supports firm use of social media as a supplementary channel to 
disseminate material information. This use is expected to provide benefits for firms as a 
means to enhance the flow of their information. The motivation behind firm adoption of 
Twitter platforms is discussed in the following section. 
2.3.2! Motives for firm adoption of twitter 
The arrival of social media such as Twitter enables people with Internet access to publicly 
broadcast, share and exchange their opinions in virtual communities. The facilitating features 
of information dissemination allow users to publicise their opinions, which makes Twitter 
unique from traditional media channels. For instance, traditional media channels provide less 
accessibility for people and some firms to publish their own information, whereas Twitter 
allows user communication to be more visible. From other perspectives, Twitter allows firms 
to have direct and multi-way conversations with a large variety of audiences, such as 
customers, stakeholders and potential investors (Lee et al., 2015a; Trinkle et al., 2015). This 
channel not only allows firms to engage in less formal and more frequent conversations, but 
also allows them to receive ongoing feedback and comments, providing them with useful 
information (Kim and Youm, 2017; Misirlis and Vlachopoulou, 2018). The adoption of 
Twitter can also provide firms with potential advantages in enhancing their customer 
engagement, promotional mixes, product innovation, detection of customer complaints, and 
dissemination of firm news and information (Li, 2010a; Du and Jiang, 2014; Zhou et al., 
2015). Firms may also gain legitimacy by improving their engagement and dialog over 
Twitter (Seele and Lock, 2015; Castelló et al., 2016; Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Lee et al., 
2018b). Therefore, firms may perceive benefits from using Twitter in terms of improving 
their image, enhancing their sales activities, creating brand awareness, building reputation 
and increasing public interest (Culnan et al., 2010; Kietzmann et al., 2011; Kumar and 
Mirchandani, 2012; Marshall et al., 2012; Rui et al., 2013; Floreddu et al., 2014; Ibrahim et 
al., 2017; Elliott et al., 2018).  
Firms can use Twitter channels to build relationships and trust, promote brands, and create 
brand communities (Leek and Christodoulides, 2011; Kaplan, 2012). For example, firms may 
use Twitter to post a tweet about a new product, and customers may react to this post by 
providing comments or suggesting improvements. Customers may also “like” the tweet, 
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which would enhance the visibility of the tweet among their friends and followers, thus 
enlarging the promotional reach of the new product. Meanwhile, many firms use Twitter 
platforms to connect with potential customers. They also benefit from using Twitter by 
sharing knowledge with their employees (Salo, 2017). The engagement between firms and 
employees on social media during the working day provides firms with long-term benefits 
(Behringer and Sassenberg, 2015; Huang et al., 2015). A Twitter platform can be used as a 
channel for employees to communicate, share knowledge, create ideas and collaborate 
(Kwahk and Park, 2016; Luo et al., 2018). 
In addition, there are many features of Twitter that make this communication channel unique 
and revolutionary for firms’ communication. First of all, Twitter enables audiences to obtain 
required information at lower acquisition cost and on a timely basis. It also reduces the costs 
of printing and distributing firm information. This advantage allows improvement in the 
timeliness and usefulness of firm information (Drake et al., 2017). Second, Twitter allows 
information to be available to a wider range of users, with unlimited access (Cade, 2018). 
Third, Twitter platforms are accessible from mobile phones and Internet browsers at anytime 
and anywhere (Blankespoor et al., 2014). The accessibility of this platform on the Internet 
and mobile phones enables firms to reach a wide range of audiences at timely basis and lower 
communication cost. Fourth, firms can use Twitter for many purposes, such as customer 
communication, marketing, recruiting employees and managing investor relations (Cade, 
2018). Fifth, Twitter allows users to improve the presentation of their messages by using 
different forms, such as graphics, videos, text or even audio. Sixth, while Twitter allows users 
to actively push information to market participants, it also allows users to search and retrieve 
more information by using the search engine (Miller and Skinner, 2015). This feature allows 
both users with Twitter accounts and non-registered users to access all posts relating to 
specific topics, users or firms.4 Finally, Twitter allow users to engage with other users’ 
messages (tweets) by liking, reposting (retweeting) and responding (replying) to their 
messages. This can add another perspective on how other users view the matter. Taking these 
features together, Twitter facilitates information dissemination and may influence people’s 
perception in unexplored ways (Miller and Skinner, 2015). 
Meanwhile, users’ messages on Twitter may contain misleading information, rumours and 
other negatively perceived information about the firm, which can impose risks to the firms’ 
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4 However, users need to be registered with Twitter to make comments (Debreceny, 2015). 
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reputation and concern many public relation (IR) agencies (Cade, 2018). Firms can use their 
Twitter accounts to address any rumours or issues, and hence repair the reputational damage 
by demonstrating their ability to address any raised concerns, and lessen negative perception 
by showing empathy, sharing criticism, or even redirecting investor perception towards 
positive highlights (Lee et al., 2015a; Cade, 2018). Lee et al. (2015a) demonstrated that 
Twitter enables firms to answer users’ concerns and comments during product recall crises, 
allowing them to rebuild their reputational damage. Cade (2018) showed that firms can 
mitigate criticism on Twitter about the discretionary accrual adjustment by redirecting 
investors’ attention to positive aspects of the firm disclosure. In addition, previous studies on 
management, psychology and accounting (see Elliott et al., 2012; Cade, 2018) suggested that 
the adverse effects of negative events can be tempered by opening communication and 
helping individuals towards understanding the act that caused the negative event, and 
working towards overcoming any other related events. Even though Twitter may seem 
threatening for firms in case they lose control over what may be written about them on social 
media, thereby becoming reluctant to use social media (Investis, 2015), it can provide 
managers with a better understanding of users’ demand for information and how they should 
respond to this issue. Furthermore, the continuous reliance of individuals on Twitter to 
receive news and investment advice means that firms failing to participate in conversations 
with market participants is noticed (Cade, 2018).  
In addition, Twitter provides firms with opportunities to meet investors’ demand of 
information and influence investors’ perception of them. Firms can use this channel to gain 
benefits by gaining and maintaining investors’ awareness through effective dissemination 
activity of investor-related information (Lee et al., 2013). Therefore, this channel has become 
an essential part of firm communication and many investor relation (IR) agencies appear to 
have adopted Twitter for investor communication (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Additionally, 
many institutional and retail investors use this channel for investment activity (see 
Brunswick, 2014; Elliott et al., 2018). Bloomberg has incorporated Twitter messages about 
firms into its data service (Elliott et al., 2018). This service allows market participants (e.g. 
traders and professional investors) to monitor the discussions raised about the firm on Twitter 
through the Bloomberg terminal (Alden, 2013). As social media has become an important 




2.3.3! Disclosure on social media 
Firms provide disclosure as a form of financial reports to describe its economic condition 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001; Mayew, 2012). These reports can include many outlets such as 
financial statements, management discussions and analysis (MD&A), footnotes and other 
mandated filings. However, some firms may also provide additional information as voluntary 
disclosure, which can be defined as information that goes beyond the required regulations to 
provide accounting and other information deemed relevant to users' decision-making needs 
for the efficient operation of capital markets (Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995). Firms may also 
voluntary engage in communication to various stakeholders via conference calls or corporate 
website, for example.  
However, before firm information is communicated to investors, firms determine an 
information package, which comprises: (1) the selection of information that can be included 
in the firm disclosure (e.g. the data that can be included such as the amount of sales or/and 
current earnings); (2) how the information is presented and structured (the mediums used, e.g. 
text, graphs or charts, and presentation attributes, such as tone, readability, volume, accent 
volume); and (3) who presents this information (a third party, the company, or the CEO, CFO 
or other management position). In this regard, social media may influence the composition of 
the firm information package (firm’s information selection, presentation and presenter) 
(Blankespoor, 2018). 
Firstly, social media platforms may affect firms’ selection of information in many ways. The 
audiences of social media platforms can influence the types of information that are disclosed 
to investors. For example, firms may choose to disclose less complex information when the 
particular audience is less capable of handling sophisticated information. This behaviour is 
compatible with previous literature (Bushee et al., 2003) which find that a firm’s decision to 
open conference calls is to reach a broader range of retail investors (firms with less complex 
information). In contrast, firms with more complex information are less likely to have open 
conference calls, and more likely to target sophisticated investors. Second, social media 
enables firms to interact informally with users, which allows firms to use subjective (rather 
than objective) information. However, firms’ selection of information over social media 




Secondly, social media platforms may influence firms’ selection of medium and presentation. 
In particular, every social media platform has a unique setting that encourages and facilitates 
specific mediums (text, video, audio or image). Facilitating features provide firms with 
greater flexibility in their choices than with other channels, such as conference calls or press 
releases. Second, disclosure narrative attributes can be affected by the greater informality, 
wide language intensity and expected presentation style (Blankespoor, 2018). The great 
flexibility of social media could affect the tone and the level of readability of a firm’s 
messages. Finally, the greater facilities of social media platforms regarding non-text mediums 
may lead to the use of more non-verbal attributes in firm messages. These non-verbal 
behaviours may provide opportunity for management in their connecting with investors. 
Lastly, social media platforms may provide firms with opportunities to be more personalised 
in a way that is different from physical presence. Many platforms allow the firm and its 
executive to have different accounts. This allows firm managers to build their personal 
reputation and have direct and personal interactions with investors. 
Meanwhile, firms may consider the incentive to provide corporate disclosure when the 
benefits of a disclosure exceed its cost. Firms’ dissemination decisions are unlike corporate 
disclosure decisions, which relate to firms’ decisions to use a certain channel for distributing 
corporate information or not (Jung et al., 2018b). The next section discusses more about 
dissemination on social media. 
2.3.4! Dissemination on social media 
Once firms have created an information package, management can choose the number of 
channels and whether a specific channel can be used to disseminate or distribute firm 
information. For example, firms can use their websites or initiate conference calls to 
distribute their information. The recent development of social media has increased the 
availability of information channels that firms can use to distribute their information. This 
development in communication technology enables and encourages investors to process 
firms’ information on a timely and prolonged basis (Blankespoor, 2018). This channel has 
influenced the way that firms communicate with investors (Lee et al., 2015a), and provides 
firms with more control over dissemination decisions (Jung et al., 2018b).  
Among social media platforms, Twitter provides unique features that support firms in further 
disseminating and promoting firm information. In particular, the design of short messages on 
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Twitter makes this channel suitable to be used for dissemination purposes, rather than for 
revealing new information (Jung et al., 2018b). In fact, firm tweets often include quotes or 
hyperlinks to more informative reports (e.g. annual reports, corporate websites or conference 
calls). Moreover, firms are not mandated to repeat or broaden the information disclosed 
through other disclosure channels over Twitter, which allows them to disentangle 
dissemination from disclosure (Jung et al., 2018b). In addition, firms can use Twitter to send 
multiple repeated messages to increase the emphasis of the information. These features 
suggest that the primary use for this channel is to disseminate information and supplement 
other disclosure channels, without providing comprehensive information (Blankespoor et al., 
2014). This channel allows firms to directly push messages to current and potential investors 
in a timely fashion, which decreases investors’ search costs and, hence, potentially increases 
investor attention (Teoh, 2018).  
Whilst firms may use RSS and email to send their information to investors, the historical data 
of these technology channels cannot be observed by researchers (Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
Firms may also distribute their information through corporate websites or webcast conference 
calls. Firms usually use these channels as disclosure channels, whereas Twitter is used more 
for dissemination purposes (Blankespoor et al., 2014). In addition, corporate websites require 
investors to search for or pull firm information. On the contrary, firms can use Twitter to 
push their information to investors, rather than waiting for investors to retrieve the 
information from the website. This mechanism allows firms to directly push their information 
to investors, which in turn reduces investors’ cost of acquiring information. Furthermore, 
firms may also use Twitter to reach investors regularly and at any time. These features are 
unlike those of conference calls, which usually occur irregularly and over a limited period of 
time. Additionally, Twitter features such as redirection of messages (retweeting) are expected 
to increase the audience that can receive firm information. Twitter also allows firms to 
communicate with joint audiences such as customers and investors, unlike other traditional 
disclosure channels (e.g. conference calls, press releases). To increase the emphasis of the 
information disseminated, a firm may send frequent or multiple tweets regarding specific 
news or information. Overall, dissemination over Twitter results in reaching a diverse 
audience of potential investors.  
Typically, firms depend on third party intermediaries, such as the press, to disseminate their 
information. This dependence tends to limit the amount of information disseminated to 
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investors, as the press are keen to deliver some subset of firm news and information (Miller, 
2006; Blankespoor et al., 2014). While press editors make the decision of which firm to 
cover, firms are unsure of when/whether the press will deliver their information to market 
participants and the public (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018b). In contrast, Twitter 
allows firm managers to have more control over the dissemination decision. This allows 
managers to choose the time and frequency of disseminated information. In addition, using 
Twitter to disseminate and spread information allows firms to directly reach investors and 
bypass other media channels. Furthermore, the press is keen to express their opinion and 















Chapter 3.! The Effect of Twitter Dissemination on Cost of Equity5 
3.1! Introduction 
Revolutionary communication tools, such as social media applications, provide a massive 
amount of information (“big data”), which leads to a great deal of attention and action on the 
part of firms (de Camargo Fiorini et al., 2018). These tools of big data bring profound 
changes in the way that firms manage their customers and business (see Raguseo, 2018), and 
have become important channels to diffuse information (Agarwal et al., 2019), as part of 
firms’ disclosure strategy to meet the increased demand for information by investors. A key 
objective is to reduce the uncertainty about current and future investment opportunities. 
Corporate disclosure can help to reduce the information asymmetry that exists between 
management and market participants, and between informed and uninformed investors 
(Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). In 
turn, this can have significant implications as to which companies attract the necessary 
financial resources to grow and become successful. 
Although corporate information is assumed to be available to all market participants once 
firms disclose, “most firms have difficulty ensuring their news reaches a broad set of 
investors”, which results in information asymmetry (Blankespoor et al., 2014, p. 80) and this 
increases the need for a better dissemination strategy. This strategy is about a firm’s decision 
to spread information about the firm to the public through specific channels or not. A firm's 
decision to disseminate is different from its voluntary disclosure decision, which focuses 
more on providing information, if the benefits of disclosure outweigh the associated 
processing and proprietary costs (Kothari et al., 2009b). In contrast, the dissemination 
decision is related to firms’ choice of communication channel to distribute already disclosed 
information. For instance, firms are required to report their quarterly results each quarter of 
the year with the SEC, however they are not required to use conference calls or social media 
channels to disseminate these quarterly reports. Therefore, the decision to disseminate could 
exceed disclosure decision and show how firms attempt to shape their information 
environment (Jung et al., 2018b). Dissemination is also necessary for informing investors 
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5 This chapter has been published in International Journal of Information Management: 
Albarrak, M.S., Elnahass, M., Papagiannidis, S. and Salama, A. (2020) ‘The effect of twitter dissemination on 





about a firm, resulting in improving investor recognition of the stock and therefore a lower 
cost of equity (hereafter, COE) (Merton, 1987). The challenge is that investors can only 
spend limited time and pay little attention to news about firms, due to the acquisition cost that 
they bear through searching, retrieving and understanding the required information (Merton, 
1987; Hong and Stein, 1999; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2011). As such, 
investors may rely on few information intermediaries, such as the press, to receive news 
about firms. Due to limitations in coverage, there is a high chance that investors will not 
receive the news about lower press coverage firms or start-ups that do not command the 
necessary recognition. Instead, managers may use social media as a complementary channel 
to address this challenge (Blankespoor et al., 2014). This makes it possible for investors to 
obtain relevant information on a timely basis and in doing so to reduce the acquisition cost of 
information, by saving the time and energy needed to search for relevant news. Such 
dissemination activity is expected to lead to lower information asymmetry and improve 
investor recognition. Therefore, our study seeks to examine whether a firm's dissemination of 
financial information (iDisc) on Twitter has an impact on the firm’s COE.  
The effect of dissemination decisions has not been widely explored in the literature due to the 
difficulty of isolating dissemination from disclosure. Prior studies (Mayew, 2008; Kimbrough 
and Louis, 2011) have been either silent about the dissemination role or assume that 
dissemination exists once the disclosure is released. Although recent studies (Bushee et al., 
2010; Li et al., 2011) have pointed out that dissemination can be isolated from disclosure 
through press coverage, firms have no control over the content and dissemination decisions of 
the press. The press is also likely to adjust the content of information by expressing opinions, 
including summaries, or providing additional information, which makes the effect of 
dissemination unclear. In addition, firms have no control over whether the press will cover 
firm news or the time that this is done. Conversely, firms may opt to use Twitter for 
dissemination as they can have full control over the volume, frequency and timing of the 
disseminated information and can reach investors undiluted. As such, using Twitter allows 
firms to directly reach a broad number of current and potential investors and bypass other 
media channels. Furthermore, Twitter messages are limited to 140 characters, which makes 
them short and ideal for dissemination. Twitter also allows firm to push their information to 
investors at a time of their choosing, unlike the firm’s website which requires investors to 
search for the information. In addition, firm messages over Twitter usually include links to 
more informative reports such as press releases or the firm’s website, which supports the use 
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of Twitter for dissemination purposes. In addition, Twitter allows firms to send multiple 
messages to increase the emphasis and reach of the information. Meanwhile, conference calls 
are usually used as a disclosure channel, and they are set at a specific time and date. This is 
different from Twitter, where firms can send as many messages as they want and at any time 
they choose.However, there is little empirical evidence on how firms' dissemination of 
financial information on Twitter can be valuable to firms. Hence, this study aims to shed light 
on whether iDisc affects their COE, also controlling for many relevant factors. 
The study employs a sample of 1,737 observations which represent 584 non-financial firms 
with Twitter accounts that are listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange for the period 2009-
2015. The findings show that firms can reduce the COE by improving their information 
environment through their dissemination activities on big data information technologies 
channels. This evidence suggests that the managerial choice of using iDisc and diffusing 
information through their social media accounts could be perceived as part of the firm’s 
strategic voluntary disclosure policy. This finding also shows the importance of using Twitter 
as a communication channel to connect with market participants, to reduce investors’ 
acquisition costs, reduce the gap between informed and uninformed investors and help 
investors to make better investment decisions. This paper contributes to the growing literature 
on the market consequences of firms’ dissemination of information on Twitter (Blankespoor 
et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a; Prokofieva, 2015; Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017; Jung et al., 
2018b). These studies show how firms benefit from Twitter activity by improving market 
liquidity and attenuating negative market reaction. First, we show how iDisc affects the 
implied COE, based on an average of four measures of COE.6 Our study adds to Al Guindy 
(2017), which examined firms’ use of Twitter and the cost of capital. We have examined the 
dissemination effect, which is different from firms’ decisions to use Twitter. We have also 
used dissimilar COE estimates, more control variables and a different estimation model. In 
addition, our study contributes to previous studies by focusing on firms that are traded on the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
6 The four estimates of COE are RCT, RGLS, ROJ and RMPEG which were introduced by Claus and Thomas’s model 
(2001) Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s model (2005) and Easton 
(2004). These estimates are based on analysts’ earnings forecast and firm’s share prices. While both RCT and 
RGLS models assume clean surplus accounting, RCT allows stock price to be expressed in terms of book value, 
abnormal earnings growth and forecasted abnormal earnings growth, whereas RGLS expresses share price in 
terms of book value, forecasted return on equity and forecasted book value. Furthermore, ROJ is generalised as 
an extension of Gordon’s constant growth model. This model expresses stock price in terms of forecasted 
earnings per share and perpetual growth rate. RMPEG expresses stock price in terms of forecasted earnings per 




NASDAQ stock exchange and by selecting a longer sample period. Second, while previous 
studies examined the effect of the level and quality of a variety of disclosure information and 
channels (Botosan, 1997; Orens et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; 
Mangena et al., 2016), our empirical settings focus on firms' dissemination activity. Our 
results show that dissemination has a meaningful effect on COE, which is not in line with 
prior studies (Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2011) that argue that 
the real effect is from the information precision. Although tweets are short messages which 
are expected to have a smaller amount of information than an annual report, our results show 
the influence of iDisc on COE. Third, we contribute to previous studies (Blankespoor et al., 
2014; Jung et al., 2018b) that isolate the effect of dissemination from disclosure by 
examining the influence of dissemination on the COE. Fourth, the findings remain unchanged 
under varied news magnitudes and contents. Therefore, we extend the prior evidence of 
Kothari et al. (2009a) by examining the effect of dissemination and the tone of a new 
information intermediary, Twitter, and big data on the COE. Finally, we contribute to the 
literature on big data (e.g. Warren Jr et al., 2015; Sivarajah et al., 2017; Stieglitz et al., 2018) 
by collecting over a million pieces of data for a longitudinal time period and constructing a 
measure of the amount of financial information that firms diffuse from the large set of firms’ 
tweets data. While some studies focus on outside and within firm data (e.g. Gandomi and 
Haider, 2015), our study focuses on the firm’s initiative data on Twitter. Overall, this study 
contributes to the literature by analyzing social media big data in the financial context. 
The research provides important implications for firm managers, regulators, policymakers 
and investors. The research findings show that disseminating financial information (iDisc) 
reduces the COE. This reduction in COE should encourage firm managers to consider the 
benefit of disseminating firm information over Twitter. The finding of the study should also 
encourage firms that are less visible to use Twitter to communicate and reach a broader 
number of current and potential investors. This increase in visibility improves the investor 
base and thus reduces the investor required rate of return. In addition, Twitter provides a fast, 
inexpensive and acceptable platform for information processing. This platform accelerates 
the information delivery to a broad reach of current and potential investors at a lower cost. As 
such, this study encourages regulators to expand disclosure requirements to include using 
social media platforms for disseminating material information; this should contribute to a 
better information environment and capital market. 
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While COE reflects investors’ expected return on their investment, there are many studies 
(Sprenger et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018) investigating the association with price movement. 
However, this study extends previous literature by investigating the association with COE. 
Cost of equity is an essential element of managers’ investment decisions (El Ghoul et al., 
2018). Besides investors and market managers, COE also has important implications for the 
real economy as it plays a major role in capital budgeting and corporate finance decisions 
(Attig et al., 2013). Regulators usually view the reduction of COE as a motivation and 
justification for improving firm reporting practices (Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017). For instance, 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) chairman, Robert Herz, has stated that “It’s 
about lowering the cost of capital, lowering the cost of preparation, and lowering the cost of 
using information” (see Wild, 2004; Lambert and Verrecchia, 2015). In addition, firm 
dissemination of financial information via Twitter should help investors to make better 
informed investment decisions 
The next section reviews the relevant literature. The methodology section outlines the sample 
data and model tested. The paper then presents and discusses the empirical results, comparing 
and contrasting them with past literature. The paper concludes by considering the theoretical 
and managerial implications of the empirical evidence.  
3.2! Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1! Information asymmetry, information intermediaries and cost of equity 
Cost of equity is the cost to a firm of using investors’ funds that the company raises and uses. 
Previous studies have documented the important role of accounting information in reducing a 
firm’s COE (Easley and O'hara, 2004; Beyer et al., 2010). Some attention has been paid to 
the communication channel used for disseminating firm information and its implications for 
the COE. Francis et al. (2008) show that disclosing management forecasts and conference 
calls are associated with a higher COE, whereas this association is not significant for press 
releases. Kothari et al. (2009a) highlight the role of information intermediaries on the COE, 
finding that it is affected by business press coverage for both good and bad news. They find 
that information reported by management and analysts does not provide significant evidence. 
They also suggest that "technological innovation […] and changes in disclosure channels 
and the number and type of information intermediaries that continue to reshape disclosure 
and financial reporting practices create new and exciting opportunities for research" (p. 
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1667). Such intermediaries create value by being easier to manage, and being more efficient 
and specialised than other media channels (del Águila-Obra et al., 2007). 
As “the cost of equity capital is increasing in the level of information asymmetry” (Beyer et 
al., 2010, p. 314), making dissemination decisions to spread information through different 
communication channels matters (Drake et al., 2014; Twedt, 2016). In essence, firms’ 
dependence on financial intermediaries, such as the press, could be subject to some limitation 
as the press may favour articles about firms that attract a wider audience (Miller, 2006), which 
may affect the effectiveness of the firm’s disclosure. Therefore, improving the reach and spread 
of information through dissemination could play a role in enhancing the usefulness of corporate 
disclosure. That is, different degrees of dissemination, apart from voluntary disclosure, matter 
(Drake et al., 2014). Previous studies have found that the dissemination level of the business 
press affects stock prices (Li et al., 2011), price discovery (Twedt, 2016), information 
asymmetry (Bushee et al., 2010) and the expected rate of return (Fang and Peress, 2009). Li et 
al. (2011) find that dissemination over Dow Jones alerts provides investors with value-relevant 
information. Francis et al. (2004) argue that the value relevance of information reduces the 
COE by improving the quality of reporting and lowering firms’ information risk. However, 
improving a firm’s information environment reduces potential investors’ estimation risk, an 
element of risk arising from investors’ uncertainty about the ‘true’ parameters of a security’s 
return or pay-off distribution (Botosan, 2006; Easley & O'hara, 2004). Overall, these findings 
imply that dissemination has its own capital market consequences apart from disclosure. 
3.2.2! Social media and financial dissemination 
Social media employ mobile technologies and web-based to create highly interactive 
platforms by which various stakeholders, individuals and communities can create big data by 
sharing, discussing, co-creating, and modifying user-generated content (e.g. Kietzmann et al., 
2011; Ngai et al., 2015; Shiau et al., 2017). In addition to being user-driven communities, 
over the past years social media channels have provided an enormous amount of timely data 
that has served many business functions and purposes (Manika et al., 2015). When it comes 
to financial dissemination, firms attempt to improve the information environment by 
initiating investor relations (IR) programmes (Agarwal et al., 2016), providing information 
through various communication channels. Among these channels are channels supported by 
information technology, such as corporate websites and social media, which have become an 
essential part of IR programmes. For example, firms use their websites to provide 
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information (Ettredge et al., 2002) and broadcast conference calls (Bushee et al., 2003) and 
social media to disseminate corporate announcements (Jung et al., 2018b). 
Among the social media platforms, Twitter provides an accessible communication channel 
that enables customers, investors and firms to engage with each other in a two-way 
conversation by posting tweets and receiving comments. For example, from the investor 
perspective, Li et al. (2018) have proposed a framework for monitoring emerging 
technologies and by using patent analysis and Twitter data mining. Such monitoring can 
facilitate early investments and high return on these in due course. Social media data has also 
been used to make stock price predictions (Daniel et al., 2017) or to detect corporate fraud 
(Xiong et al., 2018). From the firms’ perspective, unlike other communication channels, 
Twitter provides a unique mechanism that allows distinctions to be made about the effect of 
firms’ dissemination decisions. Firstly, firms that seek to disseminate press releases would 
send investor-related information to newswire services or other information intermediaries 
(Bushee and Miller, 2012). It is difficult for firms to be certain about when or even whether 
the information would be broadcast to investors. Conversely, firms on Twitter have the 
option to choose the time to distribute investor information. Secondly, Twitter makes it 
possible for firms to know the size of their audience, which may motivate firms’ 
dissemination decisions. Thirdly, the design of Twitter messages suggests that it is more 
likely to use tweets for dissemination rather than distributing comprehensive information. 
Tweets are limited to 140 characters, and often include hyperlinks to full press releases 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014) or quotes from either press releases or conference calls (Jung et 
al., 2018b). Even though Tweets could be stand-alone pieces of information, Blankespoor et 
al. (2014, p. 81) “find evidence that they are more commonly used as a method of 
dissemination”. Fourth, prior literature has explored various aspects of voluntary disclosure 
channels (Ettredge et al., 2002; Bushee et al., 2003). Twitter provides different mechanisms 
that support the dissemination role. For instance, conference calls are infrequent and are 
limited to a short period, whereas firms can use Twitter more frequently. Also, corporate 
websites require investors to search through the whole website for the desired information, 
which takes time and effort. In contrast, Twitter does not wait for investors to look for 
information about the firm as it applies ‘push’ technology, which directly reaches investors 
and reduces the acquisition cost of information. Fifth, the spread of tweets can also reach 
more than the firm's followers as Twitter enables the followers to redirect and share tweets 
with their follower lists, through the ‘retweet’ feature. Finally, firms can repeatedly post 
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tweets over days or use hashtags (#earnings) or cashtags ($Ticker) that are ideally used to 
share opinion and spread news, which is expected to enhance investor recognition about a 
firm. All these features enable firms to expand the reach of firm disclosure on a timely basis, 
isolating the effect of dissemination from disclosure. Once investors receive and read this 
information, they can become less concerned about information asymmetry. 
As this platform has become popular, researchers have paid more attention to studying the 
market consequences of disseminating information on Twitter. For a list of technology firms, 
Blankespoor et al. (2014) show that dissemination through links to press releases on Twitter 
reduces information asymmetry and improves market liquidity, especially for firms with a 
weaker information environment. In line with this, Prokofieva (2015) finds similar results for 
an Australian sample (100 ASK). Meanwhile, firms are most likely to use Twitter to 
strategically disseminate favourable news (Jung et al., 2018b). Firms can also use Twitter to 
attenuate negative market reaction to unfavourable news such as product recall crises (Lee et 
al., 2015a), acquisition announcements (Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017) and negative earnings 
surprises (Miller and Skinner, 2015). The attenuation effect suggests that firms that have 
better interaction, response and control to adjust investors’ concerns mitigate the reputation 
damage of negative corporate announcements. As a firm loses control, other users’ tweets 
may aggravate the adverse reaction (Lee et al., 2015a). Overall, prior studies generally 
highlight how firms’ dissemination decisions on Twitter in spite of other information 
intermediaries influence the capital market in many aspects (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et 
al., 2018b). Also, using Twitter makes it possible to understand manager behaviour toward 
dissemination decisions. However, prior research (Botosan, 1997) has shown that managers 
strategically adjust disclosure decisions in a way to achieve their goals by increasing firm 
value and reducing the COE. We, therefore, attempt to fill such a gap in the research by 
studying the impact of the firm's dissemination of financial information on the COE. 
3.2.3! iDisc and cost of equity (COE) 
According to the “market-liquidity hypothesis”, information asymmetry introduces adverse 
selection problem into transactions between market participants, and, therefore, should 
reduce market liquidity in firm shares (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000; Mangena et al., 2016). Firms are hence issue shares at a discount as investors pay less 
for shares that have high transaction costs (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Firms alleviate 
the adverse selection problem between the firm and its investors (Verrecchia, 1983) and 
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reduce information asymmetries among informed and uninformed investors (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994) by voluntarily disclosing their information to decrease investors’ 
incentives to acquire costly private information (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) and increase 
market participants' demand for the firm’s stock, thus lowering the firm’s cost of equity 
(Easley and O'hara, 2004; Beyer et al., 2010). However, information about the firm may not 
reach the public effectively, and greater dissemination could play a role in improving the 
effectiveness of disclosure. As such, Twitter allows firms to make their own dissemination 
decisions and be less dependent on other information intermediaries such as the press. That 
is, iDisc is likely to improve the effectiveness of firm information (in turn reducing the COE) 
by pushing information more directly and immediately to a broader reach of market 
participants, including uninformed investors. As investors receive firm information on a 
timely basis, they become less concerned about information asymmetry and thus improve 
stock liquidity and reduce the cost of equity.  
Recently, Blankespoor et al. (2014) and Jung et al. (2018b) have argued that firms may 
disseminate their information on Twitter to reach many potential investors. Accordingly, the 
‘investor recognition hypothesis’ suggests that improving investor recognition of the firm 
will increase stock prices and reduce the cost of equity (Merton, 1987; Lehavy and Sloan, 
2008). The key assumption here is that investors, among all firms, only buy the stocks of 
firms that they recognise. Therefore, stock prices increase when more investors know about 
the firm. If only a small number of investors are aware of the firm’s stock, then these 
investors will take a larger portion of the stock. For this reason, stock with lower investor 
recognition needs to offer a higher rate of return for the risk that investors gain from the large 
undiversified position. One way to enhance investor recognition is to present information to 
market participants through more dissemination channels. Therefore, firms can use iDisc to 
improve the breadth of their information. As information is widely disseminated, investor 
awareness of the firm’s news increases, which improves investors’ risk sharing and reduces 
the cost of equity. In addition, the value of dissemination rises when investors become aware 
of the stock, by reducing the acquisition costs that investors gain from their limited time and 
attention to firm disclosure (Hong and Stein, 1999; Hirshleifer et al., 2009). Such costs limit 
the information that investors process from corporate disclosure and make them mainly 
depend on a limited number of communication channels (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). For 
this reason, firms attempt to improve the dissemination of corporate disclosure in many 
information intermediaries such as Twitter (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Such an improvement 
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of dissemination is expected to provide investors with information about the firm at a lower 
acquisition cost, which reduces the information asymmetry and hence reduces the cost of 
equity.  
Based on the above, we conjecture that a higher use of iDisc is predicted to enhance 
investors’ reach with the firm information. This is likely to reduce the gap between informed 
and uninformed investors. As firms rely more on the use of iDisc to disseminate news, 
investors can receive the news at a low acquisition cost and with better investor recognition. 
Thereby, a higher level of iDisc use is expected to reduce COE.  
H1: There is a significant negative association between iDisc and the cost of equity (COE). 
3.3! Methodology 
3.3.1! Sample and data 
Our initial sample includes non-financial firms listed on the US NASDAQ stock exchange 
that have official Twitter accounts. Our sample focuses on the US because foreign firms have 
different information environments, and the dissimilarities in transparency can influence the 
COE. The SEC, the regulator of the US stock markets, allows firms to use social media such 
as Twitter for disclosing financial information that complies with Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Dorminey et al., 2015). US firms have shown frequent adoption of Twitter and early use for 
corporate announcements (Zhou et al., 2015; Jung et al., 2018b), which ensured a potential 
coverage during our sample period. Consistent with Bushee et al. (2010), we mainly focus 
our sample on one stock exchange to remove any effect of exchange listing.  
The study focuses specifically on NASDAQ-listed firms. Many technology-focused firms are 
traded in NASDAQ. Technology firms tend to be early adopters and users of Twitter, which 
increases the probability of using Twitter for disseminating financial information 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). Firms that are traded 
in NASDAQ are relatively smaller in size and have a lower number of analysts following 
them than NYSE (Bushee et al., 2010; Dang et al., 2018; Meshcheryakov and Winters, 2019). 
They therefore face higher visibility concerns than firms in NYSE (Bushee and Miller, 2012). 
In fact, Dang et al. (2018) find that firms switch their listing from NYSE to NASDAQ to 
become more visible to investors among other NASDAQ-traded firms. This visibility concern 
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is relevant for the study because dissemination of firm information over Twitter can increase 
a firm’s visibility and improve firms’ information environment (Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
We focus on 2009-2015, even though Twitter was founded in March 2006, because Twitter 
accounts’ popularity grew among its users around 2009 (Marwick and Boyd, 2011). We also 
exclude tweets before 2009 to avoid the macroeconomic effects of the financial crisis (2007-
2008), limited Twitter activity (approximately less than 10% of our sample had Twitter 
accounts before 2009), and limited use of cashtags in Twitter before 2009. 
Our data collection strategy is based on identifying whether each firm in the sample has a 
Twitter account, using a number of checks (e.g. whether they had the Blue Verified Twitter 
Badge). After identifying Twitter adopter firms, we check whether these firms have positive 
median earnings forecasts for one and two years ahead to measure the implied COE. These 
consensus earnings forecasts are collected as of June to ensure that analysts had incorporated 
all the information from fiscal year reports in their forecasts. Firms with missing observations 
on the COE are excluded from the sample. These restrictions reduce the sample size to 584 
firms (1,737 firm-year observations) from the initial sample of 745 non-financial firms with 
Twitter accounts that are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. 
Corporate adoption of Twitter does not necessarily mean using their Twitter accounts for 
disseminating financial information (iDisc). We, therefore, use two sources to download the 
full texts of tweets to identify iDisc. We retrieve Twitter data from both Twitter’s application 
programming interface (API) and Twitter’s advanced search. Twitter API provides a 
maximum number of tweets (up to 3,200 tweets). Tweets beyond 3,200 are, therefore, 
manually collected through Twitter’s advanced search function. Manual collection is 
performed to obtain tweets between the last collected tweets from Twitter API and the first 
tweet published by the firm’s account. If the number of tweets is large, we use the advanced 
search option to search for financial keywords. We used keywords that related to financial 
capital, balance sheet items, equity and debt financing, financial ratio and financial reporting 
and announcement (discussed further in Measuring iDisc). The total number of tweets 
collected is 1,197,208 tweets, approximately 2/3 of which come from Twitter API. The mean 
(median) value of the number of tweets is 4,588 (944), which suggests that the total number 
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of collected tweets is not particularly large. We process these tweets through a matching 
classification scheme to quantify iDisc tweets.7  
In addition to Twitter data, we collected all news articles that mentioned the firm’s name 
from LexisNexis. This database includes major news media channels such as Wall Street 
Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post and USA Today. We used company 
identifiers to allocate all firm news in the database. We define news coverage as the total 
number of news articles about the firm. In addition, we obtained accounting and market data 
to measure the dependent and control variables from Bloomberg and DataStream. To control 
for the outliers, we winsorize cost of equity (COE), financial leverage (LEV), the dispersion 
of analysts forecast (DISP), systematic risk (BETA), long-term growth rate (LTG) and return 
on assets (ROA) at the 2.5th to 97.5th percentiles. Consistently with previous literature (Chen 
et al., 2009; Botosan et al., 2011), we winsorize the COE to lie between 0 and 0.6 as 
investors are not expected to require negative rates of return and high COE could be driven 
by outliers. 
3.3.2! Variables 
3.3.2.1! Cost of equity (COE) 
The dependent variable in this model (COE) is the implied COE, which is estimated as the 
average of four equity premium estimates: (i) Claus and Thomas model, RCT (2001); (ii) 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan model, RGLS (2001); (iii) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 
model, ROJ (2005); and (iv) Easton model, RMPEG (2004). The COE estimates are measured 
based on current stock prices and analysts’ future earnings forecast. In other words, COE 
equals the discount rate that is used to discount future cash flows to determine current stock 
value. However, each of these estimation models has different assumptions and 
implementations. For instance, RCT assumes that the market expects abnormal earnings to 
grow at a constant rate, which equals the inflation rate, beyond the forecast horizon. RGLS 
assumes that the market expects prices in terms of future return on equity (FROE) “to 
linearly fade to an industry-based ROE 12 years hence, which GLS estimates based on 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
7 The classification process followed several steps: (1) we uploaded the data to the Python software programme; 
(2) we read all these data; (3) we applied “stop words”, which is a process used to remove words that have no 
meaning in the text (e.g. “a”, “the”, “and”); (4) we divided tweets into words by applying a technique to split the 
text into separate words; (5) we matched the word in each tweet with our financial keyword list ; (6) we gave a 
value of 1 to every tweet that matched with our list of keywords; (7) we downloaded the data into an Excel file 
for tweets that matched our classifications. 
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historical industry ROE” (Botosan et al., 2011, p. 1098). ROJ is driven from an accounting-
based evaluation model that use analysts’ forecasts to calculate short- and long-term growth 
in earnings and to set an infinite growth that equals the 10-year treasury bond yield minus 3 
percent. RMPEG anticipates that the market expects abnormal earnings to grow at zero rate 
beyond the forecast horizon.  Appendix C provides an explanation of the implementation of 
all COE measures. To calculate the four models (RCT, RGLS, ROJ and RMPEG), a numerical 
technique is employed. 
After calculating these estimation model (RCT, RGLS, ROJ and RMPEG),!risk-free return which is 
measured using ten-year Treasury bond yield is subtracted from each of these models. Then, 
the arithmetic mean of the four COE models is computed to measure the COE. The use of an 
average of these measures aimed to reduce the estimation errors (Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Hail 
and Leuz, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 2016). The implied COE is a good 
measure for comparing the COE to realised returns, because it attempts to differentiate the 
effect of growth and cash flow from the COE (Chen et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011). Pástor et 
al. (2008) also indicate that the implied COE is a useful estimate for the time-series variation 
of expected returns. In essence, COE equals the average expected rate of return of RCT, RGLS, 
ROJ and RMPEG minus the risk-free rate 
3.3.2.2! iDisc  
We focus on financially related information (iDisc-related tweets), as financial information is 
important to investors and firms are mandated to disclose this information but are not 
required to disseminate it on Twitter. This makes it possible to distinguish the effect of 
dissemination from disclosure (Jung et al., 2018b). To identify iDisc tweets from big data of 
firm tweets, we search for the existence of financial information by combining several sets of 
financial keywords or using single phrases. For instance, we use the following keywords and 
phrases to look for earnings-related tweets: 
(“earnings”, “revenue*”, “profit*”, “income”, “loss*”, “sales”, “dividend”, “financial”) 
AND (“disclos*”, “report*”, “record*”, “perform*”, “statement*” “release*”, “announce”, 
“declare*”, “quarter”, “annual”, “result*”) 
We also use other financial keywords that relate to financial reporting, stock prices, balance 
sheet items and their variants such as:  
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(“annual report*”, “annual statement*”, “press release*”, “balance sheet”, “cash flow”, “cash 
inflow”, “total assets”, “current assets”, “total liabilit*”, “current liabilit*”, “long term assets”, 
“long term debt”, “net income*”, “net profit*”, “capital gain”, “net loss*”, “capital loss”, 
“capital expenditure*”, “market capital*”, “stock pric*”, “secur* pric*”, “share* pric*”, 
“merger”, “acquisition”, “earnings per share”, “stock* repurchase”, “share* repurchase”, 
“stock* offering”, “share* offering”) 
The development of financial keyword lists starts with identifying words used in previous 
studies (Kothari et al., 2009a; Matsumoto et al., 2011; Kravet and Muslu, 2013; Campbell et 
al., 2014). The strategy of developing word lists includes searching and adding other 
synonyms for financial words through WordNet and other dictionary software applications. 
Additional terms and synonyms have been added from Campbell Harvey’s financial glossary 
lists (Harvey, 1999). Terms or words that relate to firm activity, reporting, announcements 
and disclosure were included in the lists. To reduce the classification error, we look for the 
existence of multiple words in the same tweet.  
In addition, Twitter provides features that firms can use to push information regarding any 
event or topic by using the hash key (#). These hashtags can be used for earnings 
announcements or quarter earnings events. Twitter also makes it possible for users and firms 
to discuss and disseminate a firm’s financial information through the cashtag key feature 
($ticker). Thus, we also included hashtags that are used for firm announcements and cashtags 
in our keywords list, such as:  
(“#earnings”, “#quarterearnings”, “#annualreport*”, “#financialresult*”, “#pressrelease”, 
#Q12014, e.g. $AAPL for Apple inc). 
Tweets that match with our list of keywords are quantified as iDisc tweets. Our analysis 
examines the annual number of iDisc tweets for each firm in our sample period. Figure 3.1 
provides two examples of iDisc tweets. In addition, further examples for iDisc tweets are 






Figure 3.1 shows two examples of iDisc tweets 
3.3.2.3! Control variables 
While we argue that disseminating financial information (iDisc) on Twitter improves a firm’s 
information environment to reduce the cost of equity by enhancing firm connection and 
information availability and accessibility to investors, we include many other control 
variables. These variables include firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), financial 
leverage (LEV), the dispersion of analysts forecast (DISP), systematic risk (BETA), long-term 
growth rate (LTG), press coverage (NEWS), institutional holdings (INSTOWN), earnings 
surprise (SURP) and return on assets (ROA). These control variables are related to firm 
characteristics, analysts' forecast attribute, systematic risk, information intermediaries, 
content of information and firm performance.  
To illustrate more, larger sized firms have a better information environment (Gebhardt et al., 
2001) and expect to have lower costs of equity (Botosan, 1997; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; 
Mangena et al., 2016), whereas smaller firms have a lower information environment, lower 
liquidity and hence expect to have a higher COE. Therefore, firm size (SIZE) is expected to 
have a negative association with COE.  
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In addition, the book to market ratio (BTM) reflects the difference in firm accounting 
conservatism and investment opportunities (Hail and Leuz, 2006). This variable is considered 
a risk factor (Easton, 2004; Mangena et al., 2016). That is, firms with a higher BTM ratio are 
undervalued in price and should have a higher risk premium (Fama and French, 1992; Gode 
and Mohanram, 2003). In this sense, we expect the book-to-market ratio (BTM) to be 
positively associated with COE.  
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms that use more financial leverage face 
greater financial uncertainty and expect to have higher risk premiums. Firms with a high 
leverage ratio may face more liquidity risk that arise from limiting their ability to meet their 
obligations. Furthermore, those firms may also encounter more restrictions in their ability to 
access external funds, which in turn might affect the analyst evaluation from the credit rating 
perspective. Therefore, firms with higher debt on their capital structure may have a higher 
cost of equity (Fama and French, 1992; Dhaliwal et al., 2006; Cao et al., 2015). We, 
therefore, expect a positive association between LEV and COE. 
The uncertainty surrounding the information environment due to wider dispersion of analysts' 
forecasts is expected to increase firm risk (Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Kothari et al., 2009a). 
That is, wider dispersion or disagreement in analysts' forecasts implies greater uncertainty 
about earnings forecasts (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2018), implying a 
greater risk for the firm information environment and hence a higher cost of equity. 
Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between dispersion analyst (DISP) and cost of 
equity (COE).  
Under the capital asset market pricing model, investors expect a higher required rate of return 
as systematic risks become higher. Systematic risk or market beta (BETA) is an 
undiversifiable risk that increases the firm risk premium (Botosan, 1997; Botosan et al., 
2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2015). As the risk increases, the certainty that 
investors expect to earn from their investment will become smaller, which, in-turn, increases 
their required return on their investment. Consequently, firms with high systematic risk 
(BETA) are expected to have a higher COE. 
Prior literature (Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; Cao et al., 2015) indicates that firms with a 
high long-term growth rate (LTG) are considered riskier and have more uncertainty than 
lower LTG firms. Thai is, high prospect about firm growth and earnings may result in the 
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inflation of stock prices and that any misestimating of growth rate can have a significant 
effect on the share price (Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Chen et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
market perceives a firm with high LTG as a high-risk investment and hence they expect a 
higher cost of equity. Therefore, we predict a positive association between LTG and COE. 
While media coverage may shape the firm information environment, which is expected to 
influence the expected rate of return, the press may contain additional information and favour 
a direction of news stories that could influence the firm valuation and cost of equity (Fang 
and Peress, 2009; Jung et al., 2018b; Niessner and So, 2018). Kothari et al. (2009a) find that 
media coverage increases the firm's cost of equity when the news is negative, whereas 
positive news reduces the equity financing. Therefore, we do not provide any certain 
direction between media coverage (NEWS) and COE.  
The existence of institutional investors enhances the monitoring role on firm management, 
exerting more pressure on them to provide better information quality, transparency and 
management practices (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010; Attig et al., 2012). This enhancement of the 
monitoring and information role reduces the agency problem and information asymmetry 
between market participants and hence reduces the cost of equity (see Elyasiani et al., 2010; 
Attig et al., 2013). Therefore, we expect that high institutional holdings are likely to enrich 
the firm public information environment, reducing the uncertainty and thus reducing the cost 
of equity. 
Firm managers may have an incentive not to miss earnings expectations. Previous studies 
(Mikhail et al., 2004) have argued that earnings surprise can be costly to the firm as analysts 
would not prefer to follow firms with an earnings surprise. That is, an earnings surprise may 
cause an analyst's forecast to be inaccurate, which is not preferable for many analysts, 
resulting in lower analyst coverage and thus a lower information environment. In other 
words, an earnings surprise reflects the uncertainty surrounding the current earnings, which 
imposes a higher risk and is expected to increase the cost of equity (Rogers et al., 2009; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011; Kim and Shi, 2011). Therefore, we expect earning surprise (SURP) to be 
possibly associated with the cost of equity (COE).  
Furthermore, we control for firm performance by including return on assets (ROA) that may 
determine firm decision to use communication channel for disseminating information 
(Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Lee et al., 2015a; Zhang, 2015; Jung et al., 2018b). Firms that have 
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an increase in earnings, stable profitability and better performance are expected to have less 
exposure to default risk, lower uncertainty and hence lower COE (e.g. Francis, Khurana and 
Pereira, 2005; Gode and Mohanram, 2003). However, previous studies (e.g. Ferris et al. 
2017) propose that the relationship between return on assets (ROA) and COE is inconclusive, 
which means that the direction of the relationship can be either positive or negative. Thus, the 
study expects no association between ROA and COE. In addition to these variables, we 
include both year and industry fixed effects in the regressions using the Fama-French 12-
industry classification. 
Where, these control variables are measured as follow. First, firm size (SIZE) is computed 
using the natural logarithm of market value of equity. Second, book to market (BTM) ratio is 
estimated as book value of common equity scaled by market value of equity. Third, financial 
leverage (LEV) is estimated as long term debt scaled by market value of equity. Fourth, 
analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) equals the standard deviation of one year ahead earnings 
per share forecast. Fifth, BETA is estimated using the market model with 60 months stock 
return. Sixth, the consensus long term growth forecast (LTG) equals the average long-term 
growth forecast in June or two-year consensus EPS forecast minus one-year consensus EPS 
forecast divided by the mean of one-year consensus EPS forecast. Eighth, news coverage 
(NEWS) is measured by using the natural logarithm of number of news articles about the 
firm. Seventh, institutional ownership (INSTOWN) equals the proportion of the shares 
outstanding owned by institutions. Ninth, earnings surprise (SURP) is estimated using natural 
logarithm of the consensus earnings forecast for forthcoming fiscal year minus actual earning 
divided by stock price. Tenth, return on assets (ROA) is measured by scaling the income 
before extraordinary items to book value of total assets. Additionally, full descriptions of the 
variables and measurements are presented in Appendix B. Appendix C provides all the model 
measurements and descriptions for measuring the cost of equity (COE). 
3.3.3! The empirical model  
To examine the impact of iDisc and other control variables on the implied cost of equity 
premium we employ the following Model (1): 
COE$% = 'β) + β+iDisc$% +'β0'SIZE$% +'β4'BTM$% +'β8'LEV +'β;'DISP$% +
'β='BETA$% +'β?'LTG$% +'βA'NEWS$% '+ 'βD'INSTOWN$% +
'β+)'SURP$% +'β++'ROA$% +'β+0 T%
0))D
%G0)+; + β+4'v$ +'ε$%  (1) 
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The dependent variable in Model (1) is the cost of equity (COE). The independent variable is 
firm’s dissemination of financial information on Twitter (iDisc). The control variables are 
firm size (SIZE), book to market (BTM), financial leverage (LEV), analysts' forecast 
dispersion (DISP), beta (BETA), long-term growth forecast (LTG), news coverage (NEWS), 
institutional ownership (INSTOWN), earnings surprise (SURP) and return on assets (ROA).  
Our estimation procedures utilised pooled cross-sectional regressions with robust standard 
error clustered at the firm level to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity 
(Petersen, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2015; Ferris et al., 2017).8 To mitigate 
potential endogeneity between iDisc and the COE (Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005), we utilise 
a two-stage least square model (2SLS) with clustered standard error at the firm level.9 We use 
non-iDisc tweets in the previous year (LagOthertweet) as the instrumental variable in line 
with prior social media and business press literature (Drake et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a). 
This instrumental variable is related to iDisc and is not directly related to the COE. In 
addition, LagOthertweet captured the prior tendency of firm activity and responsiveness in 
their Twitter account, which is likely to be correlated to iDisc. This measure also represents 
the amount that corporate firms added to their Twitter accounts. The results of the F statistic 
in the first stage is 34 which is greater than the critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock, 1997). 
Also, the association between LagOthertweet and iDisc is positive and significant, which is 
consistent with our prediction and the previous literature (Lee et al., 2015a). 
3.4! Results and Discussion 
3.4.1! Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1-Panel (A) reports the percentage of firms that have adopted Twitter and use iDisc 
in our sample. The results show that over 66% of firms used iDisc at least once in our sample 
period and 44% of the firms have disseminated financial information over Twitter for at least 
three years. This indicates that firms consider Twitter to be a suitable channel for 
disseminating financial information and many of these firms are persistent in their use of 
Twitter. This finding is comparable with Jung et al. (2018b), who found that more than 57% 
of firms that have a Twitter account disclose earnings-related tweets. Panel (B) shows that the 
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""" """"""""""""""""""""
8 The Breusch-Pagan test shows significant results (p-value = 0.000), indicating the presence of 
heteroscedasticity. 
9 To test for the endogeneity, we ran the Durbin Wu-Hausman test. The results show a P-value of 0.31, 
suggesting that endogeneity is prevalent."
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percentage use of each iDisc class varies across the years and it also shows the average 
number of tweets per year. We find that the mean number of iDisc tweets of the full sample 
is, on average, seven tweets per year per firm. The results show that the number of such 
tweets grows substantially over time, which offers some primary insights into the role of 
Twitter in the dissemination of financial information by firms. This can be justified through 
the SEC guidance of April 2013, which motivates firms to use Twitter for dissemination 
purposes (Dorminey et al., 2015). In addition, the results show that financial reporting tweets 
are the dominant type of iDisc, two-thirds of iDisc being related to financial reporting, which 
far exceeds other types. To illustrate more, the results indicate that on average 70% of firms’ 
financial tweets are related to financial reporting. This finding is consistent with Jung et al. 
(2018b), who found a higher number of tweets related to the earnings releases. Our results 
also show that 7%, 21%, and 15% of iDisc tweets were related to financing, financial terms 
and financial ratio respectively. Nevertheless, the classification procedures allow multiple 
classification schemes where tweets may fall into more than one category. This means that 
the classification of tweet is not exclusive to a specific category and each tweet could be 
classified in more than one class. As such, the percentage sum of financial reporting, 
financing, financial terms and financial ratio may exceed hundred percent. However, iDisc 
calculation does not take into the account the classification of tweets; but it considers whether 
each tweet contain financial information, as explained in Section 3.3.2.2. 
Panel A: Twitter and iDisc Adoption among Firms in the Sample 
Type % to Firms with Twitter Account 
Firms use iDisc once 66% 
Firms use iDisc for three 
years 
44% 
Notes: Panel (A) provides the percentage of firms in NASDAQ, with a Twitter 
account, which uses iDisc once and for three years. 
Panel B: Average iDisc use among Firms 
Years Average iDisc 
 Tweets 










      
2009 1 70% 11% 22% 18% 
2010 3 68% 10% 25% 18% 
2011 6 68% 10% 27% 27% 
2012 6 70% 8% 23% 16% 
2013 8 69% 8% 23% 14% 
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2014 11 76% 6% 17% 11% 
2015 13 77% 5% 18% 11% 
Average 7 73% 7% 21% 15% 
      
Notes: Panel (B) reports the average number of iDisc tweets per year and summary 
statistic of the percentage use of iDisc components across the sample period. 
Table 3.1: Firm Twitter and iDisc Characteristics 
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of iDisc activity based on the Fama-French 12-industry 
classification. The distribution of iDisc tends to be heterogeneous across industries. The 
highest use during the whole sample period is prevalent in the business equipment industry. 
For this industry, at least half of the companies used iDisc once, which represents 
approximately 37% of the total number of firms that use iDisc. This result is expected given 
that firms in the business equipment industry are more likely to adopt this new 
communication channel (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Although the oil and gas industry shows a 
high reliance on iDisc, consistent with Jung et al. (2018b), the percentage of iDisc tweets is 
rather low as compared to other sectors, with a low concentration for the number of firms. In 
contrast, firms in food, tobacco, textiles, apparel, leather and toys classifications tend to focus 
more on non-financial information. 
Fama-French 12-Industry classification Percentage of iDisc based on 
Industry Total iDisc  
   
Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel, Leather, Toys 15.3% 1.2% 
Cars, TV's, Furniture, Household Appliances 16.5% 1.0% 
Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Office Furniture, Paper, Com 
Printing 33.6% 4.1% 
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products 43.8% 0.3% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 48.1% 1.2% 
Software, Computers, and Electronic Equipment 54.0% 37.2% 
Telephone and Television Transmission 39.4% 4.1% 
Utilities 29.8% 0.7% 
Shops Wholesale, Retail, and Laundries, Repair Shops 
Services 16.2% 4.1% 
Healthcare, Drugs and Medical Equipment  36.4% 17.0% 
Mines, Construction, Bldg Material, Transportation, Hotels, 
Business Service, Entertainment 36.0% 28.9% 
Notes: The table provides summary statistics of firm use of iDisc across Fama-French 12-
industry classification excluding financial industry for NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts 
from 2009 to 2015. 
Table 3.2: Industry Summary of iDisc 
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Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables considered. The summary statistics 
of the dependent variables show that the mean estimate of COE is 5%, which is in line with 
the prior evidence (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Attig et al., 2013; Cao et al., 2015). COE is based 
on four estimates: ROJ, RMPEG, RCT and RGLS. In comparison, ROJ, RCT and RGLS show higher 
premiums than COE of 6.7%, 5.8% and 10.2% respectively, whereas a lower premium of 
4.4% is associated with RMPEG.  The mean of firm size (SIZE) is 21.15, and the unreported 
mean (median) of firm size is $9144.4 million ($1277.7 million). The mean (median) of 
book-to-market (BTM) equals 0.42 (0.35). Sample firms have a mean financial leverage 
(LEV) of 15%. The median of dispersion (DISP), systemic risk (BETA) and the long 
consensus forecast of earnings estimates (LTG) are 8%, 1.03 and 15% respectively. Also, the 
mean and median of BETA are greater than one, which indicates that the sample consists of 
firms that have higher systematic risk than the market. These results are comparable to prior 
studies (Cao et al., 2015). Additionally, the average news coverage (NEWS) is 5.87, and 
approximately 86% of firms are owned by institutional owners (INSTOWN). The mean 
average of earnings surprise (SURP) is equal to 0.2, which is in line with (Chen et al., 2011). 
However, the mean of the profitability measure (ROA) is (4.9%), compared to a median of 
5.4%. 
Variables N Mean Median Min Max SD 
       
COE 1737 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.17 0.03 
iDisc 1737 1.10 0.00 0.00 5.59 1.37 
SIZE 1732 21.15 20.97 17.01 27.16 1.71 
BTM 1732 0.42 0.35 -0.01 1.75 0.31 
LEV 1736 0.15 0.08 0.00 0.8 0.17 
DISP 1588 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.93 0.16 
BETA 1600 1.06 1.03 -2.08 3.88 0.56 
LTG 1737 0.2 0.15 -1.2 0.847 0.13 
NEWS 1729 5.87 5.65 1.61 8.94 1.13 
INSTOWN 1490 0.86 0.92 0.00 1.71 0.26 
SURP 1559 0.20 0.04 -3.70 3.77 0.69 
ROA 1737 0.049 0.054 -1.21 0.22 0.11 
       
Notes: The table summary statistics are presented for COE estimates, iDisc and other control variables for 
NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for definitions of the 
variables. The table presents the number of observations (N), mean (Mean), median (Median), minimum 
(Min) and maximum (Max) values and standard deviation (SD). To control for outliers, we use a winsorizing 
level of 2.5th to 97.5th percentiles for COE, LEV, DISP, BETA, LTG and ROA. 
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for all the Variables 
The Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix is presented in Table 3.4 for all the variables at 
the 10% significance level. The correlation matrix shows a significant and negative 
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correlation between COE and iDisc. This finding provides a preliminary conclusion that 
firms which use iDisc have a lower COE. Results indicate that smaller (larger) sized firms 
have a higher (lower) COE. High risk, measured by BTM, LEV, DISP, BETA, LTG and 
SURP, is associated with high risk-premiums. Richer information environment variables 
(NEWS and INSTOWN) are negatively correlated with COE. The result also show that ROA is 
negatively correlated with COE. Overall, correlations between COE and the other 
independent variables are in line with expectations and previous studies (Orens et al., 2010; 
Cao et al., 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2016). Moreover, in Table 3.4 iDisc is negatively correlated 
with, DISP and ROA, and non-significantly negative correlated with BTM, LTG and SURP. 
These correlations suggest that enhanced iDisc alleviates the uncertainty and risk factors. The 
table also show that iDisc is positively correlated with SIZE, BETA and NEWS. The positive 
correlation between firm SIZE and iDisc indicates that larger firms publish more iDisc tweets. 
Furthermore, firms with a higher rate of news (NEWS) use iDisc more. The correlations also 
show that firms with higher BETA are more likely to release financial information on Twitter. 
In addition, the results show that lower return on asset (ROA) firms use iDisc more 
frequently. Considering both the Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix and unreported 
VIF tests indicates that multicollinearity is not dominant across our control variables. 
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Variables  COE iDisc SIZE BTM LEV DISP BETA LTG NEWS INSTOWN SURP ROA 
COE 1 -0.11*** -0.24*** 0.37*** 0.1*** 0.06* 0.1*** -0.03 -0.04 -0.1*** 0.09*** -0.08** 
iDisc -0.084*** 1 0.13*** 0.002 0.012 -0.06** 0.12*** -0.05 0.11*** -0.055 0.02 -0.08** 
SIZE -0.29*** 0.18*** 1 -0.38*** 0.16*** 0.2*** -0.01 -0.19*** 0.64*** 0.15*** -0.3*** 0.38*** 
BTM 0.38*** -0.032 -0.44*** 1 0.005 0.07** 0.1*** -0.2*** -0.12*** -0.06* 0.24*** -0.42*** 
LEV 0.09*** 0.02 0.15*** -0.06** 1 0.1*** -0.03 -0.2*** 0.17*** 0.05 -0.05 -0.21*** 
DISP 0.05** -0.05 0.29*** -0.05 0.06** 1 0.1** -0.03 0.23*** 0.1** -0.07** 0.04 
BETA 0.15*** 0.09*** -0.03 0.09*** -0.04 0.06** 1 0.07** 0.09*** -0.02 0.12*** -0.1*** 
LTG 0.24*** -0.001 -0.18*** -0.05** -0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05** 1 -0.12*** -0.03 0.1*** -0.11*** 
NEWS -0.08*** 0.11*** 0.63*** -0.17*** 0.092*** 0.26*** 0.05** -0.08*** 1 -0.06** -0.07** 0.11*** 
INSTOWN -0.17*** 0.005 0.24*** -0.1*** 0.07*** -0.005 -0.03 -0.13*** 0.13*** 1 -0.14*** 0.04 
SURP 0.177*** -0.001 -0.25*** 0.15*** -0.032 -0.05** 0.079*** 0.18*** -0.09*** -0.185*** 1 -0.3*** 
ROA -0.24*** 0.015 0.32*** -0.204*** -0.07*** 0.037 -0.05 -0.27*** 0.12*** 0.152*** -0.22*** 1 
Notes: The table presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation between COE, iDisc and control variables for NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. 
See Appendix (B and C) for the descriptions of the variables. ***, **, * present the statistically significant level at 1%, 5% and <10% respectively.  
Table 3.4:  Pearson and Spearman Correlations for the Cost of Equity (COE), iDisc and other control Variables
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3.4.2! Empirical results 
Table 3.5 reports the results of the two estimation models (i.e., OLS in column 1 and 2SLS in 
column 2) for the association between iDisc and COE. Results show a negative and 
statistically significant association between iDisc and COE (p < 0.05) in OLS and (p < 0.1) in 
2SLS.10 Our results show that the economic significance of iDisc is -0.16%, which 
means that if iDisc tweeting increases by 50%, the COE is expected to change by -0.08%. 
However, the finding suggests that firms that disseminate more financial information (iDisc) 
have a lower COE. This implies that firms’ decisions to engage in broader dissemination 
actions through iDisc promote financial benefits for both investors and managers. That is, 
investors can receive a firm’s information at a lower acquisition cost and managers are able 
to alleviate the information asymmetry as well as enhance investor recognition. Although 
tweets are not expected to have comprehensive information, the results show that iDisc can 
still reduce COE, which supports our hypothesis. This finding is in line with our expectation 
that the effect of tweets should be small as it is less likely to have rich information. However, 
tweets provide an accessible (open) use for managers at lower costs, efficient timings and 
better control. This finding is consistent with other communication mechanisms such as 
corporate websites and open conference calls that firms can use to disseminate their 
information to the public openly (Zhao et al., 2009; Orens et al., 2010). Nevertheless, these 
channels are used as primary channels for disclosing corporate information whereas Twitter 







10 The reduction in sample size is due to the additional data requirements. To check whether our results are affected 
by missing data, we also ran the regression with the lagged iDisc as the instrumental variable. The Lagged iDisc 
can be an appropriate instrument as it is less likely to affect the cost of equity once year later. The Hausman test 
is 0.39, with first stage partial square equal to 0.59. In addition, a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) models 
is applied and show a negative association between iDisc and COE. These results are presented in the appendix 
D. Overall, our main results remain unchanged using these estimation models. 
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 (1) (2) 
 (OLS) (2SLS) 
   
iDisc -0.0016** -0.0045* 
 (0.0007) (0.0026) 
SIZE -0.0028*** -0.0024* 
 (0.0011) (0.0013) 
BTM 0.0404*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0048) 
LEV 0.0292*** 0.0265*** 
 (0.0059) (0.0081) 
DISP 0.0041 0.0074 
 (0.008) (0.0106) 
BETA 0.0056*** 0.0062*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0023) 
LTG 0.0290*** 0.0341*** 
 (0.0097) (0.0116) 
NEWS 0.0036*** 0.0052*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0016) 
INSTOWN -0.0043 -0.0053 
 (0.0051) (0.0064) 
SURP 0.0034** 0.0033* 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) 
ROA 0.0248 0.0377* 
 (0.0176) (0.0222) 
   
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
Wu-Hausman Test  0.31 
   
Constant 0.0556*** 0.0388 
 (0.019) (0.0249) 
   
Observations 1,146 744 
R2 0.389 0.392 
Notes: The table presents the regression results of the impact of iDisc on COE. The sample consists of 
nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for 
definitions of the variables and measurements. Column (1) represents the results from pooled cross-sectional 
regression clustered at the firm level (OLS). Column (2) reports the results from the second stage of the 2SLS 
regression model. *, **, *** signify the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.5: The Impact of iDisc on Cost of Equity (COE) 
With respect to other variables, across the two columns, we find a negative coefficient on 
firm size (SIZE) and positive coefficients on the book-to-market ratio (BTM) and financial 
leverage (LEV), which is consistent our prediction. Additionally, COE tends to significantly 
increase systematic risk (BETA), with positive coefficients, which is consistent with our 
59#
#
prediction. These findings suggest that firms with higher uncertainty are associated with a 
higher required rate of return. The coefficient on LTG is positive and significant, which 
supports our expectation, indicating that the market perceives high growth firms as riskier. 
News coverage (NEWS) shows a positive association, which suggests that more news 
coverage, which is not under the firm's control, increases the COE. That is, firms with higher 
media coverage face more risk than lower coverage firms. These firms have higher 
stakeholder pressure as they are exposed to more stakeholder groups (Zyglidopoulos et al., 
2012). They also have higher levels of scrutiny from stakeholders, which makes them more 
vulnerable to campaign targets (Friedman, 1991; Rehbein et al., 2004). In addition, previous 
literature (Niessner and So, 2018) found that media coverage may favour negative news. 
Therefore, firms with more news coverage could face higher risks of getting into difficulties 
when the media provide misshaping or negative news, which consequently increases the COE 
capital (Kothari et al., 2009a). The coefficient on earnings surprise (SURP) is significantly 
positive, suggesting that firms that have higher optimism about analysts’ earnings forecasts 
have a greater COE (El Ghoul et al., 2011), which confirms our prediction. However, our 
results show no association for DISP, INSTOWN and ROA in Column (1) and positive 
association for ROA in column (2). 
3.4.3! The firm visibility effect 
Firms seek to attract investor attention, as well as reduce investor acquisition costs, by 
disseminating information through many information intermediaries (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2009). If firms with low press coverage rely on a small number of 
communication channels which are reasonably affordable, there is a high chance that 
investors will not receive news about the firm on a real-time basis. Therefore, low (high) 
visible firms are less (more) likely be frequently observed by market participants, and, hence, 
lower (higher) investor recognition and higher (lower) COE are likely (Merton, 1987). 
Accordingly, low visibility firms might have a higher need to disseminate firm news and, 
hence, rely more on iDisc. Under these scenarios, iDisc will help firms improve firm 
visibility and be less dependent on other information intermediaries, by voluntarily making 
dissemination decisions and directly approaching market participants promptly (Blankespoor 
et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018b). As such, we predict that the impact of iDisc on the implied 
COE is more pronounced for less visible as compared to more visible firms. 
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To measure firm visibility, we have used firm size (SIZE), analyst following (ANALYSTS) 
and the number of investors (LNOWN) as proxies for a firm's visibility, where the upper 
quartile (lower three quartiles) is used to proxy for highly visible (low visible) firms.11 These 
proxies are in line with Merton (1987), who argues that there is a stronger effect of investor 
recognition for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk. That is to say, firms with a smaller size, 
low analyst following, and a limited number of investors are less visible to market 
participants (Agarwal et al., 2016). Although firms may issue voluntary disclosure to attract 
market participants, smaller sized firms are likely to be neglected and may not be able to 
benefit from such actions (Bushee and Miller, 2012). To overcome this concern, some firms 
attempt to initiate investor relation programmes to attract investor recognition and analyst 
followings (Bushee and Miller, 2012). This is likely to provide valuable communication 
sources to mid-size and/or small firms, given that large analyst following is associated with 
an increased demand for the firm's stock, which as a result improves the firm's value 
(Agarwal et al., 2016). Also, previous research (Lehavy and Sloan, 2008) has argued that 
firm value is positively associated with the investor base.  
We partitioned the full sample into high and low visibility firms under each variable, and the 
results are presented in Table 3.6 using OLS estimation with clustered standard errors at the 
firm level. The findings provide strong evidence that lower-visibility firms use iDisc to 
reduce their COE, with significant and negative coefficients reported under columns 2, 4 and 
6 (p < 0.01, p < 0.01 and p < 0.01 respectively). These findings are also consistent with prior 
studies which show that the effect of investor recognition is more pronounced for small-sized 
firms (Merton, 1987; Blankespoor et al., 2014; Agarwal et al., 2016). Additional evidence 
suggests that corporate dissemination reduces the COE for firms with low information 
certainty, low analyst following and a limited number of investors (Botosan, 1997; Orens et 
al., 2010). In contrast, we find that high-visibility firms with high investor awareness tend not 
to rely on iDisc to reduce the COE and consistently show insignificant associations with 
COE. This might be attributable to large firms having more analysts following them and a 
larger number of shareholders. Accordingly, these firms seem to benefit from other channels 
of dissemination and may be reached by more traditional information intermediaries. 
However, firm size (SIZE) is not included in the column 3 and 4 due to the high correlation 
######################################## ####################
11 Analyst following (ANALYSTS) is defined as natural logarithm of number of analysts making an earnings 




between firm size (SIZE) and analysts following (ANALYSTS), which could cause a 
multicollinearity problem. That is, firms that are larger in size have a higher analysts 
following (Sun and Liu, 2016). Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion that 
broader dissemination to the public on Twitter improves firm visibility, which leads to better 
recognition and lower cost of equity, consistent with prior literature (Lehavy and Sloan, 




























       
iDisc 0.00005 -0.003*** -0.0003 -0.0036*** 0.0003 -0.003*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008) 
SIZE -0.0012 -0.0055***   -0.0001 -0.0076** 
 (0.0031) (0.0017)   (0.0043) (0.0031) 
BTM 0.0487*** 0.0362*** 0.0495*** 0.0403*** 0.0512*** 0.0316*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0042) (0.0072) (0.0046) (0.0111) (0.0078) 
LEV 0.0341** 0.0289*** 0.0308*** 0.0311*** 0.0259* 0.0305*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0068) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0141) (0.0071) 
DISP -0.0017 0.0085 0.0029 -0.006 0.0008 -0.0018 
 (0.0101) (0.0097) (0.0096) (0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0097) 
BETA 0.0068 0.0053*** 0.0053** 0.0054** 0.0052 0.0062*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0046) (0.0019) 
LTG 0.0327*** 0.0314** 0.0246 0.0313*** 0.0041 0.0320*** 
 (0.011) (0.0124) (0.0246) (0.0107) (0.0263) (0.0106) 
NEWS 0.0031 0.00315* 0.0016 -0.0001 0.0052** 0.0023 
 (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.002) 
INSTOWN -0.0054 0.0001 0.0072 -0.006 0.0082 -0.0025 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.0068) (0.0081) (0.0061) 
SURP 0.0033 0.0029* 0.0019 0.0033* 0.0037 0.0025 
 (0.0052) (0.0016) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0017) 
ROA 0.110*** 0.00343 0.0952*** -0.0333* 0.0950*** 0.0109 
 (0.0293) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0338) (0.0186) 
ANALYSTS   0.0041 -0.0036   
   (0.0048) (0.004)   
LNOWN     -0.0047 0.0025 
     (0.0065) (0.0026) 
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Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.00872 0.114*** -0.0295* 0.0360** 0.0032 0.152*** 
 (0.0647) (0.0320) (0.0159) (0.0169) (0.0675) (0.0514) 
Observations 341 805 541 605 328 801 
R2 0.275 0.443 0.350 0.442 0.355 0.430 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) of the impact of iDisc on COE based on firm visibility. The sample consists of 
nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for definitions of the variables and measurements. The full sample is 
divided into subsamples based on firm size, analyst following and number of investors. Firm observation placed on the 4th (1s, 2d, 3d) quartile level is designated as high 
visible (low visible) firms. Columns (1-2) represent the relation based on firm size (SIZE). Analyst following (ANALYSTS) is added to columns (3-4) and number of 
investors (LNOWN) is added to columns (5-6). The coefficient estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS). *, **, *** 
represent the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
Table 3.6: The Effect of iDisc on Cost of Equity (COE) for High- and Low-Visible Firms 
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3.4.4! The effect of news magnitude and content  
Firms are likely to have incentives to disclose good news rather than bad news to positively 
affect their stock value (Skinner, 1994). Therefore, firms are expected to increase their 
dissemination of good news on Twitter, rather than negative news. Nevertheless, firms could 
also use Twitter to attenuate the effect of unfavourable firm announcements such as negative 
earnings surprise (Miller and Skinner, 2015) or product recall (Lee et al., 2015a). As such, we 
conjecture that firms that miss analysts’ forecasts have less incentive to use iDisc as 
compared to those with a positive earnings surplus. We expect that voluntary disclosure could 
be used to match managers’ and market expectations (Matsumoto, 2002). 
To examine the effect of news magnitude (i.e. negative/positive earnings surprises) on the 
conditional use of iDisc to reduce the COE we utilize our base Model (1) to additionally 
control for the absolute earnings surprise (|SURP|) as an indicator variable for negative 
earnings surprise (NegSURP), which takes the value of one when SURP is negative and zero 
otherwise. We also include two interaction variables between absolute earnings surprise with 
iDisc (|SURP| * iDisc) and negative earnings surprise (|SURP| * NegSURP). Therefore, we 
specify Model (2) as follows: 
COE$% = 'β) + β+iDisc$% + β0' SURP '$%'+'β5'NegSURP$% +'β9' SURP '$% ∗
iDisc$%' + 'β;' SURP '$% ∗ NegSURP$% + 'β<'SIZE$% +'β?'BTM$% +
'βC'LEV +'βF'DISP$% +'β+)'BETA$% +'β++'LTG$% +'β+0'NEWS$% '+
'β+5'INSTOWN$% +'β+9'ROA$% +'β+; T%0))F%J0)+; + β+<'v$ +'ε$%  (2) 
The definition of the variables in Model (2) are as follows: the dependent variable is the cost 
of equity (COE), the independent variable is firm’s dissemination of financial information on 
Twitter (iDisc) and the control variables are absolute earnings surprise (|SURP|), negative 
earnings surprise (NegSURP), interaction variables between absolute earnings surprise with 
iDisc (|SURP| * iDisc), interaction variables between absolute earnings surprise with negative 
earnings surprise (|SURP| * NegSURP), firm size (SIZE), book to market (BTM), financial 
leverage (LEV), analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP), beta (BETA), long-term growth forecast 




Since firms have the option to use Twitter, firms may use iDisc to provide more positive than 
negative news (Jung et al., 2018b). Therefore, we extend our analysis to identify the effect of 
news content on the conditional use of iDisc to reduce the COE. Previous literature (Kothari 
et al., 2009a) has studied the effect of the disclosure’s content by different information 
sources on the COE. They found different impacts on COE depending on the source 
(management, analysts and business press) and the content of the disclosure (favourable and 
unfavourable news). Johnstone (2016) also argues that the effect of financial reporting on the 
COE is subject to the direction of the report (what the report says). That is, bad information 
increases the uncertainty of future expected payoff and hence increases the COE. However, 
good news provides higher certainty of future cash flow and, thus, reduces the COE. To 
examine our predictions, using our base Model (1), we additionally include TONE as a proxy 
for iDisc contents and its interaction with iDisc (TONE_ iDisc). This measure aims to reflect 
whether iDisc tweets provide positive and negative meaning. We used Loughran and 
McDonald dictionary lists (2011) to identify the positive and negative words of iDisc tweets. 
We measured the TONE as the difference between positive and negative words divided by 
the sum of positive and negative words. Accordingly, our model (3) is specified as: 
COE$% = 'β) + β+iDisc$% + β0'TONE$% +'β5'TONE$% ∗ ' iDisc$% +'β9'SIZE$% +
'β;'BTM$% +'β<'LEV +'β?'DISP$% +'βC'BETA$% +'βF'LTG$% +
'β+)'NEWS$% '+ 'β++'INSTOWN$% +'β+0'SURP$% +'β+5'ROA$% +
'β+9 T%0))F%J0)+; + β+;'v$ +'ε$%  (3) 
The definition of the variables in Model (3) are as follows: the dependent variable is the cost 
of equity (COE), the independent variable is firm’s dissemination of financial information on 
Twitter (iDisc) and the control variables are tone (TONE), interaction variables between tone 
with iDisc (TONE * iDisc), firm size (SIZE), book to market (BTM), financial leverage 
(LEV), analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP), beta (BETA), long term growth forecast (LTG), 
news coverage (NEWS), institutional ownership (INSTOWN), earning surprise (SURP) and 
return on assets (ROA). 
We estimated Models (2) and (3) using OLS and the results are reported in Table 3.7. The 
result from Model (2) shows that the dissemination of financial information on Twitter 
(iDisc) is significantly associated with a lower COE even after controlling for the magnitude 
of the news. The results show that the coefficient of iDisc is equal to negative 0.13%, which 
indicates that increasing iDisc tweets by 100% reduces the COE by 0.13%.  Although this 
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may be a relatively small increase in % terms, this was a result of a very small number of 
posted messages. Increasing them can result in a high return of the time and effort put into 
systematically engaging investors. The coefficients of |SURP| is positive (statistically 
significant). However, NegSURP, |SURP| * iDisc and |SURP| * NegSURP are not 
statistically significant. These results are consistent with Jung et al. (2018), who found an 
insignificant result by using the total number of the firm’s followers, and with the idea that 
the dissemination of firm initiated information may improve the information environment. 
The findings highlight the important role of iDisc, which extends beyond the type of news. 
Concerning the effect of news content, results for Model (3) provide evidence that the TONE 
of the news does not drive the negative association between COE and iDisc. Both the level 
and interaction variables for TONE show insignificant associations with COE. That is, firms’ 
managers may benefit from iDisc even with unfavourable news. The overall findings provide 
limited support for the influence of news magnitude and news content on information 
dissemination through iDisc. These findings support our main findings and are in line with 
predictions. 
 Model (2) Model (3) 




   
iDisc -0.0013* -0.0017** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
|SURP| 0.001***  
 (0.0003)  
NegSURP 0.0008  
 (0.0017)  
|SURP| * iDisc  -0.00007  
 (0.0001)  
|SURP| * NegSURP -0.0004  
 (0.0003)  
TONE  0.00004 
  (0.0002) 
TONE * iDisc  -0.00001 
  (0.00004) 
SIZE -0.0026** -0.0028*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0367*** 0.0404*** 
 (0.004) (0.0041) 
LEV 0.0245*** 0.0292*** 
 (0.0062) (0.0059) 
DISP 0.0075 0.0041 
 (0.0085) (0.008) 
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BETA 0.0051*** 0.0056*** 
 (0.0018) (0.0018) 
LTG 0.0309*** 0.0289*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0098) 
NEWS 0.0032** 0.0036*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) 
INSTOWN -0.0045 -0.0043 
 (0.0052) (0.0051) 
SURP  0.0249 
  (0.0177) 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0028*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0011) 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0600*** 0.0559*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0195) 
Observations 1,229 1,146 
R2 0.401 0.389 
Notes: The table reports the effect of iDisc on implied cost of equity capital after controlling for news 
magnitude and information content. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter 
accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for definitions of variables and measurements. Model 
(2) presents the results after adding news magnitude based on earnings surprise variables. Model (3) includes 
the tone (TONE) of iDisc text, in which a tweet could convey the meaning of news reported and its interaction 
with iDisc (TONE * iDisc). TONE is measured based on positive and negative words from the Loughran and 
McDonald lists. The coefficient estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm 
level (OLS) and *, **, *** represent the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.7: News Magnitude of iDisc and Cost of Equity (COE) 
3.4.5! The effect of providing additional information and the reach of iDisc 
In this section, we examine the association between iDisc on COE by considering different 
measures of iDisc and COE. First, we count the iDisc tweets that include hyperlinks, as this 
allows users to acquire more information from websites by following the posted link 
(Blankespoor et al., 2014). Second, we examine the relationship studying the reach of iDisc 
tweets through counting the number of followers that receive iDisc tweets (size of the 
audience). The advantage of number of followers is that firm know the intended audience of 
their Twitter account which may be a factor that motivate firms to disseminate on Twitter  
and shape their information environment (Jung et al., 2018b). Tweets that are disseminated to 
larger followers expect to reach larger number of audiences and hence have more effect on 
the equity financing. Finally, we employ an alternative COE measure, RPEG (Easton, 2004), 
based on long-term horizon estimates. RPEG is measured as the difference between the median 
of 5 years ahead earnings per share forecast (FEPS5) and 4 years ahead earnings per share 
forecast (FEPS4) scaled by share price at June next year. Across different measures of COE, 
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Botosan et al. (2011) find that RPEG, which assumes no dividend payment, is a valid proxy for 
COE. They state that RPEG is a reliable measure “associated with firm-specific risk 
characteristics in a theoretically predictable and stable manner” (p. 1085). Empirical studies 
on the relationship between corporate disclosure and the COE also use RPEG as a proxy for 
COE (Kim and Shi, 2011; Mangena et al., 2016). The findings are presented in Table 3.8 and 
show that iDisc_Hyperlink and iDisc_Followers in column (1) and (2) are negatively and 
significantly associated with COE. This implies that tweets which permit more access to 
information or are diffused to extend to potential investors considerably reduce the COE. The 
results also show that tweets that are spread larger firm audience have stronger negative 
association with COE. The results in column (3) show a significant and negative association 
between RPEG (as an alternative measure of COE), which is consistent with our main findings. 
The use of the alternative estimation model to measure COE, which is based on on Easton’s 
(2004) model, RPEG, has increased the number of observations. That is, RPEG has more data 
availability and is measured differently from COE, which is based on the existence of four 
COE estimates. 







    
iDisc_Hyperlink -0.0015**   
 (0.0007)   
iDisc_Followers  -0.001***  
  (0.0002)  
iDisc   -0.0038** 
   (0.0017) 
SIZE -0.00280*** -0.003** -0.0113*** 
 (0.00107) (0.0013) (0.0026) 
BTM 0.0404*** 0.0388*** -0.0106 
 (0.00412) (0.0048) (0.009) 
LEV 0.0293*** 0.0268*** -0.0359** 
 (0.00591) (0.0067) (0.0153) 
DISP 0.00414 0.0037 0.0406*** 
 (0.00805) (0.0106) (0.0146) 
BETA 0.00563*** 0.0063*** 0.0101** 
 (0.00177) (0.0019) (0.005) 
LTG 0.0290*** 0.0247* 0.0697 
 (0.00974) (0.0141) (0.0447) 
NEWS 0.00361*** 0.0039** 0.0092*** 
 (0.00138) (0.0015) (0.0027) 
INSTOWN -0.00430 -0.0024 -0.037*** 
 (0.00511) (0.0057) (0.0139) 
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SURP 0.00341** 0.0033* 0.0119*** 
 (0.00159) (0.0017) (0.0042) 
ROA 0.0248 0.0029 -0.134*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.033) 
    
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant 0.0563*** 0.0589** 0.315*** 
 (0.0194) (0.0249) (0.0509) 
    
Observations 1,146 822 2,399 
R2 0.388 0.404 0.222 
Notes: This table represents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) using different 
measures of iDisc and COE. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts 
from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for definitions of variables and measurements. We use iDisc 
with hyperlink in column (1). In column (2), we use RPEG as an alternative measure of the cost of equity. The 
coefficient estimates are based on pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS) and *, 
**, *** represent the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Table 3.8: Applying Alternative Measures of iDisc and Cost of Equity (COE) 
3.4.6! Controlling for information quality and other firm characteristics 
In Table 3.9, we further check the robustness of our main results by controlling for a set of 
other variables in Model (1). First, we use discretionary accruals, based on Jones's model 
(Francis et al., 2008; Demirkan et al., 2012), as a proxy for information quality. Previous 
literature (Hughes et al., 2007; Lambert et al., 2011) has argued that information quality has 
both direct and indirect (through information asymmetry) effects on the COE. Francis et al. 
(2008) find that the impact of financial information on the COE becomes insignificant after 
controlling for information precision. Theoretical models (Lambert et al., 2007) indicate that 
information asymmetry does not affect the COE after controlling for information quality. In 
column (1), we, therefore, incorporate discretionary accruals measured as the difference 
between discretionary accruals based on Jones model and firm’s corresponding discretionary 












where TACC is total accrual, TA is total assets, ΔREV is change in revenue and PPE is gross 
property, plant and equipment. From the previous equation, α1 α2 and α3 are used to 

















Beside the variables that are defined, ΔREC is change in account receivables. However, 
ACCRUAL equal to [(TAit / TAit-1) – N_ACCRUAL]. 
Second, following previous research (Lee et al., 2015a; Jung et al., 2018b), we include an 
indication of the social media adoption of financial reporting, namely advertising intensity 
(ADVERTISING). This is calculated as total advertising expense divided by the total sales. 
Even though firms with high advertising expenses are more likely to have a Twitter account, 
firms that spend less on advertising tend to use Twitter for announcement purposes (Jung et 
al., 2018b). We also control for whether a firm headquarters is located in Silicon Valley 
(SILICON) and whether the firm’s manager is younger than the median age (CEOAGE). 
Firms that are located in Silicon Valley and have younger managers are more likely to adopt 
social media platforms (Lee et al., 2015a). Furthermore, we also control for the growth in 
sales (GROWTH_SALES) which is measured as the percentage change in sales from 
previous year. Firms with high growth in sales are more likely to adopt other communication 
channels such conference call for corporate reporting (Frankel et al., 1999). Previous 
literature (Lee et al., 2015a; Jung et al., 2018b) have also control for GROWTH_SALES. 
Finally, the implied COE is measured by using earnings estimates of analysts’ forecasts as a 
prediction of market expectations. Using these estimates might be subject to criticism as the 
poor market expectation by analysts may bias the implied COE estimates. Accordingly, 
previous studies suggest controlling for analysts’ sluggishness forecasts by including price 
momentum (Chen et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 2011). We, therefore, include the price 


















     
iDisc -0.0019** -0.0021** -0.0017** -0.0016** 
 (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
SIZE -0.0022* -0.003* -0.0032*** -0.0031*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0446*** 0.0491*** 0.0360*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0069) (0.0043) (0.0042) 
LEV 0.0290*** 0.0319*** 0.0292*** 0.0282*** 
 (0.007) (0.0083) (0.006) (0.006) 
DISP 0.0053 0.0019 0.005 0.0046 
 (0.0081) (0.0101) (0.0083) (0.0082) 
BETA 0.0049** 0.0045* 0.0066*** 0.0064*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0018) 
LTG 0.0435*** 0.0443*** 0.0312*** 0.0302*** 
 (0.0084) (0.0138) (0.01) (0.0097) 
NEWS 0.0022 0.0023 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0014) 
INSTOWN 0.0006 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0035 
 (0.0055) (0.0078) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
SURP 0.0053*** 0.0025 0.0038** 0.0034** 
 (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
ROA 0.0392* 0.0715*** 0.0289 0.0310* 
 (0.0214) (0.0199) (0.0186) (0.0181) 
ACCRUAL -0.0023    
 (0.0095)    
ADVERTISING  -0.009***   
  (0.0025)   
SILICON  0.0046   
  (0.0041)   
CEOAGE  0.0011   
  (0.0026)   
GROWTH_SALES  -0.0073   
  (0.0093)   
MMT6   -0.0103***  
   (0.0018)  
MMT12    -0.0128*** 
    (0.0021) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0318 0.0575** 0.0705*** 0.0660*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0287) (0.0197) (0.0194) 
Observations 675  549 1,100 1,115 
R2 0.445 0.423 0.411 0.415 
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Notes: This table presents the regression results from estimating our base Model (1) by including additional 
robustness tests for our selected sample. The sample consists of nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter 
accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for definitions of the variables and measurements. 
Column (1) controls for information quality by adding discretionary accrual (ACCRUAL) as a control variable. 
Column (2) reports the regression after adding variables that relate to social media adoption (ADVERTISING, 
SILICON, and CEOAGE). We have also added price momentum in the last 12 months and 6 months in 
columns (3&4) to control for the sluggishness of analysts' forecasts. The coefficient estimates are based on 
pooled cross-sectional regression clustered at the firm level (OLS) and *, **, *** represent the significance 
level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Table 3.9: Robustness Tests for Including Other Additional Variables 
The results in column (1) suggest that the negative effects of iDisc on COE is not affected by 
information quality, whereas discretionary accruals (ACCRUAL) are insignificant. This 
finding supports the incremental role of dissemination for corporate disclosure (Fang and 
Peress, 2009; Blankespoor et al., 2014), rather than the quality of information. When 
controlling for the effect of social media indicators, in column (2) we find a negatively 
significant association between iDisc and COE. While ADVERTISING is negative 
statistically significant, the other indicators of social media (SILICON, CEOAGE and 
GROWTH_SALES) report insignificant associations with COE.12 These results alleviate any 
concern regarding the willingness to adopt social media and the implications of the use of 
iDisc. Finally, the results in columns (3 and 4) show that the two indicators of momentum are 
negatively and significantly associated with COE, which is consistent with prior research 
(Chen et al., 2009). These findings suggest that the noise of analysts' forecasts does not drive 
our results. The negative and significant association between iDisc and COE is robust, which 
suggests that our main findings are not affected by analysts’ noise. 
3.5! Conclusion 
The amount of real-time data, “big data”, on social media has attracted various practices 
among many firms due to its application and involvement in people's daily life, resulting in a 
great deal of attention and business change (e.g. Raguseo, 2018). Social media such as 
Twitter has become a popular channel for many firms to disseminate financial information by 
directly reaching investors promptly. This study has examined the association between firms’ 
dissemination decisions about financial information and the COE. Overall, the findings 
support the idea that firms can use Twitter to improve the communication with investors, 
######################################## ####################
12 The decrease in the number of observations is due to missing variables. 
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which reduces the time and energy of acquiring news about the firm, reduces information 
asymmetry and enhances investor recognition and firm visibility.  
More specifically, the study has made a number of theoretical contributions. Firstly, using the 
implied COE as a proxy for COE, we find that iDisc is significantly and negatively associated 
with the COE. The results indicate that firms which rely more on iDisc to voluntarily 
disseminate financial information have significantly lower COE financing. This finding is 
robust for firm-specific risk, information intermediaries, analysts' forecast biases, earnings 
surprise and financial performance. Second, we have shown that the effect of iDisc is more 
pronounced for less-visible firms that are smaller in size, have a low analyst following and a 
limited number of investors. These findings are consistent with the investor recognition 
notion that highly visible firms are likely to have a lower impact on the COE since their 
information is already disseminated through other information intermediaries. Third, we have 
extended our analyses to examine whether the magnitude of the news, when missing earnings 
forecasts or conveying more negative or positive meanings, would affect our main findings. 
We find that iDisc is negatively associated with the COE even after considering the 
magnitude of the news. Finally, the results are robust to different iDisc and COE measures. 
As a sensitivity check, we have: (i) used iDisc with hyperlinks to reflect the diffusion and 
spread of information; (ii) used number of followers that receive iDisc to reflect the size of 
the audiences that firm information reaches; and (iii) applied the modified price-earnings 
growth (RPEG) model, as an alternative measure of the COE. The findings from these 
sensitivity analyses support our main results, suggesting that extensive use of iDisc reduces 
the COE. These findings motivate firms’ managers to use Twitter to disseminate financial 
information in order to enhance firms’ information environment and transparency and also to 
reduce the uncertainty and agency problem between informed and uninformed investors, 
which limits the firm’s accessibility to lower external financing costs. These findings also 
shed light on firm managers' concerns about firm visibility by showing that disseminating 
financial information on Twitter can benefit these firms and reach a wider number of 
investors. Managers should also consider engaging in iDisc activity to reduce the COE even 
when news about the firm is not favourable. 
Future research could examine other markets and how decision investments are affected by 
local social media practices. Similarly, other social media and big data platforms that have 
different characteristics to those of Twitter (e.g. Facebook or LinkedIn) could be considered. 
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For example, the size of Twitter messages (“a tweet”) is limited to 140 characters, which 
limits the information provided in each message. Other social media platforms do not have 
such limitations, which may mean that they have a different effect to Twitter. It would also be 
of interest to examine not just dissemination but also user engagement and whether the 
sectors in which firms operate and their business norms play a role in social media investor 
engagement. We also acknowledge some limitations regarding the variable measurements, 
such as using SILICON as a proxy for technology firms, which is subject to some limitations 
as not all technology firms' headquarters are located in Silicon Valley. In addition, the study 
is limited to firms that are traded on the NASDAQ stock exchange. Future studies can 
overcome this limitation by employing cross-country samples. Furthermore, the study focuses 
on COE and not cost of debt and hence does not reflect the total cost of capital. Thus, the 
study provides a venue for future studies to examine the effect of iDisc on cost of debt. 
However, our study provides comprehensive evidence that using social media as a 
dissemination channel can have a real effect on the capital market. Another limitation of the 
current study is the measures of cost of equity which are formulated on the forecasted values 
of different financial aspects, e.g. earnings, growth, and dividends. These forecasting figures 
are assessed and evaluated by different analysts which can be subjected to personal views of 












Chapter 4.! The Effect of Carbon Dissemination on Cost of Equity13 
4.1! Introduction 
Undoubtedly, climate change-related events that receive high media coverage and increased 
attention from environmental groups, governments, and investors motivate firms to make 
strategic investments to improve their environmental performance (El Ghoul et al., 2018) and 
to consider carbon impacts as part of their management strategy (Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 
2010; Sprengel and Busch, 2011). Such interest has “created opportunities and challenges for 
firms in their risk-return relationships with shareholders and other stakeholders” (Ng and 
Rezaee, 2015, p. 128). This interest also puts growing pressure on managers to satisfy 
shareholders’ carbon-related information demands to enable investors to assess potential 
risks, including regulatory, physical and business risks, and evaluate their investment strategy 
(e.g. Dobler et al., 2014). Managers, therefore, have incentives to show their proactivity by 
strategically conveying messages about carbon-related information to reduce investors’ 
uncertainty about future cash flows and to sustain a better competitive advantage and 
reputation (see Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997). The value of carbon 
information, however, is expected to increase as more stakeholders become aware of it 
(Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). While firms may disclose carbon information, it is difficult to 
ensure that this information reaches a larger set of investors by relying on traditional or third-
party communication channels, which results in information asymmetry (see Easley and 
O'hara, 2004; Blankespoor et al., 2014) and thus a higher cost of equity (COE) (e.g. Dhaliwal 
et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2014). Consequently, firms acknowledge the importance of 
improving the dissemination of their information apart from disclosure (Bushee et al., 2010; 
Bushee and Miller, 2012). Thus, a broader spread of carbon information allows potential 
investors to be aware of a firm’s information and enlarges the investor base, which in turn 
can improve firm value and reduce the COE (Merton, 1987; Heinkel et al., 2001; Byun and 
Oh, 2018). 
This study employs legitimacy theory to examine whether a firm’s dissemination of carbon-
related information (iCarbon) on Twitter’s social media network can influence a firm’s 
######################################## ####################
13 This chapter has been published at Journal of Business Strategy and the Environment: 
Albarrak, M.S., Elnahass, M. and Salama, A. (2019) ‘The effect of carbon dissemination on cost of equity’, 
Business Strategy and the Environment. Epub ahead of print. 
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COE.14 Social media is an essential tool for connecting stakeholders with firms, for 
influencing corporate practice, and for controlling corporate pollution and irresponsible 
practices (Jia et al., 2016). The Twitter platform, which enables the isolation of the effect of 
dissemination from that of disclosure (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018b), has 
“changed the disclosure landscape and the way firms communicate important information to 
stakeholders” (Lee et al., 2015a, p. 368) and can provide positive signals to market 
participants about a firm's environmental responsibility to respond to the uncertainty of 
carbon risks and to improve the firm's reputation and image (Barnett and Salomon, 2012). 
Twitter provides open platform for firm and the public to engage about environmental issues 
which helps firms to gain legitimacy (Grimmelikhuijsen and Meijer, 2015; Castelló et al., 
2016; Lee et al., 2018b). In addition, Twitter’s design of short messages (tweets) may allow 
many firms to gain legitimacy among stakeholders and avoid scrutiny by demonstrating that 
they are environmentally responsible organisations (see Stanny, 2013). Twitter also allows 
firms to know the size of their audience and the number of their followers, which may 
motivate their decision to disseminate to a broader audience, in a much more timely and 
efficient manner than a corporate website can achieve. Firms can share their news and discuss 
their performance through the use of a hashtag (#CarbonEmissions or #ClimateChange) to 
spread their messages to stakeholders who are concerned about global warming issues and 
threats and to attract the attention of these stakeholders. By retweeting, the recipients of 
carbon-related tweets can share this information with their followers to expand the 
information reach to a more diverse audience and to more potential investors. In essence, 
using Twitter allows firms to reach potential investors directly and prolongedly in a timely 
manner that can reduce the time, effort, and energy that investors need to spend on finding, 
searching for and accessing information (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Miller and Skinner, 2015). 
Twitter also mitigates information asymmetry by meeting the demand for information and 
ensuring its availability to investors (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2009; 
Blankespoor et al., 2014). 
######################################## ####################
14 Legitimacy is defined as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” 
(Suchman, 1995, p.574). Legitimacy theory argues that firms seek to alter public perception about the firm by 
legitimatising their activity though environmental reports (Cho and Patten, 2007). Firms’ dissemination of 
carbon-related information (iCarbon) may boost stakeholder support and help to ensure that the firm’s activities 
are perceived as legitimate.  
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Our paper makes several contributions to the extant literature. First, while the extant research 
(e.g. Sharfman and Fernando, 2008; Chen and Gao, 2011; Kim et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2015b; 
Peng et al., 2015; Balvers et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; Gupta, 2018; Jung et al., 2018a; Zhou 
et al., 2018; Fonseka et al., 2019) focused on temperature shocks, managing 
climate/environmental risks and responding to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) survey 
to examine market responses to firms’ voluntary climate change information disclosure or 
their associations with the cost of debt financing/equity capital, this paper examines the 
dissemination effect of carbon-related information via Twitter (iCarbon) on the COE. This 
broader effect is unlike that of disclosure and has its own capital market consequences 
(Bushee et al., 2010). Corporate disclosures also “often reach only a portion of investors, 
which results in information asymmetry among investors” (Blankespoor et al., 2014, p. 79). 
Second, the prior research (Bushee et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011) has paid particular attention 
to press releases, as an information intermediary, to examine the effect of dissemination on 
information asymmetry. The press, however, is biased towards the coverage of highly visible 
firms and often modifies the information released by firms by adding a discussion, providing 
opinions, and/or summarising the news (Blankespoor et al., 2014). In contrast, Tweets 
disseminated by firms are short and independent of media adjustments, which makes them 
most likely to be used for disseminating purposes rather than for providing comprehensive 
information. Finally, while previous studies (Chen et al., 2014; Jame et al., 2016; Bartov et 
al., 2018) examine the effect of user-granted information over social media on capital market 
activity, we focus more on firm granted information. Prior work shows how firms’ 
dissemination on Twitter improves market liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Prokofieva, 
2015) and attenuates negative market reaction to product recalls (Lee et al., 2015a) and 
acquisition announcements (Mazboudi and Khalil, 2017), to the best of our knowledge, no 
study has examined the effect of the Twitter dissemination of carbon-specific information on 
the COE. 
We employ a sample of 1,737 observations, representing 584 non-financial firms with 
Twitter accounts, listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange for the period 2009-2015. We use 
the implied cost of equity, which is based on the average of four estimates, as a proxy for the 
COE, and the number of tweets that relate to carbon information15, as a proxy for iCarbon. 
######################################## ####################
15 We focus on carbon information because US firms that emit at least 25,000 metric tons of CO2 are mandated 
to report their emissions, but not on Twitter, which allows us to differentiate the effect of dissemination from 
that of disclosure decisions. 
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Our findings show that the better dissemination of carbon information reduces a firm’s equity 
financing costs. We also examine the effect of firms’ environmental disclosure score on the 
association between iCarbon and the COE.16 Our results report no effect of environmental 
reporting, whereas iCarbon is negatively related to the COE. Consistently, we find similar 
results by examining the effect of environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure. 
Overall, our findings support the legitimacy theory and indicate that firms that voluntarily 
disseminate more carbon-related information have a lower COE. The results are robust for 
the alternative specifications of the model. 
The research provides several implications for firms’ managers, regulators, policymakers and 
investors. The findings of the research show that firms’ dissemination of financial 
information via Twitter (iCarbon) help managers to lower firms’ equity financing. This 
finding should embrace firm managers to use social media as communication channel to meet 
investors demand of information. In addition, regulators have less established rules and more 
flexibility over what information is disseminated through social media in comparison to other 
traditional disclosure channels (Blankespoor, 2018). Therefore, the research encourages 
policymakers to implement more rules toward firm use of social media to address carbon 
emission and climate change issue and material information. Carbon related information 
attract great interest due its influence on the ecosystems and human health/life (Giannarakis 
et al., 2017). As such, regulators should give more consideration to implement more rules to 
improve carbon related information and alleviating the harm to the ecosystem due to carbon 
emission. Beside managers and regulators, the findings of the study show that investors 
benefit from firm’s dissemination of carbon related information by reducing investors’ 
uncertainty over their required rate of return and making better decision making. 
The research provides several implications for firm managers, regulators, policymakers and 
investors. The findings of the research show that firms’ dissemination of financial 
information via Twitter (iCarbon) help managers to lower firms’ equity financing. This 
finding should encourage firm managers to use social media as a communication channel to 
meet investors’ demand for information. In addition, regulators have less established rules 
and more flexibility over what information is disseminated through social media, in 
comparison to other traditional disclosure channels (Blankespoor, 2018). Therefore, the 
######################################## ####################
16 The environmental disclosure score reflects the amount of environmental data that the firm reports and makes 
available to the public. 
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research encourages policymakers to implement more rules for firms’ use of social media to 
address carbon emissions, climate change issues and material information. Carbon-related 
information attracts great interest due its influence on ecosystem and human health/life 
(Giannarakis et al., 2017). As such, regulators should give more consideration to 
implementing additional rules to improve the reporting of carbon-related information and 
alleviate the harm to the ecosystem due to carbon emissions. Beside managers and regulators, 
the findings of the study show that investors benefit from firms’ dissemination of carbon-
related information by reducing investors’ uncertainty over their required rate of return and 
making better decisions. 
The organisation of the paper is as follows: the literature and hypothesis development are 
reviewed in section 2. The data and methodology are presented in section 3. Section 4 
presents the results and discusses the key findings. Section 5 concludes. 
4.2! Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Organisations operate in a social, political and economic context (Buhr, 1998) and have 
obligations to society in general that go beyond their interests and legal responsibilities. As a 
part of the modern project of justice and progress, organisations establish their legitimacy 
based on society’s perception of their contribution to the public good (Brunsson, 2006). The 
relationship between organisations and society, then, is viewed as a “social contract” in 
which their continuing existence relies upon adapting to the social norms, values, and 
expectations of organisations and their activities. Such a strategy is essential to obtain and 
preserve social approval or a licence to operate (Schepers, 2010), i.e., legitimacy17, by 
changing the societal perceptions of social constituencies (Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Patten, 
1992; Oliver, 1996; Buhr, 1998; Scherer et al., 2013). As Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) state, 
“Organisations seek to establish congruence between the social values associated with or 
implied by their activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social system 
of which they are a part” (p.122). Undoubtedly, “organisations that…lack acceptable 
######################################## ####################
17 The legitimacy concept is “rooted in neo-institutional social theory…and has branched out from sociology and 
is commonly used within legal scholarship that examines the connections among legal frameworks, social norms 
and decision making” (Bowen, 2014; p.59). Parsons (1960) viewed legitimacy in organisational institutionalism 
as the sharing of common values between the organisation and the social system in which it exists. Among other 
institutional theorists, Suchman (1995) provided an in-depth analysis of organisational legitimacy and referred 
to it as “a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p.574). 
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legitimated accounts of their activities…are more vulnerable to claims that they are negligent, 
irrational or unnecessary” (Meyer and Rowan, 2004, p.50, cited in Suchman, 1995, p.575). 
We use legitimacy theory (e.g. Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Suchman, 1995; Deegan and 
Gordon, 1996; Adams et al., 1998; Campbell, 2000; Garriga and Melé, 2004; Zhao, 2012) as 
a positive theory that embraces a system-oriented perspective, which is derived from political 
economy theory18 (e.g. Williams, 1999; Woodward et al., 2001; Deegan, 2014), to explain 
why firms disseminate carbon-related information via Twitter. Much of the prior research 
drawing on legitimacy theory to explain or predict particular managerial activities claims that 
environmental disclosures to communicate with society, on whom an organisation depends 
for its viability, are necessary to gain legitimacy among stakeholders (Zeng et al., 2012; 
Deegan, 2014), improve stakeholders’ perceptions of a firm’s environmental efforts (Cho and 
Patten, 2007; Plumlee et al., 2015), mitigate stock market risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; 
Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Salama et al., 2011), reduce the cost of equity capital (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2014; Fonseka et al., 2019; Lemma et al., 2019), improve financial 
performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Clarkson et al., 2011), and 
lessen exposures to political and public pressures (Cho et al., 2012) 
Lindblom (1994) identifies four possible paths to legitimisation to respond to such public 
pressure. The first path is to inform the relevant public about actual changes in activities or 
intentions to improve performance. The second path is to attempt to alter stakeholders’ 
perceptions of negative events without making any changes to those actions. The third path is 
to distract attention away from the threatening events by emphasising more positive actions 
that do not necessarily have to be related. The fourth path is to attempt to influence society’s 
expectations with regard to performance.  
It is also pertinent to note that legitimacy is “a multidimensional concept” (Álvarez-García et 
al., 2018, p. 72), which, according to Suchman (1995), is composed of three dimensions that 
co-exist in most real-world settings: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive legitimacy. Pragmatic 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) emphasises the self-interested calculations of the particular 
interests of an organisation’s most immediate social actors, through exchange, influence, or 
######################################## ####################
18 According to Gray et al., (1996), stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory are both derived from a broader 
theory that has been called political economy theory. The political economy is “the social, political and 
economic framework within which human life takes place” (Gray et al., 1996, p.47). The viewpoint included is 
that society, politics and economics are inseparable, and economic issues cannot be investigated without 
considerations of the political, social and institutional framework in which the economic activity takes place.  
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disposition. Pragmatic legitimacy occurs when the legitimacy granter fulfils his/her interests, 
achieving a value contribution, while acquiring specific commitments with the legitimacy 
seeker (Díez-de-Castro et al., 2018). The second dimension of legitimacy is moral (ethical) 
legitimacy, which “becomes the decisive source of societal acceptance for corporations in an 
increasing number of situations” (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006, p. 74). Stakeholder pressure 
reflects moral legitimacy (Salmi, 2008), which rests on judgements about whether a given 
activity is the right thing to do to promote the social welfare of the actors that surround the 
organisation, rather than on judgements about whether the evaluated objective benefits a 
particular set of constituents (Suchman, 1995). Therefore, “moral legitimacy should be 
achievable by claiming to be ethical and acting accordingly” (Treviño et al., 2014, p. 200). 
An organisation is evaluated as legitimate from a moral point of view when audiences 
perceive that it defends and pursues principles accepted and valued as socially positive, 
which are considered more important than private interests by such an organisation (Díez-de-
Castro et al., 2018; Miranda et al., 2018). Maintaining this legitimacy notion leads to 
competitive advantages, such as enhanced reputation (Schepers, 2010), which emphasises the 
economic benefits to organisations of being different (Bowen, 2014). Moral legitimacy is 
usually analysed by evaluating the appropriateness or desirability of the outcomes 
(consequential legitimacy), procedures (procedural legitimacy), structures (structural 
legitimacy), and leaders (personal legitimacy) used to achieve the objectives. Unlike moral 
legitimacy, cognitive legitimacy is established when the techniques and procedures used to 
achieve an organisation’s objectives are perceived to be adequate and accepted without 
question (Salmi, 2008; Iglesias-Pérez et al., 2018). Cognitive legitimacy accentuates that an 
organisation is granted legitimacy when audiences see its activities as fitting into their beliefs 
and assumptions or when they cannot imagine that an organisation would not be 
corresponding to their interests (Treviño et al., 2014). Cognitive legitimacy, therefore, 
represents a state of “comprehensibility” or a “taken-for-granted” (inevitability or 
permanence) (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Schepers, 2010) and operates at the subconscious 
level, making it difficult for the organisation to directly and strategically influence 
perceptions (Suchman, 1995). 
Using legitimacy theory as an interpretive lens, Patten (1992) examined the change in the 
environmental disclosures of annual reports by 21 North American petroleum companies in 
response to the increased environmental concern resulting from the 1989 Alaskan Exxon 
Valdez oil spill incident. He argued that if the Alaskan oil spill resulted in a threat to the 
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legitimacy of petroleum firms and not just to Exxon, then legitimacy theory would suggest 
that companies operating within the petroleum industry would respond by increasing 
environmental disclosures in their annual reports. Patten’s results show that there was a 
significant increase in the environmental disclosures made by the companies across the 
petroleum industry for the post-1989 period, even though the incident itself was directly 
related to one petroleum company. Patten suggested that threats to a firm’s legitimacy entice 
it to include environmental information in its annual report. Deegan and Rankin (1996) also 
utilised legitimacy theory to explore how organisations altered their environmental reporting 
practices in their annual reports around the time of environmental prosecutions. The sample 
consisted of 20 Australian companies, which were subject to successful prosecution by the 
New South Wales and Victorian Environmental Protection Authorities, during the period 
1990-1993. Of those firms that had been prosecuted, 18 provided positive and qualitative 
environmental news in their annual reports. Only two of the companies within the sample 
made any reference to the prosecutions. They found that prosecuted firms disclosed more 
environmental information (of a positive nature) in the annual report in the year of 
prosecution than any other year in the sample period. The prosecuted firms also disclosed 
more environmental information relative to non-prosecuted firms. The results of the study 
supported the view that management considered that the prosecutions negatively impacted 
the community’s perception of the organisation, and as a result, management made other 
affirmative environmental disclosures in the annual report to limit the likely damage to the 
company’s reputation as a result of the prosecutions. 
More recently, Cho et al. (2012) examined two competing theories (voluntary disclosure 
theory19 and legitimacy theory) to explain why some firms choose to disclose their 
environmental capital spending, while others do not. They found that disclosure does not 
appear to signal better future environmental performance relative to non-disclosure and that 
firms with worse environmental performance are more likely to disclose the amount they 
spend. They concluded that firms use environmental disclosure more as a strategic 
legitimising resource for reducing their exposures to political and regulatory concerns than as 
a mechanism for signalling superior environmental performance. Stanny (2013) examined 
voluntary disclosures concerning greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by US S&P 500 firms to 
######################################## ####################
19 Voluntary disclosure theory explains the disclosure of both general and financial environmental information 
(Bewley and Li, 2000). Such theory suggests that companies use the information “to signal an unobservable pro-
active strategy toward environmental concerns relative to poorer performing firms” (Cho et al., 2012, p.487). 
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the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) from 2006-2008 and found that many firms only 
answer the CDP questionnaire but do not disclose their emission amounts or how they 
account for them. Consistent with legitimacy theory's predictions, she concluded that firms 
disclose the minimum necessary to reduce adverse public opinion, avoid scrutiny, and deter 
the possibility of being targeted by a shareholder resolution. 
This paper contributes to empirical tests of legitimacy by examining a particular class of 
voluntary environmental information (iCarbon) and its dissemination impact on the COE. 
Climate change and its consequences present one of the most persistent threats to global 
economic stability (Peng et al., 2015) and have the potential to affect firms’ costs of equity 
capital, which is the required rate of return given the market’s perception of a firm’s riskiness 
(El Ghoul et al., 2011; Lui et al., 2016). The current emergence of investor interest in 
climate-related risks calls for a specific type of global data about such risks to support 
rational investment decisions (The Economist, 2017).  
Managers have private information about firms’ carbon profiles, including the carbon 
strategy, carbon emissions, and carbon reduction activities that is not directly accessible by 
outside stakeholders (Luo and Tang, 2014). Organisations seek to protect (or enhance) past 
legitimacy accomplishments that they have already acquired by developing “a defensive 
stockpile of supportive beliefs, attitudes and accounts” (Suchman, 1995, p. 595). Lee et al. 
(2015b) provided empirical evidence to support this theoretical supposition. They examined a 
sample of Korean firms from the CDP and concluded that firms could mitigate the adverse 
effects of carbon disclosure on shareholder value by communicating their carbon news 
periodically (i.e., carbon management efforts and performance through the media coverage of 
global warming in daily newspapers) in advance of its carbon disclosure. It can thus be 
implied that managers strategically release relevant information to maximise the value of the 
firm as perceived by capital providers (see Beyer et al., 2010).  
Accordingly, iCarbon can be considered a legitimate social contribution made by firms to 
enhance organisational credibility and legitimacy (see Lee et al., 2013; Lee et al., 2015b; 
Castelló et al., 2016) and can be among the various aspects of transparency in environmental 
reporting to change societal perceptions and to respond to climate change-related political 
and public pressures. iCarbon is also expected to reduce investors’ incentive to acquire 
private information by improving the broadness of information to a wider reach of investors, 
reducing information asymmetry, increasing share demand and thus reducing the COE 
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(Easley and O'hara, 2004; Blankespoor et al., 2014). Correspondingly, using iCarbon enables 
a firm to transmit carbon-related information at lower acquisition costs, allowing potential 
investors to gain knowledge about a firm’s environmental information and assess carbon-
related risks. Such a strategy increases the willingness among those investors to take on a 
larger portion of a firm’s shares, which improves risk diversification (risk-sharing) and hence 
reduces the COE (Merton, 1987; Heinkel et al., 2001; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008). 
Legitimacy, then, is a perception resource that organisations manipulate through various 
communication-related strategies (Aerts and Cormier, 2009; Deegan, 2014; Higgins and 
Larrinaga, 2014) to engage in dialogues with stakeholders, to portray an image that these 
organisations are trying to convey to the relevant public (Stanny, 2013), and to enhance their 
reputation (Ullmann, 1985; Hasseldine et al., 2005; De Villiers and Van Staden, 2006; Beyer 
et al., 2010; Busch and Hoffmann, 2011; Auger et al., 2013). As an innovative source of 
information, iCarbon serves as one of the communication channels between a firm and its 
stakeholders. Legitimacy theory suggests that the need to legitimise business actions will 
motivate managers to voluntarily disseminate carbon-related information on Twitter.  
Greater dissemination can increase investors’ recognition of a firm, which enlarges its 
investor base and thus enhances risk sharing and reduces the COE (Merton, 1987). 
Consistently, Heinkel et al. (2001) demonstrate that investors who ethically care about a 
firm’s green investment are willing to invest in ‘green’ firms and avoid ‘non-green’ firms, 
which puts greater pressure on polluting firms to improve their environmental performance. 
That is, ‘green’ firms can expect to have a larger investor base, which results in higher risk 
sharing and lower COE. In contrast, ‘non-green’ firms can expect to have fewer investors, 
lower risk sharing, lower stock prices and hence higher COE. As such, greater iCarbon can 
increase investors’ awareness of firms’ carbon-related information, making these firm more 
legitimate, which enlarges the investor base. In addition, using iCarbon allows a firm to 
transmit carbon-related information at lower acquisition costs, allowing many potential 
investors to know about a firm’s environmental information. This increases the willingness 
among those investors to take a larger position in a firm’s shares and hence reduce COE. The 
discussion above leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: The dissemination of carbon-related information on Twitter (iCarbon) has a significant 
and negative association with the cost of equity (COE). 
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4.3! Research Design 
4.3.1! Sample and data 
Our sample comprises all non-financial firms with official Twitter accounts that are listed on 
the US NASDAQ stock exchange for the period from 2009 to 2015. We focus on US firms 
because foreign firms are exposed to different transparency levels, which influence their 
COE. Additionally, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) permits firms to use 
social media, especially an interactive platform such as Twitter, for disseminating corporate 
information. Many US firms also adopt Twitter and use it for multiple purposes, including 
corporate announcements (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 2018b), which induces an 
expected coverage during the sample period. We also focus on a single stock exchange to 
avoid any effect from exchange listing (Bushee et al., 2010). NASDAQ is considered one of 
the main stock exchanges in the US after NYSE. Many technology firms are traded on the 
NASDAQ and they have a greater likelihood of adopting Twitter and have potential Twitter 
activity and coverage (Debreceny et al., 2002; Chen et al., 2010; Blankespoor et al., 2014; 
Lee et al., 2015a; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). In addition, NASDAQ-traded firms face more 
visibility concerns than those traded on the NYSE in terms of firm size and analyst following 
(Bushee and Miller, 2012; Dang et al., 2018), which makes these firms more relevant for the 
study. Furthermore, our sample period allows us to mitigate any macroeconomic effects of 
the financial crisis. 
Our data collection starts by identifying whether each firm in the sample has an official 
Twitter account. We first search firms’ websites, including the Investor Relations pages, for 
any links or mentions of a firm’s Twitter account. If a firm has not provided any Twitter 
account on its websites, we identify all profiles that match their names on Twitter by using 
the users’ search engine. We ensure that only certified accounts, with a blue verified Twitter 
badge, are considered, assuring that the firms are the main source of carbon-related 
information. We also use Google’s search engine to search for firms’ adoption and presence 
on Twitter. 
To measure the implied COE, we require all firms in our sample to have positive median 
earnings forecasts for one and two years ahead. These earnings forecasts are collected in June 
of each year to ensure that analysts have assimilated all the information from the fiscal year 
report in their forecasts. We also require firms to have available COE estimates. This 
procedure retains a full sample of 1,737 observations, representing 584 firms. 
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To download a firm’s tweets, we use two main features that are usually used to aggregate 
Twitter data. We first use Twitter’s application programming interface (API), which provides 
up to 3,200 tweets per user. If the number of tweets that the firm posts on Twitter exceeds 
3,200, we then use keyword searches using Twitter’s advanced search option. This procedure 
makes it easier to manually retrieve tweets. We refine our search criteria by using keywords 
that relate to carbon information (e.g., carbon, climate change, CO2, emissions, GHG, global 
warming, greenhouse gas, and pollution). We then merge all firms’ tweets from the Twitter 
API and advance search under one file. 
We use two sources (Bloomberg and DataStream) to collect the data used to estimate the 
dependent and control variables. We also use LexisNexis to count the number of articles that 
are disseminated on other communication channels and that are related to carbon information. 
We allocate these articles by using company identifiers and keyword search features. We use 
our carbon keyword list, mentioned in section 4.3.2.2, to retrieve carbon-related news 
articles. This procedure allows us to retrieve articles from many sources, such as The Wall 
Street Journal, USA Today, The Washington Post and The New York Times. We also 
winsorise the amount of carbon news coverage (CD_NEWS), financial leverage (LEV), long-
term growth forecast (LTG), beta coefficient (BETA), book-to-market ratio (BTM), earnings 
surplus (SURP) and the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (DISP) at the 2.5th to 97.5th 
percentiles to control for outliers. This Winsorising level is also used for the COE to 
eliminate negative values because we are not expecting investors to require a negative rate of 
return. 
4.3.2! Variables 
4.3.2.1! Cost of equity (COE) 
Our dependent variable (COE) is based on the implied cost of equity (Hail and Leuz, 2006; 
Hail and Leuz, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011), which is measured as the average of four COE 
estimates: (i) Claus and Thomas’ model (2001), RCT; (ii) Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan’s 
model (2001), RGLS; (iii) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth’s model (2005), ROJ; and (iv) Easton’s 
model (2004), RMPEG. We use the average of these estimates to reduce any estimation error of 
the COE (Hail and Leuz, 2006). We also use this measure because it enables us to 
differentiate between the influence of both cash flow and growth from the COE (Chen et al., 
2009). This estimate is useful for time-series variations in the COE (Pástor et al., 2008). 
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Overall, cost of equity is measured based on the average of four cost of equity estimates (ROJ, 
RMPEG, RCT and RGLS) minus risk-free return as discussed in Appendix C.  
4.3.2.2! iCarbon 
Our independent variable, iCarbon, reflects the number of carbon-related tweets that are 
disseminated to the public. We compute this measure by searching for keywords and phrases 
that relate to carbon-related information. In this regard, we use many keywords that were 
used in the prior literature and that align with carbon disclosure, reporting and information 
(e.g. Griffin and Sun, 2013; Hsu and Wang, 2013; Schmidt et al., 2013; Hahn et al., 2015; 
Lee et al., 2015b). We also use the Twitter hashtag key (#), a feature that can be used to 
broaden climate information and trigger discussions among users about an event or specific 
topic. Thus, we include many hashtags that relate to carbon emissions, climate change and 
global warnings. In general, we define several keyword lists based on combinations of words 
and single phrases to identify iCarbon tweets. 
To allocate iCarbon tweets, we process all collected tweets through a matching scheme 
program that we developed in Python. This program follows many steps: we ask the program 
to (1) read all firms’ tweets, (2) divide these tweets into words, (3) remove the words that 
have no meanings (“stop words” such as “a” and “the”) and (4) align these tweets with our 
keyword lists, which we define as follows: 
(“carbon*”, “emission*”, “gas”, “climate”, “GHG”, “pollution”, “CO2”) AND (“disclos*”, 
“report*”, “statement*” “release*”, “announce”, “declare*”). 
(“carbon* emission*”, “gas emission*”, “climate emission*”, “GHG emission*”, “pollution 
emission*”, “CO2 emission*”). 
(“greenhouse gas*”, “carbon dioxide”, “carbon neutral”, “carbon footprint”, “climate change”, 
“greenhouse effect*”, “carbon offset*”, “carbon monoxide”, “@CDP”, “global 
warming*”,“fossil fuel*”, “#globalwarming”, “#global_warming”, “#global-warming”, 
“#climate-change”, “#climatechange”, ”#climate_change”, “#climate”, “#carbonemission”). 
After matching firms’ tweets with our keyword lists, we count the annual number of tweets 
that match our keyword lists for each firm or zero otherwise. Figure 4.1 provides some 




Figure 4.1 shows two examples of iCarbon tweets 
4.3.2.3! Control variables 
Our control variables include many variables associated with firm characteristics such as firm 
size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM) and financial leverage (LEV) (Fama and French, 
1992; Botosan, 1997; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2009). Larger firms have a better 
information environment and thus a lower COE (Gebhardt et al., 2001). The COE increases 
for undervalued firms that have a greater BTM ratio. Additionally, firms that have high LEV 
in their capital structure expect to have a higher COE (Cao et al., 2015). We also expect a 
positive association with the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts (DISP), beta coefficient (BETA) 
and long-term growth forecast (LTG). Firms that have a more uncertain information 
environment, systematic risk or market mispricing would be expected to have a higher COE 
(Gebhardt et al., 2001; Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Botosan et al., 2011; El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Cao et al., 2015). We further control for the availability of information by other 
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intermediaries by including the amount of carbon news coverage (CD_NEWS) and the 
percentage of institutional holdings (INSTOWN) (Cao et al., 2015; Zhou et al., 2018). Prior 
literature shows inconclusive results carbon coverage (CD_NEWS) and cost of equity 
(Richardson and Welker, 2001; Li et al., 2017). Hence, we do not expect a certain direction 
between CD_NEWS and COE. We expect higher institutional ownership (INSTOWN) to 
improve a firm’s information environment and thus be associated with a lower COE (Griffin 
and Sun, 2013; Cao et al., 2015; Li et al., 2017). We also consider the content of firm news 
by controlling for earnings surplus (SURP). Due to the higher uncertainty of future earnings 
profitability, we expect that firms with negative earnings (LOSS) are difficult to analyse and 
thus have a higher COE (Orens et al., 2010). Furthermore, we include many variables that 
determine climate change/carbon information. Additionally, we control for independent 
directors (BOD_IND), the environmental committee (ENV_COMMITTEE), CDP 
participation (CDP), firm age (AGE) and whether the firm is subject to the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) Mandatory Reporting Rule. Independent board directors play a 
monitoring role in managerial decisions and activities, which enhances disclosure policy and 
transparency. An environmental committee plays an advisory role in the better management 
of emissions and disclosure policy and a motivating role in reporting reliable information. We 
also include the CDP to control for firms’ willingness to report carbon information. This 
measure represents the firm’s ability to identify carbon-related issues and their potential 
consequences (Jung et al., 2018b). Aged firms “tend not to choose to operate environmental 
information disclosure” (Zeng et al., 2012, p. 317). Firms in industries that are more sensitive 
to carbon information are more inclined to choose greater transparency in the policy of 
disclosure to avoid the scrutiny of regulators (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Therefore, we 
expect firms under EPA regulation to respond more to investor demand and to use iCarbon 
more. Technology firms are expected to be more inclined towards technology adoption, and 
thus, we expect them to be more active on Twitter (Blankespoor et al., 2014). The full 
definition and measurement of the control variables is discussed in the next paragraph.   
Firm size (SIZE) is measured as natural logarithm of firm’s equity market value. BTM equals 
the ratio of book value to market value. Financial leverage (LEV) is estimated by dividing the 
long-term debt to equity market value. Analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP) equals to 
standard deviation of one-year consensus forecast of earnings per share. BETA is beta 
coefficient of market model using 60 with at least 24 months stock and market return. The 
consensus long term growth forecast (LTG) is measured as the mean of long-term growth rate 
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of earnings forecast or two minus one year ahead average EPS forecast scaled by one year 
ahead average EPS forecast. News coverage (CD_NEWS) equals the natural logarithm of 
number of carbon-related news articles. Institutional ownership (INSTOWN) is measured by 
the percentage of firm’s shares owned by institutions. Earning surprise (SURP) equal the 
consensus earnings forecast minus firm’s earnings scaled by share price. LOSS is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm reports negative earnings and 0 otherwise. Board 
Independence (BOD_IND) is measured as the percentage of independent directors in the 
board. Environmental Committee (ENV_COMMITTEE) is dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 if a firm has an environmental committee and 0 otherwise. Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) participation is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm participate and 
report to CDP and 0 otherwise. Firm age (AGE) is measured as the number of years since the 
firm is listed. Environment protection agency industry rules (EPA) is measured as a dummy 
variable that take a value of 1 if the firm belong to industry under GHG Mandatory Reporting 
Regulation and 0 otherwise. Technology firms (TECH_FIRM) is an indicator variable that 
takes a value of 1 if a firm belongs to technology industry (SIC 3570-3579, 3610-3699, 7370-
7379, 3810-3849, 4800-4899, 4931, 4941) and 0 otherwise. The full definition and 
measurement of our dependent, independent and control variables are presented in 
Appendixes B and C. 
4.3.3! Model 
To examine the impact of iCarbon on COE, we employ the following Model 1: 
OdXPQ = ') ++'aOefghiPQ + '0'jklXPQ + '5'mMnPQ + '9'`XY +
';'okj[PQ + '<'mXMNPQ + '?'`MpPQ + 'C'Oo_]XqjPQ '+
'F'k]jMdq]PQ + '+)'j_W[PQ + '++'`djjPQ + '+0'mdo_k]oPQ +
'+5'X]Y_OdnnkMMXXPQ + +'+9'Oo[PQ ++;'NpXPQ '+ '+<'X[NPQ +
'+?'MXOr_skWnPQ + '+C MQ
0))F
QJ0)+; + 'tPQ  (1) 
The dependent variable in model 1 is the implied cost of equity (COE). The independent 
variable is the amount of carbon-related information that firms disseminate on Twitter 
(iCarbon). The control variables are as follows: firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio 
(BTM), financial leverage (LEV), analysts' forecast dispersion (DISP), beta (BETA), 
consensus long-term growth forecast (LTG), carbon news coverage (CD_NEWS), percentage 
of institutional ownership (INSTOWN), earnings surplus (SURP), indicator for loss-making 
firms (LOSS), the proportion of independent directors on the board (BOD_IND), whether the 
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firm has an environmental committee (ENV_COMMITTEE), CDP participation (CDP), firm 
age (AGE), whether the firm is subject to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
whether the firm is a technology firm (TECH_FIRM). 
Our estimation procedures employ pooled OLS regressions with robust standard error 
clustered at the firm level to control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Petersen, 
2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2015; Ferris et al., 2017).20 We also utilise a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) model as an alternative estimation, clustered at the firm level, to 
control for any potential endogeneity between iCarbon and the COE (Nikolaev and Van Lent, 
2005). In this model, we use both the lagged value of iCarbon and the industry-year iCarbon 
mean as our instrumental variables. These instruments are more related to a firm’s 
engagement in iCarbon but do not necessarily affect the firm’s value or COE (Schreck, 2011; 
Cheng et al., 2014). Firms’ performance environmental and social issues is influenced by 
other firms’ performance in the same year, country and industry, whereas iCarbon in the 
prior year is expected to reflect firms’ persistence and the stability of using iCarbon over 
time. To capture the validity of these instruments, our tests show that both LAG_iCarbon and 
IND_iCarbon are significantly correlated with iCarbon. We perform two diagnostic tests to 
identify the validity of both the IVs and the specification of our system equations, the Sargan 
test (mis-specification test with the null hypothesis of no mis-specification) and the Breusch 
and Pagan LM test (to examine whether cross-equation disturbances are truly associated with 
each other and if the equations need to be tested simultaneously).21 Both IVs theoretically and 
statistically satisfy the necessary conditions for validity and relevance, and hence, the 2SLS 
results tend to be consistent and more efficient than those obtained using the OLS method. 
4.4! Results and Analysis 
4.4.1! Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics, provided in Table 4.1, for all our variables in Model 1 show that the 
mean of COE is equal to 5%, which is consistent with the prior literature (El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Ferris et al., 2017). The mean value of iCarbon is 0.51, which indicates that firms’ use 
of iCarbon is not high. The natural logarithm of firm size (SIZE) has a mean equal to 21.147, 
######################################## ####################
20 Our results show the existence of a heteroscedasticity problem; the Breusch-Pagan test is significant with p-
value = 0.000. 
21 The partial-R2 is equal to 0.844, with an F-statistic higher than the critical value (Staiger and Stock, 1997). The 
Durbin Wu-Hausman test shows a P-value of 0.87, suggesting that endogeneity is not an issue. The Sargan test 
for over-identification is insignificant with a P-value equal to 0.4736. 
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which is equivalent to an unreported mean of firm value equal to 9144.414 million dollars. 
The mean and median values of BTM are equal to 0.424 and 0.347, respectively. On average, 
firms in our sample have leverage equivalent to 15%. The medians of DISP, BETA and LTG 
are 0.081, 1.029 and 0.15, respectively. 
!
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for COE, iCarbon and control variables 
Regarding news coverage of carbon information, on average, a natural logarithm of 0.77 
news articles is issued regarding firms. Furthermore, the table shows that institutional 
investors own a high proportion in terms of the mean and median of the sample. It also 
appears that the mean of earnings surprise is negative (-0.334), whereas the median is 
positive (0.031). Accordingly, approximately 18% of our sample report negative earnings. 
Our sample also shows that 78% of firms’ board directors are independent and that a small 
number of firms have an environmental committee and participate in the CDP, with a mean 
 Variables N Mean Med Min Max SD 
COE 1737 0.052 0.045 0.00 0.172 0.035 
iCarbon 1737 0.509 0 0 111 3.522 
SIZE 1732 21.147 20.968 17.009 27.163 1.715 
BTM 1732 0.424 0.347 -0.006 1.755 0.314 
LEV 1736 0.15 0.082 0 0.8 0.172 
DISP 1588 0.131 0.081 0.017 0.926 0.157 
BETA 1600 1.055 1.029 -2.075 3.879 0.563 
LTG 1737 0.2 0.15 -1.162 0.847 0.134 
CD_NEWS 1737 0.770 0 0 3.367 1.061 
INSTOWN 1490 0.863 0.920 0.00 1.707 0.260 
SURP 1703 -0.334 0.031 -85.714 42.446 7.962 
LOSS 1737 0.176 0 0 1 0.381 
INDEPENT 1625 0.781 0.818 0.143 1 0.122 
ENV_COMM
ITEE 1400 0.014 0 0 1 0.119 
CDP 1737 0.22 0 0 1 0.417 
AGE 1737 21.33 18 0 78 16.66 
EPA 1737 0.324 0 0 1 0.468 
TECH_FIRM
S 1737 0.482 0 0 1 0.500 
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for COE, iCarbon and control variables for nonfinancial 
NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for variables 
descriptions and measurements. This table shows variables’ observations number (N), values of mean 
(Mean), median (Med), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) and standard deviation (SD). We use 
winsorizing percentiles level of 2.5th to 97.5th to control for outliers.'
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value of 0.014 and 0.22, respectively. The mean (median) of firm age (AGE) is 21.33 (18) 
years.  
The Spearman and Pearson correlation matrix between the dependent, independent and 
control variables at the 10% significance level are presented in Table 4.2. The correlation 
matrix shows a negative correlation between the COE and iCarbon. This finding provides 
initial evidence that higher iCarbon use reduces the COE, which is consistent with our 
hypothesis. Larger firms tend to have a lower COE. The results also show that higher BTM, 
LEV, DISP, BETA LTG and LOSS increase the COE, while INSTOWN, SURP and 
BOD_IND reduce the COE. Additionally, our results show that loss-making firms have 
higher equity financing. In short, these results are consistent with the view that the COE is 
lower for firms with less uncertainty and a richer information environment. Consistently, 
participation in the CDP reduces the COE. However, the positive association between 
iCarbon and SIZE indicates that larger firms use iCarbon more, which is consistent with 
prior findings (Weinhofer and Hoffmann, 2010; Lee, 2012). Our results show that iCarbon is 
positively correlated with DISP and CD_NEWS. Firms that have negative earnings are less 
likely to use iCarbon. Conversely, higher BOD_INDP leads to increased use of iCarbon. 
Consistently, firms that participate in the CDP disseminate more carbon-related information 
on Twitter. Overall, the correlation matrix and unreported variance inflation factor (VIF) tests 
indicate that multicollinearity is not an issue across our empirical models.
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CDP AGE EPA TECH_FIRMS 
COE 1 -0.06** -0.24*** 0.37*** 0.1*** 0.06* 0.11*** -0.03 0.03 -0.1*** 0.02 0.06* 0.00 -0.004 0.013 0.03 0.026 -0.2*** 
iCarbon -0.01 1 0.24*** -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.01 -0.07** 0.28*** -0.02 -0.05 -0.07** 0.11*** 0.02 0.16*** 0.004 0.030 0.01 
SIZE -0.29*** 0.14*** 1 -0.38*** 0.16*** 0.2*** -0.01 -0.19*** 0.47*** 0.15*** -0.15*** -0.2*** 0.08** -0.1*** 0.30*** 0.24*** -0.06** 0.08*** 
BTM 0.38*** -0.02 -0.44*** 1 0.00 0.07** 0.1*** -0.2*** -0.01 -0.06* 0.15*** 0.11*** -0.06* 0.08*** 0.012 0.01 0.14*** 0.05* 
LEV 0.09*** 0.03 0.15*** -0.06** 1 0.11*** -0.03 -0.2*** 0.10*** 0.05 -0.06** 0.02 0.10*** -0.08** 0.11*** 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
DISP 0.05** 0.1*** 0.29*** -0.05* 0.06** 1 0.11*** -0.03 0.21*** 0.10*** 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.006 0.046 0.04 0.18*** -0.01 
BETA 0.15*** 0.02 -0.03 0.09*** -0.04 0.06** 1 0.07** 0.15*** -0.02 0.08** 0.08** 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.08** 0.18*** 
LTG 0.24*** 0.002 -0.18*** -0.05** -0.08*** 0.09*** 0.05** 1 -0.08** -0.03 0.07** 0.15*** -0.04 -0.04 -0.19*** -0.3*** 0.03 0.03 
CD_NEWS 0.01 0.22*** 0.47*** -0.04* 0.06*** 0.23*** 0.08*** -0.09*** 1 -0.06** -0.05 -0.01 0.11*** -0.05* 0.31*** 0.1*** 0.05 0.06** 
INSTOWN -0.17*** -0.06** 0.24*** -0.1*** 0.07*** -0.00 -0.03 -0.13*** 0.01 1 -0.1*** -0.06** 0.18*** -0.01 0.002 -0.02 0.00 0.01 
SURP -0.11*** 0.000 0.09*** -0.04* -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06** -0.00 0.09*** 1 0.08** -0.05 -0.01 -0.07** -0.1*** -0.01 0.11*** 
LOSS 0.17*** -0.04* -0.27*** 0.16*** 0.01 0.01 0.08*** 0.21*** -0.03 -0.1*** -0.2*** 1 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.2*** 0.03 0.12*** 
INDEPEN
T -0.06** 0.08*** 0.09*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.04* 0.04* 0.18*** 0.03 -0.03 1 -0.03 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.03 0.00 
ENV_COM
MITEE -0.01 0.00 -0.04* 0.05* -0.06** -0.03 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 1 -0.01 -0.02 0.09*** 0.06** 
CDP -0.04* 0.06*** 0.38*** -0.07*** 0.02 0.06** -0.01 -0.13*** 0.3*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.06*** 0.1*** 0.02 1 0.2*** -0.02 0.08*** 
AGE -0.02 0.002 0.2*** 0.05* -0.03 0.02 -0.1*** -0.2*** 0.1*** -0.01 -0.007 -0.15*** 0.1*** -0.02 0.14*** 1 -0.06* -0.1*** 
EPA -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.05** -0.07*** 0.15*** 0.06** 0.03 0.04* 0.05* 0.01 0.010 0.06** 0.1*** 0.00 -0.04* 1 -0.01 
TECH_FIR
MS -0.15*** -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.10*** -0.05* 0.14*** 0.04* 0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.03 0.06** -0.2*** -0.05** 1 
Notes: The table shows the Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix between COE, iCarbon and control variables for nonfinancial NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period 
from 2009 to 2015.  See Appendix (B and C) for variables descriptions and measurements. ***, **, * signify the significant of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 4.2: Pearson and Spearman correlations for the COE, iCarbon and control variables 
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4.4.2! Empirical results 
Table 4.3 reports the results of both the OLS and 2SLS estimation models for testing our 
hypothesis, identifying the possible negative significant impact of iCarbon on the COE. The 
results show significant negative coefficients between iCarbon and the COE for both models 
(p < 0.05) in columns 1 and 2. These findings imply that a managerial decision to disseminate 
carbon-related information (iCarbon) on Twitter reduces the COE. Such an improvement in 
information dissemination allows many investors to receive information in a timely and 
efficient manner, resulting in lower uncertainty in evaluating a firm’s future cash flows and a 
better assessment of a firm’s risks. Therefore, firms’ decision to disseminate and broaden 
carbon information provides benefits for both firm management and investors. First, this 
dissemination and broadening allow managers to mitigate information asymmetry and 
improve legitimacy and investor recognition. Second, this dissemination and broadening 
enables investors to acquire firm information at a lower acquisition cost and estimate firms’ 
potential risks. Even though these tweets are short, providing less comprehensive 
information, the dissemination role of carbon information on Twitter, apart from disclosure, 
has a negative impact on the COE.  
The findings also indicate a significant negative association for SIZE and positive 
associations for BTM, LEV, BETA and LTG. These results suggest that the market perceives 
firms that are small in size or have a high growth rate, financial leverage or systematic risk to 
be high-risk firms and thus should offer a higher required rate of return (COE). The negative 
coefficient of INSTOWN suggests that greater institutional ownership enhances a firm’s 
information environment, which reduces uncertainty and thus also reduces the COE. 
Furthermore, the nature of the industry may have a differing effect on the COE (Fama and 
French, 1997). Our results show that technology firms (TECH_FIRM) tend to have a lower 
COE. These firms face greater demand for information, which motivates them to provide 
more information through disclosure (Kothari, 2000). Previous studies have found that firms 
that belong to this industry and use Twitter to disseminate corporate information reduce 
information asymmetry and improve market liquidity (Blankespoor et al., 2014), which, in 
turn, reduces the COE. The regression models have R2 equal to 0.37, indicating that our 
models explain 37% of the variance in the COE. This result is consistent with the previous 
literature (e.g. El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cao et al., 2015; Breuer et al., 2018), although smaller 
R2 is not uncommon in the field of social sciences (Wooldridge, 2015). Overall, the results 
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indicate that iCarbon helps to reduce equity financing. This finding may help managers to 
consider using iCarbon strategically as part of their voluntary disclosure policy to gain 
legitimacy among stakeholders. This evidence also provides insight into the importance of 
social media, particularly Twitter, as a communication channel to connect with various 
investors. This mechanism is expected to reduce information asymmetry, improve 





 (OLS) (2SLS) 
   
iCarbon -0.0003** -0.0003** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) 
SIZE -0.0028*** -0.0028*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0395*** 0.0401*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0052) 
LEV 0.0253*** 0.0204*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0065) 
DISP 0.014 0.0156 
 (0.0107) (0.0113) 
BETA 0.0062*** 0.0054*** 
 (0.002) (0.0021) 
LTG 0.0572*** 0.05*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0176) 
CD_NEWS 0.0024 0.003* 
 (0.0015) (0.0016) 
INSTOWN -0.0115* -0.0082 
 (0.0059) (0.0061) 
SURP -0.0003 -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LOSS 0.0028 0.0025 
 (0.0037) (0.0039) 
INDEPENT 0.0132 0.0116 
 (0.0115) (0.0124) 
ENV_COMMITEE -0.0033 -0.0049 
 (0.0078) (0.008) 
CDP 0.0044 0.0054* 
 (0.0028) (0.0029) 
AGE 0.00001 0.00001 
 (0.00006) (0.00006) 
EPA 0.001 0.0009 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) 
TECH_FIRM -0.0127*** -0.0111*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0025) 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
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Constant 0.0722*** 0.0822*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0250) 
Observations 936 839 
R2 0.372 0.369 
Notes: The table presents the results of the impact of iCarbon on COE. The sample comprises of nonfinancial 
NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for variables 
descriptions and measurements. Column (1) presents the regression findings from pooled regression (OLS) clustered 
at the firm level. Column (2) presents the regression findings from the second stage of two stage least square (2SLS) 
model clustered at firm level. ***, **, * present the statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In 
parentheses, robust standard errors are presented. 
Table 4.3: The impact of iCarbon on cost of equity (COE) 
4.4.3! Additional Analyses 
4.4.3.1! The effect of Bloomberg's environmental (ENV) and environmental-social-
governance (ESG) disclosure 
We further address whether a firm’s level of environmental disclosure would affect the 
association between iCarbon and the COE. Firms that are more socially responsible have 
more incentives to disclose and engage in environmental activities and practices (Harjoto and 
Jo, 2015). These firms are motivated to maintain and improve their public images by 
generating positive media coverage, which, in turn, improves firm value and decreases the 
COE (Cahan et al., 2015; Fatemi et al., 2018). That is, investor preference for 
environmentally friendly firms can lead to a lower investor base that is willing to buy and 
hold shares in polluting firms. This preference reduces risk sharing and thus increases firms’ 
equity financing, creating environmental costs for firm managers (Merton, 1987; Heinkel et 
al., 2001; Chava, 2014). Accordingly, poor environmental performance induces lower 
demand by institutional investors and less ‘loan syndicate’ participation by banks (Hsu and 
Wang, 2013; Chava, 2014). These studies show that firms should consider the benefits of 
environmental information to reduce their equity financing. Accordingly, firms with different 
levels of environmental performance induce different behaviours towards using 
communication channels to respond to environmental issues and concerns (de Villiers and 
Van Staden, 2011). As such, firms with better environmental performance promote more 
voluntary climate change disclosure (Dawkins and Fraas, 2011). We therefore expect firms 
with a higher environmental disclosure score to use iCarbon. Hence, we address whether a 
firm’s disclosure score of environmental reporting would affect our main findings. 
We use Bloomberg for firm environmental disclosure score (ENV_SCORE). ENV_SCORE 
reflect the amount of environmental reports that available to the public. This variable 
incorporates data from many sources, including annual reports, the CDP, firms’ websites and 
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CSR reports, generating a comprehensive score for firm disclosure. This score is estimated in 
terms of both industry relevance and data availability, starting from 0.1 for low-disclosing 
firms and continuing up to 100 for high-disclosing firms. The weighting system takes into 
account the importance of each category, making a category such as greenhouse gas 
emissions carry greater weight than other disclosure items. Weighting each data point in 
terms of its importance makes the disclosure score reflect both the quality and quantity of 
disclosure (Qiu et al., 2016; Bernardi and Stark, 2018). We address this issue by including 
the environmental score (ENV_SCORE) and the interaction between iCarbon and the 
environmental score (iCarbon * ENV_SCORE) in Model 2. In the 2nd equation, the 
interaction term between iCarbon and ENV is added to examine whether the effect of 
disseminating information through Twitter on the firm’s COE is independent of the ENV 
score of the firm. Since firms have already exhibited a good reputation in their environmental 
performances, this effect may have been well-reflected and acknowledged by the investors, 
i.e. through a lower COE. Therefore, the dissemination of carbon-related information through 
Twitter may lose its impact on COE to a certain extent. Therefore, the 2nd equation addresses 
whether the ENV score may impact the influence of iCarbon on COE. 
We also examine a broader aspect of a firm’s disclosure than simply environmental reporting 
by taking into account two components of sustainability reporting in addition to 
environmental disclosure: social and governance disclosures. In this section, we address 
whether a firm’s disclosure score of ESG disclosure would also influence the association 
between iCarbon and the COE. The combination of all ESG dimensions enables many 
investors to evaluate a firm’s risks, opportunities and transparency, which in turn improves 
firm value and reduces the COE (Ng and Rezaee, 2015; Yu et al., 2018). Such an effect is 
more pronounced for lower-ESG-disclosure-performing firms than for higher-ESG-
disclosure-performing firms (Crifo et al., 2015). However, firms with better ESG disclosure 
have better interaction and communication with stakeholders (Eccles et al., 2014). These 
firms are likely to disclose their ESG activities and initiatives to signal and differentiate 
themselves in the capital market from those with lower ESG disclosure ratings (Crifo et al., 
2015). We therefore expect firms with better ESG disclosure scores to strategically use 
iCarbon more than those with lower ESG disclosure scores. ESG score reflect the amount of 
environmental, social and governance reports that available to the public.22 Therefore, we 
######################################## ####################
22 We use the Bloomberg database to obtain the ESG disclosure score, which reflects a firm’s social, 
environmental and governance data that are available to the public from corporate websites, press releases, 
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investigate whether the ESG disclosure score (ESG_SCORE) would moderate the association 
between iCarbon and the COE. To examine this influence, we include ESG_SCORE and its 
interaction with iCarbon (iCarbon * ESG_SCORE) in Model 3. In the 3rd equation, the 
interaction term between iCarbon and ESG is included in the additional analysis to further 
examine whether the effect of dissemination information through Twitter on the firm’s COE 
is independent of the ESG score of firm. It has been documented that firms with good ESG 
score are more inclined to disseminate more information and hence, contribute to lowering 
the firm’s COE. Therefore, iCarbon may lose its influence on COE. As such, additional 
analysis overall can provide further insights into the effects of Twitter dissemination on COE, 
taking into account firm's ESG score.!
Model 2 and 3 are presented as follow: 
!"#$% = '( +*+!,-./0$% +1'#23_5!"6#$% +7'+!,-./0$% ∗
#23_5!"6#'$% + '9'5:;#$% + '<'=>?$% + '@'A#3 +'B'C:5D$% +
'E'=#>F$% + 'G'A>H$% + '*('!C_2#I5$% '+ '**':25>"I2$% +
'*1'5J6D$% + '*7'A"55$% + '*9'="CKLM$% + '*<'#23NOPPKQQRR$% +
'*@'!CD$% +*B'FH#$% +*E'#DF$% + '*G'>#!S_T:6?$% +
'1( >%
1((G
%U1(*< + 'V$%  
 (2) 
!"#$% = '( +*+!,-./0$% +1'#5H_5!"6#$% '+7'+!,-./0$% ∗ #5HWNOXR +
'9'5:;#$% + '<'=>?$% + '@'A#3 +'B'C:5D$% + 'E'=#>F$% +
'G'A>H$% + '*('!C_2#I5$% '+ '**':25>"I2$% + '*1'5J6D$% +
'*7'A"55$% + '*9'="CKLM$% + '*<'#23NOPPKQQRR$% + '*@'!CD$% +
''*B'FH#$% + '*E'#DF$% + '*G'>#!S_T:6?$% + '1( >%
1((G
%U1(*< + 'V$%  (3) 
The definition of the variables in Models 2 and 3 is as follows: COE is the implied COE. 
iCarbon is the amount of carbon-related information that firms disseminate over Twitter. 
Model 2 includes ENV_SCORE, which represents firms’ environmental reporting score and 
the interaction between iCarbon and ENV_SCORE (iCarbon * ENV_SCORE). However, 
Model 3 includes ESG_SCORE, which represents firms’ environmental, social and 
governance reporting score and the interaction between iCarbon and ENV_ESG (iCarbon * 
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annual reports, sustainability reports and corporate governance reports. The score covers many topics such as 
board structure and independence, human capital, shareholders’ rights and GHG emissions. Such information is 
reflected in the ESG index score to reflect both the amount and importance of information. The score ranges 
from 0.1 to 100, where each data point is weighted in term of its importance and relevance to industry peers.  
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ESG_SCORE). Nevertheless, Model 2 and Model 3 also include other control variables that 
are in Model 1, such as firm size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), financial leverage 
(LEV), analysts forecast dispersion (DISP), beta (BETA), the consensus of long-term growth 
forecast (LTG), carbon related news coverage (CD_NEWS), the proportion of institutional 
ownership (INSTOWN), earning surprise (SURP), dummy variable for loss-making firms 
(LOSS), the percentage of independent directors on the board of directors (BOD_IND), 
indicator for the existence of an environmental committee (ENV_COMMITTEE), CDP 
participation (CDP), firm age (AGE), whether the firm is subject to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and whether the firm is a technology firm (TECH_FIRM). 
We employ OLS regression with a robust standard error cluster at the firm level to estimate 
both Models 2 and 3 and present the results in Table 4.4. In these models, we have centralised 
our explanatory variables (i.e., iCarbon, ENV_SCORE, and ESG_SCORE) and their 
interactions (i.e., iCarbon*ENV_SCORE and iCarbon*ESG_SCORE). The finding from 
Model 2 shows that ENV_SCORE does not affect the association between iCarbon and the 
COE, as the interaction between iCarbon and ENV_SCORE has no significant coefficient 
with the COE. This result means that the number of iCarbon tweets has a direct association 
with the COE, which is not affected by the environmental disclosure score. The result from 
Model 3 shows a similar finding of a negative association for iCarbon on the COE, which is 
consistent with our main findings. The results also show no significant association for the 
interaction iCarbon*ESG_SCORE. 
Similarly, we found no significant association between ESG disclosure and the COE. Overall, 
the findings provide evidence that the association between iCarbon and the COE is not 
affected by either ENV_SCORE or ESG_SCORE. The results support our argument that 
investors appreciate carbon messages and dissemination, which is different from the reporting 
score, and iCarbon has its own equity market consequences, apart from disclosure score. 
 
 Model (2) Model (3) 
 COE COE 
   
iCarbon -0.0005* -0.0013** 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) 
ENV_SCORE 0.00006  
 (0.0002)  
iCarbon * ENV_SCORE 0.00002  
 (0.00002)  
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ESG_SCORE  0.0002 
  (0.0002) 
iCarbon * ESG_SCORE  0.00003 
  (0.00002) 
SIZE 0.0003 -0.0035*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0011) 
BTM 0.0448*** 0.0385*** 
 (0.012) (0.0046) 
LEV 0.0161 0.0249*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0064) 
DISP 0.0195 0.0145 
 (0.0164) (0.0107) 
BETA 0.0032 0.0065*** 
 (0.0047) (0.002) 
LTG 0.0291 0.0594*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0176) 
CD_NEWS -0.0033* 0.0019 
 (0.0018) (0.0015) 
INSTOWN 0.0073 -0.0096 
 (0.0124) (0.0059) 
SURP 0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0033) (0.0002) 
LOSS -0.0052 0.0031 
 (0.0077) (0.0037) 
INDEPENT 0.0101 0.0107 
 (0.0193) (0.0123) 
ENV_COMMITEE  -0.0026 
  (0.0082) 
CDP 0.0005 0.0028 
 (0.0057) (0.0028) 
AGE 0.000006 0.00001 
 (0.0001) (0.00006) 
EPA 0.0009 0.0005 
 (0.0045) (0.0024) 
TECH_FIRM -0.0124*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0024) 
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0229 0.0875*** 
 (0.0568) (0.0261) 
Observations 212 927 
R2 0.335 0.377 
Notes: The table presents the effects of environmental and ESG reporting on the association between iCarbon 
and COE. The sample comprises of nonfinancial NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period for a period 
from 2009 to 2015.See Appendix (B and C) for variables descriptions and measurements. Model (2) presents the 
results after adding environmental reporting (ENV) score and its interaction with iCarbon. Model (3) includes 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) score and its interaction with iCarbon. The coefficient estimates 
are results from pooled regression (OLS) clustered at the firm level. ***, **, * present the statistical significance 
of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In parentheses, robust standard errors are presented. 
 
Table 4.4: The effect of ENV and ESG score 
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4.4.3.2! Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we use different measures for the COE and iCarbon and add different 
sets of control variables to our main Model 1. The results are reported in Table 4.5. We use 
RPEG (Easton, 2004) as an alternative measure of the COE. This measure (RPEG) is estimated 
as the difference between five years median forecast of earnings per share (FEPS5) minus 
four years ahead median forecast of earnings per share (FEPS4) divided by share price at June 
next year. RPEG is considered a reliable measure for the COE and is widely used in the 
literature (Mangena et al., 2016). This measure assumes no dividend pay-out and is 
associated “with firm-specific risk characteristics in a theoretically predictable and stable 
manner” (Botosan et al., 2011, p. 1085). We employ the analysis in our main Model 1 by 
alternatively using RPEG instead of the COE in column 1. The results show consistent 
evidence that iCarbon is negatively associated with the COE, as measured by RPEG. However, 
the increase in the number of observations in Column 1 is due to the use of a different 
dependent variable that is based on Easton’s (2004) model, RPEG, and measured differently 
from COE, which is based on the average of four proxies of COE (RCT, RGLS, ROJ and 
RMPEG). As such, RPEG has more observations (1941) than COE (1737). 
We also use two alternative measures of iCarbon. First, we use the number of iCarbon tweets 
that have a hyperlink. Including a hyperlink allows users to acquire more information by 
following the link (Blankespoor et al., 2014). Second, we use the number of iCarbon tweets 
that have been retweeted. This measure enhances the size of the audience as users share a 
firm’s iCarbon tweets with their followers through the retweet button (Jung et al., 2018b). 
Cade (2018) claim that retweeted messages are considered more valid by investors. These 
features expect to enrich corporate communication with stakeholders through social media 
(Brennan and Merkl-Davies, 2018). We present the results in columns 2 and 3 in Table 4.5. 
The results indicate that tweets with a hyperlink to the full information (iCarbon_Hyperlink) 
or news articles that are diffused to a larger number of users through the retweet feature 
(iCarbon_Retweet) on Twitter are negatively associated with the COE. This finding is 
consistent with our main findings. 
In column 4, we control for multiple variables used in the prior literature (El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Harjoto and Jo, 2015; Lee et al., 2015a; Jung et al., 2018b). We control for the ratio of 
total advertising expenses to total assets (ADVERTISING) and a dummy variable for 
whether a firm’s CEO is younger than the median value of other CEO age (CEOAGE) and 
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the percentage change in sales growth (SALES_GRWOTH). Firms that spend more on 
advertisements and have younger CEOs and high growth rates in sales are expected to adopt 
social media, have Twitter accounts and disclose more announcements on communication 
channels (Lee et al., 2015a; Jung et al., 2018b). We also expect a firm’s valuation to increase 
by generating high sales growth. Additionally, some industries are subject to different 
litigation risks and more potential lawsuits. Hence, we include dummy variables (LITI) for 
firms that operate in high-litigation industries (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). LITI take 1 if the firm 
belong to high litigation industry (SIC 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 5200-5961, 3600-3674, 7370) 
and 0 otherwise. We also control for research and development (R&D) and capital 
expenditure (CAPX). CAPX is measured as the total capital expenditure divided by total 
revenue and R&D equals research and development expenditure divided by total assets. 
Although R&D is an expense that a firm pays, this expense might generate value (Servaes 
and Tamayo, 2013). Furthermore, firms with high growth in sales (SALES_GROWTH, R&D 
and CAPX) are expected to disclose more environmental information (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Harjoto and Jo, 2015). The results in Column 4 show negative associations for 
ADVERTISING and CAPX with the COE. In contrast, DUM_CEO, GROWTH_SALES, 
R&D and LITI have no association with the COE. These findings mitigate any concern 
towards a firm’s willingness to adopt Twitter and disseminating carbon information. 
Finally, we further re-estimate our regression model by using the generalised method of 
moments (GMM).23 We use the GMM model to address the endogeneity problem that may 
affect the interpretation of our association between iCarbon and the COE. Our results in 
column 5 show that iCarbon is significant and negatively associated with the COE. This 
finding is consistent with our main finding. The results for the GMM estimation model show 
that first-order serial correlation (AR(1)) is significant (p = 0.031), rejecting the null 
hypothesis of correlated differences in the residual, whereas the second-order serial 
correlation (AR(2)) is insignificant (p = 0.391), indicating no correlation difference in the 
residual. The results also show that the result of the Hansen test (p = 0.231) is insignificant, 
which validates our instruments to address the over-identification problem. 
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23 This regression model addresses the endogeneity and unobservable variable effects by using a lagged value as 













 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 RPEG COE COE COE COE 
iCarbon -0.0005**   -0.0003* -0.0017* 
 (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.001) 
iCarbon_Http  -0.0005**    
  (0.0002)    
iCarbon_Retweet   -0.0004**   
   (0.0002)   
SIZE -0.0111*** -0.0034** -0.0034** -0.0015 0.004 
 (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0061) 
BTM -0.005 0.0407*** 0.0406*** 0.0501*** 0.0501*** 
 (0.0125) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0064) (0.019) 
LEV -0.0381** 0.0226** 0.0225** 0.0286*** 0.0117 
 (0.0186) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0176) 
DISP 0.0628*** 0.0214 0.0218 -0.0004 0.0006 
 (0.0170) (0.0132) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0238) 
BETA 0.0164** 0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0048* -0.0073 
 (0.0075) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0091) 
LTG 0.0536 0.0495** 0.0495** 0.0684*** 0.0720*** 
 (0.0457) (0.0207) (0.0207) (0.0158) (0.0227) 
CD_NEWS 0.0074** 0.0043** 0.0041** -0.0002 0.0036 
 (0.0033) (0.0019) (0.002) (0.0016) (0.0026) 
INSTOWN -0.0575*** -0.0170** -0.0170** -0.0108 -0.0085 
 (0.0149) (0.0077) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0113) 
SURP -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.00003 -0.0002 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
LOSS 0.0439*** 0.0068 0.0068 -0.0036 0.0007 
 (0.0093) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0058) 
INDEPENT 0.0106 0.0104 0.0100 0.0277* 0.0010 
 (0.0255) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0152) 
ENV_COMMITEE 0.0209 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0011 0.0105 
 (0.0330) (0.011) (0.0108) (0.0121) (0.0098) 
CDP -0.0033 0.0038 0.0037 0.0038 -0.0065 
 (0.0062) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0075) 
AGE -0.00025* -0.00004 -0.00003 0.00005 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00006) (0.0003) 
EPA 0.0038 0.0008 0.0008 0.0066* 0.0008 
 (0.0061) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0032) 
TECH_FIRM -0.0181*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.0116*** -0.0081 
 (0.0058) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0036) (0.0052) 
DUM_CEO    -0.0026  
    (0.0028)  
GROWTH_SALES    -0.0042  
    (0.0082)  
R&D    0.0017  
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    (0.0277)  
CAPX    -0.0613*  
    (0.0351)  
ADVERTISING    -0.0054***  
    (0.0017)  
      
LITI    0.0032  
    (0.0031)  
COEt-1     0.410*** 
     (0.137) 
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Constant 0.378*** 0.0915*** 0.0916*** 0.0218 -0.0686 
 (0.0636) (0.0307) (0.0310) (0.0318) (0.127) 
      
Observations 1,941 561 561 480 461 
R2 0.174 0.414 0.413 0.456  
Notes: The table presents the regression findings from our main Model (1) using alternative measures of COE, 
iCarbon, including additional control variables and using alternative estimation model. The sample comprises 
of nonfinancial NASDAQ firms with Twitter accounts for a period from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and 
C) for variables descriptions and measurements. In column (1) we use RPEG on Model (1) instead of COE. 
Alternative: we use iCarbon with hyperlink in column (2) and iCarbon tweets that are retweeted in column (3) 
instead of iCarbon in Model (1). Column (4) reports the regression after adding many control variables 
(ADVERTISING, CEOAGE, SALES_GROWTH, LITI, R&D and CAPX). Column (5) estimate Model (1) by 
using GMM regression technique and including lagged value of COE (COEt-1). The coefficient estimates are 
results from pooled regression (OLS) clustered at the firm level except for Column (5). ***, **, * present the 
statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In parentheses, robust standard errors are 
presented. 
Table 4.5: Robustness tests for other measurements and additional Variables 
4.5! Conclusion 
This study examined whether a firm’s voluntary dissemination of carbon-related information 
on Twitter influences the COE. Using a sample of non-financial firms with Twitter accounts 
that were listed on NASDAQ throughout the period 2009-2015, we developed a measure of 
carbon information reported via Twitter to reflect the number of firms that decide to 
disseminate carbon-related information in this way and broaden their reach to investors and 
gain legitimacy among stakeholders. The results show that firms disseminating carbon-
related information tend to have a lower COE. This association holds consistently throughout 
alternative estimations and is not affected by either ENV or ESG disclosure score. Overall, 
our results suggest that the increase in a firm’s dissemination of carbon information improves 
investor recognition among many potential investors and environmentally concerned groups, 
reduces information asymmetry between market participants, enables investors to evaluate 
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firms’ potential risk and acquire firm information at lower acquisition costs and allow firms 
to obtain legitimacy for their activity, which in turn reduces the COE. 
This paper provides several implications for market participants, managers and policymakers 
about integrating information technology into their strategic voluntary disclosure policy. Our 
results show the importance of firm managers considering the dissemination of carbon-
related information seriously and the benefit to the COE. As Twitter allows market 
participants to receive firm information in a timely and efficient manner, iCarbon enables 
many market participants to assess a firm’s potential risk and make better investment 
decisions. Additionally, firms should consider using iCarbon to address investors’ concerns 
and information demands and to obtain legitimacy. Our findings suggest that market 
participants incorporate carbon information, in addition to disclosure, that is disseminated on 
Twitter. This evidence prepares regulators to take steps towards encouraging firms to 
disseminate carbon information and providing more guidance on carbon emissions. While 
firms are mandated to report their emissions under EPA regulations, further regulations under 
the Clean Power Plan are under review, and they are expected to be dismantled by President 
Trump, who led the US’s exit from the Paris Agreement on climate change (Davenport and 
Rubin, 2018). The initial plan under Obama’s administration aimed to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 32% by 2030. The Trump administration proposes an easier plan that would cut 
emissions by approximately 0.7% to 1.5%. Our evidence suggests that market participants 
have an interest in climate change reporting, which should encourage regulators to implement 
a more solid plan for climate change. Furthermore, these results show the importance of using 
Twitter as a disclosure channel to communicate with market participants, to attract potential 
investors and to improve information sharing. These benefits are expected to improve firms’ 
information environment and transparency and to reduce the COE. 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of the study, which could open a new avenue 
for future studies. One of the challenges in the study is related to data collection. For 
example, firms’ Twitter accounts and messages are not available on a database and thus they 
have to be collected manually. In addition, tweets are limited to 140 characters, which may 
limit the information provided by firms over Twitter. While the study focuses on firms’ 
Twitter activity, little is known about managers’ Twitter activity with regard to carbon-
related information and its influence on the capital market. In addition, future research also 
can extend the literature by focusing on other social media platforms. Nevertheless, many 
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social media platforms have restricted access to their data, which makes data availability an 
obstacle. While the study does not control for the intensity of carbon emissions due to data 
limitations, future research can give more consideration to explaining the association between 
carbon intensity and firms’ dissemination of carbon- related information over social media. 
While the research focuses on COE capital, future studies can examine the association 
between iCarbon and cost of debt. As the PhD study has time constraints, the research 




















Chapter 5.! Conclusions 
5.1! Introduction 
The traditional disclosure and dissemination channels of information are exposed to 
limitations in providing good coverage of different types of investors, whilst investor demand 
for information continues to increase and become stronger than ever. This triggers the 
importance of exploring a more effective communication channel, which can extend the 
reach of information dissemination to a larger pool of both existing and potential investors. 
The recent development of information technology has introduced Twitter as an information 
medium with which firms can communicate with a wider number of investors. This channel 
has transformed the firm information communication landscape, allowing firms to 
disseminate information directly to investors at lower cost and on a timely basis (Blankespoor 
et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015a). Twitter has become an essential tool for investors to receive 
firm news and advice about potential investments (Cade, 2018). More specifically, firms have 
adopted Twitter and used this channel to communicate with investors and disseminate 
information about the firm (Bartov et al., 2018). This includes using Twitter to disseminate 
financial information (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Bartov et al., 2018; Elliott et al., 2018; Jung 
et al., 2018b).  
Prior literature (Bellucci and Manetti, 2017; Deegan, 2019) suggests that Twitter is an 
effective channel for communicating and engaging with stakeholders and that it can be used 
as a tool for legitimation. Furthermore, Gómez-Carrasco et al. (2020) imply that Twitter 
provides a suitable channel for environmental information. With the increasing use of Twitter 
as an information channel, practitioners and academics have been increasingly interested in 
the value added by corporate social media (Blankespoor et al., 2014; Miller and Skinner, 
2015; Cade, 2018). However, it is still unclear whether firms’ use of Twitter to disseminate 
information has an impact on their equity financing. Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is 
to examine the association between Twitter as a dissemination channel and a firm’s COE.  
Specifically, this thesis focuses on two essential types of information: financial and carbon-
related information. Both financial and carbon-related information attract great interest from 
investors, who assess them in order to evaluate firm risk, firm value and expected return 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2014). The thesis objectives are two-fold: investigating whether a firm’s 
dissemination of (1) financial and (2) carbon-related information through Twitter influences 
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the firm’s COE. At the heart of the investigation is providing a better understanding of the 
benefits of a firm’s dissemination of information through Twitter, and its capital market 
consequences. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the chapter provides a summary of the main 
findings of this thesis. Second, the chapter discusses the implications of the studies. Finally, 
the chapter provides avenues for future research.  
5.2! Findings of the Research 
This section provides a summary of the main findings of the two empirical studies examined 
in this thesis. 
5.2.1! Chapter 3: The effect of Twitter dissemination on cost of equity 
In the recent years, an increase number of firms has begun to use this channel to disseminate 
financial information and reach investors directly and on real time basis (Jung et al., 2018b). 
Accordingly, this study examines the association between firm’s dissemination of financial 
information (iDisc) on Twitter and firm’s COE.  
By using a sample (1,737 firm-year observations) of 584 non-financial firms with Twitter 
accounts that are listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange over the period 2009-2015, the 
study finds significant negative relationship between firm’s dissemination of financial 
information on Twitter (iDisc) and COE. This finding indicates that iDisc help firm to reach 
broad reach of existence and potential investors and lower their COE. The study also finds 
that the association between iDisc and COE is more pronounced for less visible firms that are 
smaller size, have lower analysts following, and have smaller number of shareholders. This 
evidence shows that the benefit of iDisc is greater for firms that face greater need for 
dissemination by gaining larger investor base and hence reducing the COE. The findings also 
show that the negative association between iDisc and COE is presence even after considering 
news magnitude (in term of missing earnings forecast) and tweets content (tone). The study 
also finds consistence results by using alternative measure of iDisc: (i) tweet with hyperlink 
(iDisc_Hyperlink) which allows investors to access more information and (ii) tweets that 
disseminate to larger size of audience (iDisc_Followers). The additional tests also show 
consistence results after using alternative measure for COE and adding more control 
variables. In essence, the finding supports the argument that disseminating financial 
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information over Twitter allow a broader reach of firm information, which, as a result, lower 
the COE. 
5.2.2! Chapter 4: The Effect of carbon dissemination on cost of equity 
The increase demand of climate change and carbon emission information by individuals, 
environmental concerned groups and regulators has leads firms to allocate resources towards 
communicating about carbon related information (Griffin and Sun, 2013). In this regard, 
Twitter provide firms with opportunity to broaden the reach of their information to diverse set 
of audience and investors (Blankespoor, 2018). This channel allows firm to broaden their 
information directly and on timely manner (Jung et al., 2018b). As such, this study examines 
whether firm’s dissemination of carbon related information (iCarbon) over Twitter affect 
firm’s COE. 
Using a sample (1,737 firm-year observations) of 584 non-financial firms with Twitter 
accounts that are listed on the NASDAQ stock exchange over the period 2009-2015, the 
findings of the study show a significant negative association between firm’s dissemination of 
carbon-related information (iCarbon) and firm COE. This finding indicates that disseminating 
of carbon related information through Twitter compensate firms’ managers by reducing the 
COE. The study also confirms that the negative association between iCarbon and COE is not 
affected by firms environmental (ENV) and/or social and governance (ESG) reporting scores. 
That is, firms with higher ENV or ESG may be motivated to use iCarbon more. These results 
imply that dissemination has its own influence on COE, which is not affected by either firm 
ENV or ESG reporting score. The sensitivity test shows consistent results across different 
measures of COE and iCarbon, and across different models with different sets of controlling 
variables. Overall, the results provide evidence that the dissemination of carbon-related 
information through Twitter assists many potential investors to learn about firm carbon 
information, and hence, reduces the gap between informed and uninformed investors. The 
efforts of firms in using Twitter to gain legitimacy among stakeholders, reduce investor 
acquisition cost of information and improve investor awareness of firms are compensated by 
the lowering of the COE. 
In conclusion, the thesis found that dissemination of both financial and carbon information 
reduces a firm’s equity financing. This thesis contributes to recent literature on firms’ use of 
Twitter to disseminate financial information (e.g. Blankespoor et al., 2014; Jung et al., 
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2018b) by showing that tweeting financial and carbon information is meaningful and 
beneficial to investors, as well as firms, by reducing the COE. 
5.3! Implication of the Research 
The findings of this thesis provide several practical implications for firm managers, market 
participants and regulators, specifically with the recommendation of adopting Twitter for 
corporate dissemination practices. As the relevance of Twitter to investors has grown in the 
last decade, firms need to know the value of using this channel for dissemination purposes, 
and its relevance to firm communication policy. The thesis also sheds light on the role of 
dissemination to impact the COE. Accordingly, this thesis encourages firm managers to adopt 
Twitter as a dissemination channel for both financial and carbon-related information.  
The findings of the thesis show that firm dissemination of financial and carbon-related 
information via Twitter can broaden the reach of this information to current and potential 
investors, including environmental concern groups. This should increase firms’ investor base. 
This evidence should provide incentives for firm managers to actively engage in Twitter with 
both current and potential investors to attract their attention to the firm. 
The thesis implies that firms’ dissemination of financial information on Twitter provides real 
economic benefit to firms by reducing the COE, which encourages firms to consider the 
beneficial role of financial dissemination practices. In addition, the findings of the first study 
show greater benefits for firms with a lower degree of visibility. This finding suggests that 
managers of less visible firms should disseminate more financial information on Twitter to 
enhance their investor base, and reduce investor acquisition costs of information.  
Regarding the findings of the second study specifically, firm managers’ special attention may 
be drawn to the dissemination of non-financial information, particularly carbon-related 
information. Investors now care more about climate change and carbon emission-related 
information, which makes broader dissemination of carbon information essential. The 
dissemination of such information allows firms to gain legitimacy among shareholder. 
Furthermore, because of increasing concerns of investors about global warming and climate 
change, investors may consider not investing in firms that are environmentally irresponsible. 
The disseminating of carbon information allows firms to broaden the reach of their carbon-
related information to investors, which allows them to enhance the firm’s investor base, in 
112#
#
turn leading to a lower COE. Therefore, firm managers should consider adopting Twitter to 
disseminate carbon information to investors, as it decreases firm COE.  
The thesis shed light on the influence of firms’ dissemination of financial and carbon-related 
information over Twitter; it enhances the transparency and firm information environment to 
satisfy investors’ need for information. The decision to disseminate over Twitter should 
provide an understanding for both regulators and investors about the reasons behind the 
firm’s adoption of Twitter and the extent to which this channel is used to dissemination 
financial and non-financial information. In addition, firms’ dissemination of financial and 
carbon-related information over Twitter increases investor awareness of firm news and 
allows them to receive firm information at a lower acquisition cost. This should assist 
investors to make better investment decisions by lowering the uncertainty of future cash flow 
and information asymmetry. Furthermore, regulators usually attempt to improve the 
availability of information to investors. Therefore, they should take into the consideration the 
benefits that Twitter provides for less-informed investors by allowing them to receive firm 
information on a real-time basis and to reduce their acquisition cost of information. 
Policymakers usually refer to lowering firm risk, uncertainty, and COE as incentives to 
improve reporting practices (Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017). This thesis provides policymakers 
with a greater understanding of the association between disseminating financial and carbon-
related information over Twitter and firm COE. In particular, it reveals the value added by 
and benefits of using social media as a dissemination channel to improve the firm information 
environment and transparency. This encourages firm managers to create new roles and 
policies to enhance the broadness of their information through social media at lower cost. In 
addition, the findings of the second empirical study encourage regulators, authorities and 
government policymakers to implement more guidance and planning regarding carbon 
emissions and climate change, and to consider the associated benefits. The Trump 
administration has proposed an easy Clean Power Plan that would cut approximately 0.7 to 
1.5% of carbon emissions by 2030. This plan initially aimed to reduce emissions by 32% 
under the Obama administration. The findings of the second empirical chapter show that 
investors care about these issues, and firms with more effective information sharing have a 
lower COE. Hence, the study recommends the development of a more effective plan to 
address climate change and carbon emissions.  
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In addition, firm use of Twitter to disseminate carbon-related information provides a signal 
for regulators that firms address the potential risks of climate change and take this matter 
seriously. As such, regulators should take more actions to reduce the impact of firms on our 
environment. It is also important for regulators to take more actions to ensure that firms 
report carbon-related information. This should enhance the transparency of firm information. 
Regulators should also consider developing suitable mandatory rules in case firms fail to 
provide transparent and reliable information. 
Generally, the findings of both studies imply that dissemination of financial and carbon 
information is useful for firms in enriching the broadness of firm news, hence, decreasing the 
expected rate of return compensated by investors, by meeting their demand for information 
and reaching a broad set of current and potential investors. Diffusing more carbon related 
information should help firms to gain legitimacy among their shareholder. Overall, the 
implications of the thesis suggest that firms’ dissemination over Twitter can be an important 
influence on the COE with regard to financial and carbon related information.  
5.4! Limitation and Recommendation for Further Research 
The thesis provides several avenues for future research to extend the literature and address 
the limitations of the study. While this study has focused on firm Twitter activity, future 
research can focus on how this activity could motivate investors to interact and respond to 
firm information. Specifically, more focus can be placed on investors’ perceptions of firm 
disseminated information on Twitter by investigating users’ replies and comments. Users can 
share their concerns about firms’ intended messages to the public. The broadness of these 
concerns may dilute or destroy firm messages, and can also facilitate negative perceptions of 
the firms. Therefore, firm failure to address and control these concerns over Twitter may lead 
to unpleasant consequences for firm reputation and value (Lee et al., 2015a; Cade, 2018). 
Future studies may also investigate how managers respond to positive and negative 
comments about financial information. Future research can show greater consideration to 
understanding management strategy towards answering investor concerns and comments, as 
in the case of climate change and carbon emission issues. Hence, it may be worth 
investigating how firm management can attenuate the market reaction to climate change 
issues on Twitter by addressing investor concerns and replying to their comments.  
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The thesis focused on two types of information related to financial and carbon information on 
Twitter. Due to the time limitation of the PhD programme, further research might consider 
other types of corporate information, such as CSR and/or other interactive social media 
channels, such as Facebook. In addition, recently Twitter announced a new limit for 
messages, increasing the maximum length from 140 to 280 characters (Rosen, 2017). Future 
research could examine whether Twitter design influences firm participation and activity. 
Additionally, further research could examine whether allowing more characters would result 
in different capital market consequences.  
Current research is limited to a sample of non-financial firms on the NASDAQ stock 
exchange. Further research can extend this study to other financial markets, where investors 
suffer from a low transparency level. Furthermore, the study has focused on the influence on 
COE, while further research may examine the effect of firms’ dissemination of financial and 
carbon-related information over Twitter on the cost of debt – where debtholders have a 
different payoff function than equity holders. 
Besides, instead of implementing words and phrases matching to quantify the number of 
iDisc and iCarbon tweets, as per this thesis, further research can also use machine learning 
techniques and methodology, such as the naïve Bayesian learning algorithm. Although this 
methodology is widely used in the literature, it is time-consuming, costly and difficult to 
replicate (e.g. Das and Chen, 2007; Li, 2010b; Kearney and Liu, 2014; Sprenger et al., 2014; 
Ahmed and Elshandidy, 2016). While the first study examined the effect of tone, future 
research can give more consideration to other tweet sentiment, such as examining the effect 
of negative and positive words separately, as negative words may have more prominent 
effects than positive words (Tetlock, 2007; Garcia, 2013; Loughran and McDonald, 2015; 
Loughran and McDonald, 2016). However, the second empirical study did not control for the 
level of carbon emissions produced by firms (the intensity of carbon emissions), due to data 
limitation. In this regard, future research can give more consideration and attention to firm 







Appendix A: Sample of iDisc Tweets 
@CommScope: #ICYMI: CommScope reports strong third quarter 2014 #financial results. 
Click here to read our official #pressrelease http://ow.ly/DCnJ1  
@CommScope: ICYMI: Our 2014 #annualreport and Form 10-K are available for download. 
Learn more by reading this blog http://ow.ly/KNVrV  
@Cognizant: Cognizant reports #Q4FY15, FY’15 results; annual revenue of $12.42 bn, up 
21% YoY http://cogniz.at/Q4FY15  
@Cognizant: “During the quarter we added approximately 11,800 employees, including 
approximately 3,770 associates from the acquisition of #TriZetto," 
@Comcast: #Comcast Reports 3rd Quarter 2015 Results #earnings http://ow.ly/TTlW0  
@CAinc: CEO gregoire: "although we saw a decline in q3 sales, we are on track for the full 
year." http://bit.ly/1c5s8w2 #earnings 
@CAinc: CEO gregoire: "q3 fy15 total revenue $1.091b compared with $1.128b last year." 
http://bit.ly/1c5s8w2  #earnings 
@Intuit: $INTU announced Q4 & FY’15 earnings results. @QuickBooks Online Grew 57% 
to 1,075,000 Subscribers. http://intuit.me/1NIaXxw  
@Intuit: $INTU announced Q2 FY’15 earnings results. Highlights here: 
http://intuit.me/1BrBRHm  
@Intuit: $INTU ongoing acceleration to the cloud delivered revenue of $672M, up 8% in Q1 
FY15. http://intuit.me/1yYtpKB  
@Seagate: Seagate Technology Provides Preliminary Fiscal Second Quarter 2012 Financial 
Results http://ow.ly/8its5  
@Seagate: Seagate Technology PLC Declares Quarterly Cash Dividend And Provides 
Update On Fiscal Third Quarter Results http://ow.ly/4vzbW 
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@MSFTnews: Microsoft increases quarterly dividend by 22%; announces $40 billion share 
repurchase http://spr.ly/6016wssk  
@MSFTnews: Microsoft reports record $0.77 earnings per share in Q2; Holiday sales & 
business demand drive revenue http://bit.ly/gUvn6G 
@MarriottIntl: Statement by Marriott International, Inc. regarding proposed Starwood 
Merger Acquisition 
@ExtremeNetworks: Extreme Networks Reports Fourth Quarter and Fiscal Year 2012 
Financial Results: SANTA CLARA, CA http://yhoo.it/QsXSvV  #ITNews #SDN 
@Adobe: Just announced: Our Record Revenue in Q1 Fiscal 2011: http://adobe.ly/gHyXtk 
@eBayNewsroom: Return on invested capital was 25.3% - a slight decline due to the 
acquisition of @gsicommerce http://cmp.ly/f/wwkkw2 
@eBayNewsroom: $EBAY repurchased approx 13.6 million shares http://cmp.ly/f/mohjd5 
@intelnews: Intel declares quarterly cash dividend http://intel.ly/nnx2pn 
@intelnews: Intel declares quarterly cash dividend, authorizes additional $10 billion for share 
repurchases http://intel.ly/hrxui0 
@intelnews: Intel reports record financial results for year and fourth quarter: 
http://intel.ly/ekbzty 
@AdvEnergy: Advanced energy announces strong growth and profitability in fourth quarter 
results http://www.aei.com/en/news_2010_02_16.html 
@AdvEnergy: AE announces 45.5% sequential revenue growth in third quarter 2009 results 
http://bit.ly/awakc 
@Acxiom: Our fourth quarter & fiscal year results have been announced- us marketing & 
data services revenue up 4 percent http://bit.ly/16ap5c0 $acxm 
@Acxiom: Acxiom announces first quarter results - diluted earnings per share up 31%, 
income from operations up 23% http://bit.ly/m1ur43 $acxm 
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Appendix B: Variables Definition and Measurements for the Whole Thesis: 








RPEG5-4 Easton (2004) Price 





Pt = share price as of June next year 










iCarbon_Hyperlink Firm's carbon-related 
Tweets with hyperlink 
The number of carbon-related tweets 




iCarbon_Retweet Firm's carbon-related 
Tweets that are 
retweeted 
The number of carbon-related tweets 








iDisc_Hyperlink Firm's financial Tweets with hyperlink 
Natural logarithm of one plus the 












ACCRUAL Discretionary accruals The difference between discretionary 
accruals based on Jones model and 
firm’s corresponding discretionary 
accruals 
Bloomberg 
ADVERTISING Advertising intensity Total advertising expenses divided by 
total revenue 
Bloomberg 
AGE Firm age The number of years since the firm is listed CRSP 
ANALYST Analyst following Natural log of number of analysts 
making an earnings forecast 
Bloomberg 
BETA Firm beta 
Beta coefficient of market model using 
60 with at least 24 months stock and 
market return 
Bloomberg 
BOD_IND Board Independence  The percentage of independent directors in the board Bloomberg 
BTM Book value to market ratio Book to market value ratio Bloomberg 





CD_NEWS News coverage Natural logarithm of number of carbon-related news articles LexisNexis 
CDP CDP participation 
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if a firm participate and report to CDP 
and 0 otherwise 
Bloomberg 
CEOAGE CEO age Dummy variable that takes 1 if CEO age 
is under the median value of other CEO 
age and 0 otherwise 
DataStream 
DISP Analysts' forecast dispersion 
Standard deviation of one-year 
consensus EPS forecast Bloomberg 
ENV_COMMITTEE Environmental Committee  
Dummy variable that takes a value of 1 
if a firm has an environmental 




Disclosure score of the amount of 
environmental reports that available to 
the public 
Bloomberg 
EPA EPA industry rules 
Dummy variable that take a value of 1 if 
the firm belong to industry under GHG 
Mandatory Reporting Regulation and 0 
otherwise  
Manually 
ESG_SCORE Environmental, social 
and governance 
reporting score 
Disclosure score of the amount of 
environmental, social and governance 
reports that available to the public 
Bloomberg 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership The percentage of firm’s shares owned by institutions Bloomberg 
LEV Financial leverage Long-term debt to equity market value ratio Bloomberg 
LITI Litigation Dummy variable that take 1 if the firm 
belong to high litigation industry (SIC 
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 5200-5961, 
3600-3674, 7370) and 0 otherwise 
Manually 
LNOWN Number of investors Natural logarithm of number of 
shareholders  
Bloomberg 
LOSS Negative earnings 
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 
if a firm reports negative earnings and 0 
otherwise 
Bloomberg 
LTG The consensus long term growth forecast 
The mean of long-term growth rate of 
earnings forecast or two minus one year 
ahead average EPS forecast scaled by 
one year ahead average EPS forecast 
Bloomberg 
MMT(12) Price momentum Compounded rate of return of the 
previous 12 months 
Manually 
computed 
MMT(6) Price momentum Compounded rate of return of the 
previous 6 months 
Manually 
computed 
NegSURP Negative earnings 
surprise 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if earning 
surprise is below zero and 0 otherwise 
Manually 
computed 
NEWS News coverage Natural logarithm of number of news articles about the firm LexisNexis 
R&D Research and 
development 
Research and development expenditure 
divided by total assets 
Bloomberg 
ROA Return on assets 
Income before extraordinary items 
divided by book value of assets (total 
common equity) 
Bloomberg 
SALES_GROWTH Sales growth  Sales change from previous year 
divided by total sales of previous year 
Bloomberg 
SILICON Silicon Valley Indicator variable equal to 1 if firm is 





SIZE Firm size Natural logarithm of firm’s equity market value Bloomberg 
SURP Earning surprise Consensus earnings forecast minus firm’s earnings scaled by share price Bloomberg 
|Surp| Absolute earning 
surprise 
Absolute value of the consensus 
earnings forecast for forthcoming fiscal 
year - actual earning / stock price 
Bloomberg 
TECH_FIRM Technology firms 
Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 
if a firm belongs to technology industry 
(SIC 3570-3579, 3610-3699, 7370-
7379, 3810-3849, 4800-4899, 4931, 






































The cost of equity measured by the average of four measures (ROJ, RMPEG, 
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The model measures earnings per share for the next 5 years by using analyst 
forecasts. The forecasted earnings for the 4th and 5th years are estimated by 
the earning forecast of the 3rd year and growth rate of long term earnings. If 
the long-term growth rate is not found, EPSt+2 and PSt+3 are used. The long 
term abnormal earning growth rate is measured as 10 years Treasury bonds 
minus 3%. Clean surplus relation is used to estimate future book value 
(=%]$_* = =% +'#D5%]* −'CD5%]*). Estimating future dividend is 
estimated by multiplying earnings per share by pay-out ratio (CD5%]* =
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The model measures forecasted return on equity by using analyst forecasts 
for the next 3 years. From the 4th year to T number of years, ROE is 
forecasted using linter interpolation to industry median based on 10 years 
historical industry specific ROE. In case the industrial ROE is lower than the 
risk-free rate, Industrial ROE would be replaced with risk free rate (Liu et 
al., 2002). It is also assumed that t = 12, which indicates that ROE remains 
constant afterwards. The research also assumes that firms are classified under 
48 industries as defined by Fama and French (1997). Additionally, the model 
applies a clean surplus to estimate forecasted book values of equity.  
 
Where, 
=%]$_* = =% +'#D5%]* −'CD5%]* 


























Pt = firm price in June in each year 
FEPS=the median of earning forecast per share for the next i year at time t 
FDIV=forecast dividend pay-out ratio equal to' mno
pno
 
DPS=dividend per share  
EPS= earnings per share  
The model assumes positive FEPS but if EPS is negative, FDIV is measured 




























EPS t+1 = The median of earning forecast per share for the next year in June 
DEPS t+1 = Dividend per share for the next Year computed as pay-out ratio 
for firms with positive earning or 6% of ROA 
d1 is the short-term earnings growth rate of EPSt+1 and EPSt+2 or long-term 
growth rate of analysts’ forecasts. This model requires EPSt+1> 0 and EPSt+2> 
















The first model is for the short-term horizon and the second is for the long-
term horizon. 
Pt = = firm price in June of each year, 






Appendix D: Additional Test for Endogeneity 
 (2) (2) 
 2SLS GMM 
   
iDisc -0.0023** -0.0019*** 
 (0.001) (0.0006) 
SIZE -0.0027** 0.0034** 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) 
BTM 0.0401*** 0.0510*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0042) 
LEV 0.0285*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.0061) (0.0053) 
DISP 0.0035 -0.0060 
 (0.0081) (0.0048) 
BETA 0.0063*** 0.0006 
 (0.0018) (0.0015) 
LTG 0.0296*** 0.0432*** 
 (0.0099) (0.0057) 
NEWS 0.0038*** 0.0018 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) 
INSTOWN -0.0042 -0.0068** 
 (0.0053) (0.0033) 
SURP 0.0037** 0.0006 
 (0.0016) (0.0012) 
ROA 0.0341* 0.0079 
 (0.0196) (0.0112) 
COEt-1  0.109*** 
  (0.0281) 
   
Year Effect Yes Yes 
Industry Effect Yes Yes 
Firm Effect Yes No 
Wu-Hausman Test 0.39  
AR(1)  0.038 
AR(2)  0.217 
Hansen Test  0.291 
   
Constant 0.0608*** -0.0709*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0252) 
   
Observations 1,051 553 
R2 0.394  
Notes: The table presents the regression results of the impact of iDisc on COE. The sample consists of 
nonfinancial firms in NASDAQ with Twitter accounts from 2009 to 2015. See Appendix (B and C) for 
definitions of the variables and measurements. Column (1) reports the results from the second stage of the 2SLS 
regression model. Column (2) estimate Model (1) by using GMM regression technique and including lagged 
value of COE (COEt-1). *, **, *** signify the significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix E: Examples of iCarbon tweets: 
@Autodesk: Our carbon footprint is down by 38% since fy2009. more facts here: 
http://autode.sk/1lkvidp  #infographic 
@CSX: CSX was recognized for our commitment to carbon emission reduction by 
@cdproject. read more: http://bit.ly/o3vmjm  
@ICFI: we're pleased to support @epagov as they reduce #GHG emissions & help 
communities become resilient to #climatechange: http://ow.ly/d6bo9  
@MSFTnews: earth day 2012: a progress report - microsoft reduces carbon emissions by 
30%, more updates http://cot.ag/hsfylg  #earthday 2012 
@Cisco: new on the @ciscocsr blog - cisco announces new greenhouse gas reduction goals. 
http://cs.co/6011njit  #csr #climatechange #eco 
@VirginAmerica: 1'st us airline to join the climate registry and will report all GHG 
emissions: http://twurl.nl/mnhjji 
@TetraTech: we are implementing @usaid kazakhstan #climatechange mitigation program to 
reduce ghg emissions and train businesses. http://t.co/x2lcanv0t8 
@YahooInc: showing our commitment to environmental sustainability: @cdp global 500 
#climatechange report 2013 http://t.co/b8vk1vj430 
@Kimball_Intl: kimball office and national office furniture complete carbon disclosure 
project report 
@Brocade: As the fight against climate change continues, we scored a 98 on the latest carbon 
disclosure project: http://gobrcm.com/urb1r  
@Brocade: #broadcom is a part of the carbon disclosure project. full report 
http://gobrcm.com/e3oxs , our details http://gobrcm.com/e3oxt  
@eBayNewsroom: ebay surges in climate counts 3rd annual corporate climate scores report: 
http://bit.ly/4firqd #ebaygreen #ebaynews 
@MGEMadison: Together, #mgegreenbiz partners offset more than 76,000 tons of co2 
emissions per year. full list here: https://www.mge.com/marketplace  
@MDLZ: $MDLZ accelerates action on #climate change with new 2020 global 
#sustainability goals. #call4wellbeing https://t.co/cstwdq6umh 
@Orionlighting: Orion technology has saved customers $500 million and reduced 
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